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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD F. McKEAN, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
MICHAEL W. McBRIDE, ALPINE LTD., 
and FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
INSURANCE CO., GEODYNE II, a Utah 
general partnership, DAN C. SIMONS, 
and ARDEN J. BODELL, 
Defendants/Appellants 
Case No. 920705-CA 
District Court No. C85-4003 
(Priority No. 16) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah Constitution Art. VIII, § 3; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992); and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Did the trial court err in holding that the Assignment executed by Cook, 
Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development on June 12, 1985, was effective to 
assign to McKean any claims that they had against defendants for breach of the 
Contract, even though Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development had 
previously conveyed their interest in the property to Child? 
-1-
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law and this Court need accord no 
deference to the ruling of the lower court, but should review it for correctness. Doelle 
v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Utah 1989). 
B. Did the lower court err in holding that the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
between Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development, as Sellers, and 
Child, as Buyer, was nothing more than an option, which was never exercised? 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law and this Court need accord no 
deference to the ruling of the lower court, but should review it for correctness. Doelle 
v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Utah 1989).1 
C. Did the trial court err in holding that Child had authority to assign 
claims to McKean even though Child was in bankruptcy at the time and even though a 
trustee had been appointed? 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law and this Court need accord no 
deference to the ruling of the lower court, but should review it for correctness. Doelle 
v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Utah 1989). 
D. Did the trial court err in holding that McKean's claims are not barred 
under the doctrines of res judicata based on Child's Third Amended Plan of 
Reorganization, which specifically provided that Child owned all of the Buyer's interest 
under the Alpine Contract and which further provided that Child had forfeited any right 
1
 Although the trial court designated this as a finding of fact, it is in the nature of a 
conclusion of law. This Court should not accord any added deference simply because it 
was denominated as a finding of fact. State v. Rio Vista Oil Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 
(Utah 1990). 
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to receive partial conveyances of property under paragraph 2.6 of the Alpine Contract, 
the exact provision McKean claims was breached? 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law and this Court need accord no 
deference to the ruling of the lower court, but should review it for correctness. Doelle 
v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Utah 1989). 
E. Did the trial court err in holding that McKean's claims against Alpine 
were not barred by the four-year statute of limitations and that the statute of 
limitations was tolled during Myron Child's bankruptcy proceeding? 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law and this Court need accord no 
deference to the ruling of the lower court, but should review it for correctness. Doelle 
v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Utah 1989). 
F. Did the trial court err in holding that McKean's claims against Geodyne 
II, Simons, and Bodell were not barred either by the four or the six year statute of 
limitations, since they were not joined as defendants within six years after the claim 
arose? 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law and this Court need accord no 
deference to the ruling of the lower court, but should review it for correctness. Doelle 
v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Utah 1989). 
G. Did the trial court err in refusing to hold that McKean's claims be 
completely set off against amounts owed by his assignors to Alpine under the Alpine 
Contract (which exceeded the sum of $4 million)? 
-3-
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law and this Court need accord no 
deference to the ruling of the lower court, but should review it for correctness. Doelle 
v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE LEGISLATION 
Determinative statutes are set forth verbatim in the Addendum to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from the lower courfs Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 672-684) and Amended Judgment (R. 685-87)2 awarding 
judgment against defendants in the principal amount of $220,000.00 with prejudgment 
interest in the amount of $265,689.76. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case Below. 
The action was tried before the lower court, sitting without a jury, on March 
7-8, 1991. The court issued a memorandum decision dated June 10, 1991, (R. 579-89) 
and entered its Amended Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and its Amended 
Judgment on September 18, 1991. (R. 672-687.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
A. The Alpine Contract. 
On June 1, 1978, the "New Empire Group" consisting of Myron B. Child, Jr., 
("Child"), Ronald S. Cook ("Cook"), Ray W. Lamoreaux ("Lamoreaux"), Wendell P. 
Hansen ("Hansen"), and New Empire Development Co ("New Empire Development"), 
2
 Copies of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended 
Judgment are appended to this Brief as Exhibits B and C, respectively. 
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collectively entered into a Real Estate Sales Agreement (the "Alpine Contract")3 to 
purchase approximately 4,400 acres located on Traverse Mountain4 from defendant 
McBride. McBride subsequently assigned the Contract to Alpine, Ltd., ("Alpine") which 
assumed the obligations thereunder. Plaintiff Richard McKean ("McKean") was not a 
party to the Alpine Contract. (Finding of Fact No. 9.)5 On November 20, 1978, 
McBride transferred all of his interest as seller under the contract, dated June 1, 1978, 
to Alpine Ltd., a Utah limited partnership. (Findings of Fact Nos. 9-10.) 
B. McKean's payment of the 1979 annual installment due under the 
Alpine Contract. 
Approximately one year later, on June 7, 1979, McKean offered to purchase 
the Traverse Mountain property from the New Empire Group, pursuant to an Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase. (Exhibit 3-P.) On June 25, 1979, the annual 
installment payment of $330,000.00 was due to Alpine under the Alpine Contract. In 
order to prevent a default on the part of the New Empire Group, McKean voluntarily 
made the payment to Alta Title Company, which was the escrow agent for McBride and 
for Alpine. (Findings of Fact Nos. 11-13, 26.) 
At the time that McKean made the payment, he and his lawyer made a 
demand for a release of certain designated parcels of the Traverse Mountain Property 
3
 A copy of the Alpine Contract is appended to this brief as Exhibit D. 
4
 Traverse Mountain is located at the "Point of the Mountain," on the boundary 
between Salt Lake and Utah Counties. 
5
 All references are to the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered 
September 18, 1992. (R. 672-684.) Findings of Fact Nos. 1-24 are based on the 
Stipulation of the Parties. (R. 518-23.) 
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under Paragraph 2.6 of the Alpine Contract, which provided for certain partial releases 
of property on payment of principal. (Findings of Fact Nos. 14, 27.) McKean renewed 
his demands in a letter sent to Alta Title Company dated July 3, 1980. (Finding of Fact 
No. 16.) 
Alpine did not release the property as demanded by McKean nor did it refund 
the money that McKean had paid on behalf of the New Empire Group. Alpine claimed 
that the New Empire Group was in default under the Alpine Contract. The trial court 
resolved this issue against Alpine, finding that the New Empire Group was not in 
material default and that Alpine was not entitled to refuse to release the property to 
them. (Findings, of Fact Nos. 24, 27, 28, 34.) 
C. The sale of the interest of New Empire Development, Cook, 
Lamoreaux, and Hansen to Myron Child. September, 1979. 
On September 20, 1980, New Empire Development, Cook, Lamoreaux, and 
Hansen entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit D-9)6 by which they 
conveyed all of their interest in the Traverse Mountain Property to Myron Child. Under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract, Child agreed to pay to each of Cook, Lamoreaux, and 
Hansen $500,000.00 in consideration, which would be due eighteen months thereafter, 
in March, 1982. (Finding of Fact No. 29; Tr. Vol. I, at 143-45, 148-49, 151-52, 153, 
171, 192; Vol. II, at 333, 336.)7 The trial court characterized the Uniform Real Estate 
8
 A copy of the Uniform Real Estate Contract is appended to this brief as Exhibit E. 
7
 The question was raised at trial whether the Contract (Exhibit D-9) and the 
Assignment (Exhibit D-8) were deposited in an escrow. The court found that the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract and the Assignment were to have been escrowed pending 
Child's payment to Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen. (Finding of Fact No. 29.) Whether 
(continued...) 
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Contract as nothing more than an "option" in Child to purchase the interests of Cook, 
Lamoreaux, and Hansen, which was never exercised. (Finding of Fact No. 29). This 
finding, however, is in the nature of a conclusion of law and should be reviewed as 
such.8 
D. Mvron Child's Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. 
On February 25, 1982, Myron Child filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah.9 In his bankruptcy schedules, 
he claimed to own all of the Traverse Mountain Property10 subject to liens in favor of 
the Alpine, Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen. (Finding of Fact No. 19; Exhibits D-23 and 
7(...continued) 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract was escrowed would have no impact on its 
enforceability. AU of the New Empire Group treated it as a valid contract and expected 
to be paid. Even though Cook and Lamoreaux testified that they had understood that 
the documents would be escrowed, (Tr. Vol. I, at 129-33), they also believed that the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract was valid and enforceable. They expected to be paid the 
amounts due under the contract. (Tr. Vol. I, at 152, 192.) 
8
 The Uniform Real Estate Contract speaks for itself as to its legal meaning and 
effect. Whether or not it constituted an "option" that was never exercised can be 
determined from the plain language of the agreement. Moreover, all of the parties to 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract treated it as a valid and enforceable contract between 
the parties, as did the United States Bankruptcy Court in its Third Amended Plan of 
Reorganization in Myron Child's bankruptcy. (Exhibit D-32, at 4.) 
9
 Child filed bankruptcy approximately one month before his payment was due to 
Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. (Tr. Vol. I, at 
155.) 
10
 The description of the Traverse Mountain property that Child claimed to own on 
his bankruptcy schedule included the property that Richard McKean had demanded be 
released by Alpine in June, 1979. 
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D-25; Tr. Vol. I, at 158-59.)11 Child indicated on his bankruptcy schedules that he was 
obligated to Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen for $500,000 under the terms of promissory 
notes executed on September 19, 1982, and secured by the Traverse Mountain property. 
(Exhibit D-23; Tr. Vol. I, at 156, 169; Vol. II, at 336.) 
E. Alpine's Motion to Compel Assumption or Rejection of the Alpine 
Contract, filed with the Bankruptcy Court. 
On June 30, 1982, Alpine Ltd. filed with the Bankruptcy Court in Child's 
Chapter 11 case a "Motion to Compel Assumption or Rejection of Executory Contract." 
(Exhibit D-28; Tr. Vol. I, at 234-36.) The motion sought an order from the Bankruptcy 
Court requiring Child to assume or reject the Alpine Contract, dated June 1, 1978. The 
Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, holding that the Alpine Contract was not an 
executory contract but that Alpine had only a lien for the unpaid balance due 
thereunder. (Exhibits D-29, D-31; Tr. Vol. II, at 236-38.)12 
Child thereafter made a number of unsuccessful attempts to sell the Traverse 
Mountain Property while he was a debtor-in-possession in his bankruptcy proceeding. 
(Exhibit D-27; Tr. Vol. II, at 242-43.) In all of his efforts to sell the land, he treated it 
as his own. 
11
 Copies of pertinent parts of Child's bankruptcy schedules, Exhibits D-23 and D-25, 
are appended to this Brief as Exhibits F and G, respectively. 
12
 The Court relied on the case of In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982), 
which held that an installment land contract is treated as a lien in favor of the seller 
and that the buyer has ownership of the realty subject to the seller's lien. 
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F. Mvron Child's Third Amended Plan of Reorganization. 
In his bankruptcy proceeding, Myron Child proposed a Third Amended Plan 
of Reorganization (the "Plan"), which was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court in an 
Order dated September 29, 1983.13 (Exhibit D-32.)14 The Plan provided that the 
Traverse Mountain Property, which was Child's primary asset, would be sold free and 
clear of all liens and that Child's creditors would be paid according to the formulas set 
forth in the Plan. Child's secured creditors under the Plan included Alpine Ltd., and 
Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen. (Exhibit D-32, at 39; Tr. Vol. I, at 211-12.) No 
objections were made to the Plan. Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen specifically voted in 
favor of its confirmation. (Exhibit D-60-P; Tr. Vol. II, at 213-14.) 
Under the specific provisions of the Plan , Child was deemed to own all of 
the interest in the Alpine Contract of the buyers (Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New 
Empire Development). The Plan provided that Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New 
Empire Development had assigned their interest in the Contract to Child by the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract of September 20, 1980. (Exhibit D-32, at 4, 8; Tr. Vol. I, at 214-
16; Vol. II, at 336.)15 
13
 Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen, as secured creditors of Child's bankruptcy estate, 
were all given notice of the confirmation hearing, as indicated on the mailing matrix for 
the Notice. (Exhibit D-31; Tr. Vol. II, at 207-08.) 
14
 A copy of the Order Confirming the Third Amended Chapter 11 Plan and of the 
Plan itself is appended to this brief at Exhibit I. 
15
 The Plan defined the 'Traverse Mountain Property Interest" as including all right, 
title, and interest of the debtor (Child) in the 'Traverse Mountain Property' pursuant to 
the "Alpine Contract." (Exhibit D-32, at 8.) The Plan defined the term "Alpine 
Contract" as referring to the June 1, 1978, Contract between McBride, as Seller, and the 
(continued...) 
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The Plan further provided that Child had "forfeited" his right to require a 
conveyance of property "pursuant to the partial release provision of paragraph 2.6 of 
the Alpine Contract." (Exhibit D-32, at 28.)16 Paragraph 2.6 is the precise provision 
of the Alpine Contract that McKean claims was breached by Alpine and McBride. He 
asserts that they failed to make a partial reconveyance of the property on receipt of the 
1979 payment. (Complaint, «| 11; R. 3.) 
G. The Sale of the Traverse Mountain Property by Child's Chapter 11 
bankruptcy trustee. 
Because Child's efforts to sell the property to a third party within one year, as 
contemplated by the Plan, proved unsuccessful, the Bankruptcy Court, on motion, 
ordered that a Chapter 11 trustee be appointed pursuant to the Plan and that the 
trustee sell the property at a public auction, free and clear of all liens. (Exhibit D-42.) 
The sale occurred on February 28, 1985, and conveyed all of Child's interest in the 
property, which under the Plan included not only his own interest under the Alpine 
Contract, but also any interest that Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire 
Development had in the Alpine Contract. (Finding of Fact No. 31; Exhibits D- 43, D-
15(...continued) 
New Empire Group, as buyers (Exhibit P-l.) According to the Plan, the Alpine Contract 
was assigned by Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development to Child "by 
an unrecorded Real Estate Contract dated September, 1980." (Exhibit D-32, at 4.) 
16
 Under Article XVI of the Plan, that forfeiture would survive even if Child failed to 
implement the Plan. Whether Child was successful in selling the property, under the 
Plan he had no further right under the Alpine Contract to have a release of property 
under paragraph 2.6 of the Alpine Contract. 
-10-
45, D-46, D-47, D-48, D-49, D-50; Tr. Vol. II, at 302-03, 305.)17 A copy of Exhibit D-
50 is appended to this Brief as Exhibit J. 
The Order described the Traverse Mountain property that was sold by the 
trustee, which included the property that McKean requested be released for the 1979 
payment. After the sale, neither Child, Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, nor New Empire 
Development had any interest in the Traverse Mountain Property. (Tr. Vol. II, at 302-
03, 305.) Since Child had lost his primary asset, the Traverse Motmtain property, he 
moved for the dismissal of his bankruptcy case, which was ordered on February 26, 
1988. (Exhibit 14-P; Finding of Fact No. 33.)18 
H. The 1985 assignment to McKean. 
While Child was still in bankruptcy, on June 12, 1985, Child, Cook, 
Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development,19 as assignors, executed an 
Assignment in favor of McKean, as assignee, by which they purported to assign to 
McKean their interest in the June 1, 1978, Contract. (Exhibit P-12; Findings of Fact 
Nos. 21-22.)20 McKean thereafter commenced this action by filing a Complaint on 
17
 The Bankruptcy Court entered an Order on March 18, 1985, confirming the sale 
of the Traverse Mountain property at the trustee's auction "free and clear of all liens, 
encumbrances, and interests." (Exhibit D-50.) 
18
 The Child bankruptcy was dismissed three years after the sale of the Traverse 
Mountain property by his bankruptcy trustee and two and a half years after McKean 
commenced this action. 
19
 New Empire Development had been involuntarily dissolved by the State of Utah 
on December 31, 1982. (Exhibit D-l.) 
20
 A copy of Exhibit P-12 is appended to this Brief as Exhibit K. 
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June 21, 1985, nearly six years after he had made the 1979 payment on behalf of the 
New Empire Group. 
I. McKean's claims against Geodvne II. Simons, and Bodell. 
McKean initially sued only McBride and Alpine. Geodyne II, Simons, and 
Bodell were not added as defendants until August 31, 1988, when McKean filed an 
Amended Complaint. (Finding of Fact No. 23; R. 152.) Geodyne II was sued solely in 
its capacity as general partner of Alpine. Simons and Bodell were sued solely in their 
capacity as general partners of Geodyne II.21 
J. McKean's Damages. 
The court found that McKean had been damaged in the amount of 
$330,000.00, subject to defendants' right of set-off in the amount of $110,000.00. 
(Memorandum Decision, R. 585; Finding of Fact No. 28.) The court held defendants 
liable for McKean's damages in the amount of $220,000.00 together with interest at ten 
percent from June 25, 1979, in the amount of $265,689.76. (Finding of Fact No. 35.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Because Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development had 
sold their interests in the Traverse Mountain property pursuant to a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract executed in September, 1979, they had no equitable interest in the 
property or in the Alpine Contract. The 1985 Assignment given by Cook, Lamoreaux, 
Hansen, and New Empire Development to McKean was ineffective to assign any claims 
against Alpine or McBride for breach of the Alpine Contract. 
21
 The judgment against Simons and Bodell is enforceable only after partnership 
assets have been exhausted. (R. 686.) 
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Child's purported assignment was also ineffective since he was in bankruptcy 
at the time and a trustee had been appointed. The trustee had sole possession of any 
assets of Child's, including his claims against Alpine and McBride. 
2. Child's Plan of Reorganization, which was confirmed by the Bankruptcy 
Court in 1983, constituted a new agreement between Child and his creditors with 
respect to the Traverse Mountain property. It specifically provided that Child had 
forfeited his right to receive partial releases of property under paragraph 2.6 of the 
Alpine Contract, which is the precise provision McKean claims was breached by Alpine 
and McBride. The Plan is res judicata as to all issues and claims between Child and his 
creditors that were raised or which could have been raised. Child's subsequent 
dismissal of his bankruptcy had no effect on the validity or res judicata effect of the 
Order confirming the Plan of Reorganization or of the Plan itself. 
3. McKean's claims are barred under the four-year statute of limitations. 
The Alpine Contract does not contain any provision allowing the buyers to recover their 
money in the event that the seller failed to convey property under paragraph 2.6 of the 
contract. McKean's claims for a refund of the money are based on an implied contract 
only, and are governed by the four-year statute of limitations according to decisions of 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
The claims against Simons, Bodell, and Geodyne II are barred even under the 
six-year statute of limitations, since they were not joined in the action until after that 
period had run. 
4. McKean's claims should be set off against the amounts owed by his 
assignors to Alpine under the Alpine Contract. At the time of the assignment to 
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McKean, his assignors (Child, Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire 
Development) owed Alpine and McBride over $4 million. Even if Alpine and McBride 
are indebted to McKean's assignors, they are entitled to set-off the amount they owe 
against the amount owed to them by such assignors. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
McKEAN RECEIVED NOTHING FROM COOK, LAMOREAUX, 
HANSEN, NEW EMPIRE DEVELOPMENT, AND CHILD BY THE 
ASSIGNMENT OF JUNE 12, 1985. 
McKean's entire case hinges on the effect of the Assignment to him from 
Child, Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development. (Exhibit 12-P.) If 
they had nothing to assign or if the assignment was invalid, then McKean has no claim 
against defendants. This is precisely the case. McKean received nothing by that 
Assignment, and has no claims against defendants for breach of the Alpine Contract. 
A. Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development 
previously sold their interests in the Alpine Contract to Child 
pursuant to the 1979 Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
On September 20, 1979, Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire 
Development executed a Uniform Real Estate Contract by which they sold their interest 
in Traverse Mountain to Myron Child. (Exhibit D-9.) Child agreed to pay the sum of 
$500,000 to each of Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen. From that date forward, Cook, 
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Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development had no interest in Traverse 
Mountain nor in the Alpine Contract.22 
Without any explanation, the lower court concluded that M[t]he effect of the 
purported assignment was to create an option with Myron Child which was never 
exercised." (Conclusion of Law No. 5.) In focusing solely on the Assignment (Exhibit 
D-8), the lower court completely ignored the legal effect of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (Exhibit D-9), which continued to be a valid agreement between the parties 
regardless of the existence of an escrow. The court's conclusion is in error and is not 
justified by the documents or by the conduct of the parties. 
1. Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen were treated as secured 
creditors in Child's bankruptcy, without objection. 
During Child's bankruptcy, Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen considered 
themselves to be nothing more than secured creditors of Child, having a lien in the 
Traverse Mountain property. Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen were so treated by the 
Bankruptcy Court. When Child filed bankruptcy in 1982, he listed the Traverse 
Mountain Property as an asset of his bankruptcy estate. (Exhibit D-25.) He also listed 
22
 McKean argued below that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was ineffective 
because Child never paid the money that he owed to Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen and 
because the Assignment (Exhibit D-8) was never delivered or recorded. The fact that 
the Assignment was to be held in escrow did not affect the validity of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, which was fully enforceable even though it may have been escrowed. 
Ron Cook testified that Child owed the money under the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
regardless of whether it was recorded or not. (Tr. Vol. I, at 152.) Similarly, Ray 
Lamoreaux testified that he could have sued Child under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, but chose not to. (Tr. Vol. I, at 192.) Moreover, as argued below, Cook, 
Lamoreaux, and Hansen all agreed in the Third Amended Plan of Reorganization 
(Exhibit D-32, page 4) that they had transferred their interest in the Alpine Contract to 
Child. Thereafter, they were barred by principles of res judicata from asserting a 
contrary position and are otherwise estopped. 
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Alpine, Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen as secured creditors, to whom he owed money 
for purchasing the Traverse Mountain Property. (Exhibit D-23.) Cook, Lamoreaux, and 
Hansen all received notice of the bankruptcy filing and of their treatment as secured 
creditors. (Tr. Vol. I, at 156, 158; Vol II, at 206-08.) After filing bankruptcy, Myron 
Child treated the Traverse Mountain property as though he owned it all, subject to the 
liens of the secured creditors.23 Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen never at any time 
claimed that he did not own all of the property. Nor did they object to Child's efforts 
to sell the property.24 
On September 19, 1983, Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen entered into an 
Agreement with Capital Thrift and Loan and Franklin Financial in which Cook, 
Lamoreaux, and Hansen acknowledged that they had previously transferred their 
interest in Traverse Mountain to Child. (Exhibit D-20.)25 The fifth recital on page one 
of the Agreement specifically provides: 
23
 Child attempted to sell the property pursuant to the Sales Agreement filed with 
the Bankruptcy Court on July 2, 1982, which also listed Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen 
as secured creditors. (Exhibit D-27.) 
24
 Ron Cook testified that he knew of Child's efforts to sell the property and 
expected to be paid in the event that the property was sold. (Tr. Vol. I, at 158-59.) 
Moreover, Cook even made efforts himself to help Child sell the property while Child 
was in bankruptcy. Cook believed that the plan of reorganization was the best way for 
him to be paid. (Tr. Vol. I, at 166, 172.) Lamoreaux testified that he could have sued 
Child under the Uniform Real Estate Contract, but chose instead to follow Child's Plan 
of Reorganization. (Tr. Vol I, at 192.) Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen voted for most 
of the plans of reorganization proposed by Child in his bankruptcy proceeding, 
including the Third Amended Plan that was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court. (Tr. 
Vol. I, at 162, 213-14.) 
25
 A copy of Exhibit D-20 is appended to this Brief as Exhibit H. 
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WHEREAS, the interest of Cook, Lamoreaux and Hansen in 
Traverse Mountain has subsequently been transferred to Mvron B. 
Child, Jr. who is the debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy proceeding and has proposed a plan of reorganization; 
(Exhibit D-20; emphasis added.)26 
Myron Child's Third Amended Plan of Reorganization (the "Plan11) was 
confirmed by Judge Clark in an Order dated September 29, 1983. (Exhibit D-32.) 
Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen all voted for the Plan.27 The Plan specifically provided 
that Child's interest in Traverse Mountain included all right, title, and interest of the 
buyers under the Alpine Contract. (Exhibit D-32, at 8; Tr. Vol. I, at 214-24.) The Plan 
defined the "Alpine Contract" as follows: 
Alpine Contract - a certain Real Estate Sales Agreement dated June 
1, 1978, by and between Michael W. McBride as "Seller" and 
Ronald S. Cook, Myron B. Child, Jr., Ray W. Lamoreaux, Wendell 
P. Hansen and New Empire Development Co. collectively as 
"Buyers." Said contract was assigned by Ronald S. Cook, Ray W. 
Lamoreaux, Wendell P. Hansen and New Empire Development Co. 
26
 According to the testimony of Ron Cook and of Merlyn Hanks at the trial, Cook, 
Lamoreaux, and Hansen entered into the Agreement in order to induce Capital Thrift, 
Franklin Financial, and Richard Christenson to approve the Third Amended Plan of 
Reorganization. (Tr. Vol. I, at 162-66; Vol. II, at 372-75.) 
27
 At the trial, Gary Jubber, who was Child's bankruptcy counsel at the time the Plan 
was confirmed, reviewed the bankruptcy files for Myron Child and testified that they 
contained the ballots signed by Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen in which each had voted 
for the Plan. (Tr. Vol. II, at 244-46.) In addition, the Bankruptcy Court's Order 
Confirming Third Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Debtor (Exhibit D-32, at 3) specifically 
states that the creditors designated as Class 8 creditors voted for the Plan. (Tr. Vol. I, 
at 213-14.) According to the list at creditors found on page 39 of the Plan, Cook, 
Lamoreaux, and Hansen were the only creditors belonging to Class 8. 
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to Myron B. Child. Jr. by an unrecorded Real Estate Contract dated 
September, 1980. 
(Exhibit D-32, at 4; emphasis added.)28 
Thus, when the Traverse Mountain property was sold by Child's bankruptcy 
trustee on February 28, 1985, she sold all of the property. Nothing remained in Cook, 
Lamoreaux, and Hansen. They had sold and transferred their interest in the Alpine 
Contract to Child. When Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen assigned their rights under the 
Alpine Contract to McKean on June 12, 1985, they had nothing to assign, having 
previously conveyed all of their interest in the property and the Alpine Contract to 
Child. 
2. Under the doctrine of equitable conversion. Child was 
the owner of the interest of Cook, Lamoreaux, and 
Hansen in Traverse Mountain. 
Even without the specific provisions in the Plan (Exhibit D-32) and the 
Agreement with Capitol Thrift (Exhibit D-20), under the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
in favor of Child (Exhibit D-10) Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire 
28
 Under the Utah Bankruptcy case of In re Booth. 19 B.R. 53 (Bankr. D. Utah 
1982), an installment land contract is treated as a lien in favor of the seller. Under the 
rule of that case, the buyer has ownership of the realty subject to the seller's lien. This 
case was relied on by Judge Clark in Child's bankruptcy when Alpine moved the Court 
for an order compelling assumption or rejection of the Alpine Contract as an executory 
contract. (Exhibits D-28; D-29; D-30.) The Bankruptcy Court denied Alpine's motion, 
holding that the contract was not an executory contract within the meaning of Section 
365 of the Bankruptcy Code, but that the contract created a lien in favor of Alpine. 
Although Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen did not file the same kind of motion with 
respect to their Uniform Real Estate Contract with Child, the same result would 
presumably have occurred, since the two contracts are indistinguishable under In re 
Booth. As it was, Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen were content to remain as secured 
creditors of Child's with nothing more than a lien in the property. Whatever claims 
they may have had against Alpine were given up when they sold their interest in the 
property to Child. 
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Development gave up any and all ownership interest that they had in the Traverse 
Mountain property. According to the doctrine of equitable conversion, Cook, 
Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development retained nothing but legal title to 
their interest in the property, having conveyed equitable title to Child. Their remaining 
legal interest was nothing more than an interest in personalty for the purpose of 
securing payment from Child. 
In Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
considered the respective interests of a buyer and seller under a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. The Court held that, under such a contract the vendor "retains legal title as 
security for the purchase price of the property." Id. at 1254 (citations omitted.) The 
vendee, on the other hand, has equitable title to the property and "is treated as the 
owner of the land." Id. (emphasis added). The Court described the doctrine of 
equitable conversion as follows: 
The doctrine of equitable conversion characterizes the seller's 
interest as an interest in personalty and not as one in realty, 
whereas the vendee's interest under the executory contract is 
deemed an interest in realty. 
Id. at 1255 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Thus, held the Court, the vendor's 
interest "is similar to the security interest of a purchase money mortgagee." Id.29 
29
 In C & J Industries, Inc. v. Bailey. 618 P.2d 58 (Utah 1980), the Court similarly 
held that, under a Uniform Real Estate Contract, the vendee "acquires all of the 
incidents of ownership except legal title. He is therefore in equity regarded as the 
owner of the property." Id. at 59 (citations omitted; emphasis added.) See also Jelco. 
Incorporated v. Third Judicial District Court. 29 Utah 2d 472, 475, 511 P.2d 739, 741 
(1973) (vendee is regarded as the owner of property under a real estate contract); 
Estate of Wilson v. State Tax Commission. 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298, 1300 
(1972) (an enforceable executory real estate contract converts a seller's interest from an 
interest in real property to an interest in personalty). 
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Thus, when Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development signed 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract in September, 1979, they gave all interest that they 
might have in Traverse Mountain, retaining only a security interest in the property. 
Thereafter, in the words of the C & J Industries case, Child was "regarded as the owner 
of the property." 618 P.2d at 59. 
It was thus entirely appropriate for Child to treat Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, 
and New Empire as secured creditors, having no ownership interest in the Alpine 
Contract or in Traverse Mountain. This was consistent with the Plan's treatment of 
them as nothing more than secured creditors. The lower court's conclusion that the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract created nothing more than an "option" is plainly 
inconsistent with the language of the Uniform Real Estate Contract itself and with Utah 
law. 
When Child's bankruptcy trustee sold the Traverse Mountain property sold 
free and clear of all hens in February, 1985, Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New 
Empire Development were left with nothing but unsecured claims against Child for the 
amount that he owed to them under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. They had no 
interest in the Alpine Contract or in Traverse Mountain. When they made an 
assignment to McKean in 1985, they had nothing to give. 
3. The conclusion that Child's interest in Traverse 
Mountain did not include the interests of Cook, 
Lamoreaux, and Hansen is contradicted by the lower 
court's own findings during the trial and by the 
McKean's own stipulation. 
The lower court concluded that Child's interest in Traverse Mountain in his 
bankruptcy proceeding "did not include the interests of other partners of New Empire." 
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(Conclusion of Law No. 5.) This conclusion is entirely at odds with the Bankruptcy 
Court's treatment of the ownership of the Traverse Mountain property under the plan of 
reorganization. Moreover, that conclusion is flatly contradicted by the next sentence in 
Conclusion No. 5: "However, the bankruptcy court had and exercised authority to sell 
the entire Traverse Mountain property free and clear of liens without adjudication of 
claims and interests." (Conclusion of Law No. 5.) 
The Bankruptcy Court did not simply arrogate to itself the right to order the 
disposition of all of the New Empire Group's interests in Traverse Mountain, including 
the interests of Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen. The Plan of Reorganization carefully 
describes how the title passed entirely into Child's hands, leaving Cook, Lamoreaux, 
Hansen, and New Empire with nothing but secured claims. During the trial, the court 
acknowledged, and McKean stipulated, that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over 
all of the Traverse Mountain property, not just Child's one-fourth: 
The Court: . . . . Evidently the bankruptcy court determined 
that he [Child] owned all of it and sold all of it and whoever 
bought it bought it-all of the interest. That's not an issue now, 
that they only sold a quarter of an interest is it? 
Mr. Tate: No. . . . 
The Court: Well, anyhow, the bankruptcy court sold the 
property as though they [Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen] had no 
claim. 
Mr. Tate: We'll stipulate that the bankruptcy court sold a 
hundred percent of the property. 
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The Court: The documents say 100 percent of the property 
was sold free and clear of any liens or any other claims back to 
Alpine. 
(Tr. Vol. II, at 301-02, 305.) 
After Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development sold their 
interests to Child, they retained no equitable interest in the property. When the 
bankruptcy trustee sold the property, she sold one hundred percent of the buyers' 
interest under the Alpine Contract. The court's conclusion to the contrary is simply in 
error. 
B. Myron Child had no authority to assign to McKean any claims that 
he might have had against defendants. Any such claims could only 
have been transferred by his Bankruptcy Trustee. 
On June 25, 1985, when he signed the Assignment to McKean, Child was a 
debtor in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case who had been ousted from control and 
operation of his business by the appointment of the trustee.30 See Article XVI of the 
Plan ("a trustee shall forthwith be appointed by the Court and the Estate shall be 
liquidated under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code"); 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541, 1108. See 
generally Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 105 S. 
Ct. 1986, 85 L.Ed.2d 372 (1985). Because the trustee was solely authorized to deal 
with the assets of Child's bankruptcy estate, Child's execution of the 1985 Assignment 
gave McKean nothing. At the trial, Child himself testified that he had no claims against 
30
 The Bankruptcy Court appointed Harriet Styler as trustee of Child's bankruptcy 
estate on February 10, 1985, (Exhibit D-42), approximately five months before Child 
signed the Assignment to McKean. She sold the Traverse Mountain property at an 
auction held on March 5, 1985. (Exhibit D-48.) 
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Alpine and that he did not believe that he had assigned anything to McKean. (Tr. Vol. 
II, at 345.) 
McKean contends that Child's assignment of his claims against Alpine was 
effective because it was not avoided by the trustee pursuant to Section 549(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and, therefore, cannot be set aside. This argument ignores the fact 
that no notice was ever given by Child that he intended to assign an asset of his 
bankruptcy estate. The Trustee was not in a position to avoid the transfer because she 
never received notice. Child violated Bankruptcy Rule 2002(c), which required Child to 
give notice of ,fa proposed use, sale, or lease of property," other than in the ordinary 
course of business, and the "time and place of any public sale, the terms and conditions 
of any private sale and the time fixed for filing objections.1'31 
Child did not give notice, as he was required to do, of his secret assignment 
to McKean. Neither did Child identify his claims against defendants in his bankruptcy 
schedules. Child's clandestine assignment of a hidden claim was made without the 
knowledge of the Bankruptcy Court and the trustee. It was made without notice to 
creditors, such as Alpine. Child's assignment was wholly ineffective to transfer to 
McKean any rights - even if they existed - that Child had against defendants. 
C. The Assignment to McKean was void for lack of consideration. 
The assignment to was invalid for lack of consideration. McKean testified 
that the consideration was his agreement not to sue Child. (Tr. Vol. I, at 58.) McKean 
had no right, however, to sue Child while Child was in bankruptcy and McKean's 
31
 See Bankruptcy Rule 6004(a) (requiring notice of a "proposed use, sale, or lease 
of property . . . not in the ordinary course of business"). 
-23-
agreement not to sue was insufficient consideration to support the assignment from 
Child. In June of 1985, McKean's claims against Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New 
Empire Development were barred by the four-year statute of limitations, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25 (1992). His agreement not to sue them was meaningless, since his 
claims were time-barred. 
IL 
McKEAN'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. 
A. When his Bankruptcy Plan was confirmed. Child forfeited his right 
to receive a partial release of acreage for the 1979 payment. 
Child's failure to sell the property for $8 million did not affect that 
forfeiture. 
The Bankruptcy Court's order confirming Child's Third Amended Plan of 
Reorganization was an adjudication of rights and has res judicata effect. A plan of 
reorganization is binding on all creditors of an estate and sales of property made 
pursuant to a plan cannot be attacked collaterally. It is res judicata as is any final order 
or judgment. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a). Under Section 1141 "a plan is binding upon all 
parties once it is confirmed and all questions which could have been raised pertaining 
to such plan are res judicata." 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 1141.01 (15th Ed. 1990).32 
See Stoll v. Gottlieb. 305 U.S. 165, reh. denied. 305 U.S. 678 (1935); In re 
Chattanooga Wholesale Antiques. Inc.. 67 B.R. 899, 905-06 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986). 
32
 Collier states further that "a confirmed plan of reorganization is binding upon 
every entity that holds a claim or interest even though a holder of a claim or interest is 
not scheduled, has not filed a claim, does not receive distribution under the plan, or is 
not entitled to retain an interest under such plan." Id. 1 1141.01 [1], at 1141-6. 
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The lower court held that the Plan was not res judicata "because the 
bankruptcy proceedings did not release defendants McBride and Alpine from their 
obligation to convey land or refund all or part of the June 25, 1979, payment made by 
plaintiff' and because "Child's bankruptcy plan failed," since he was not able to sell the 
property for at least $8 million within one year. (Conclusion of Law No. 7.) This 
conclusion is erroneous. It ignores the plain language of the Plan, which provided that 
the right to receive a partial release under the Alpine Contract had been forfeited, even 
if the Plan failed: 
Notwithstanding the occurrence of the Effective Date, if for any 
reason whatsoever and regardless of fault, the Approved Sale has 
not occurred on or before July 25, 1984, the Plan and all 
acceptances of the Plan and assumptions pursuant to the Plan shall 
be void and of no force or effect (except that the matters approved 
in Article IV, the Super Priority Loan(s) pursuant to Article III and 
the disposition of the Canterbury Property pursuant to Article 
VII (A) shall be unaffected, and Debtor shall automatically forfeit 
any right Debtor might otherwise have to require the conveyance 
to or for the benefit of Debtor of acreage pursuant to the partial 
release provision of paragraph 2.6 of the Alpine Contract) . . . . 
(Exhibit D-32, at 28; emphasis added.)33 
The Plan specifically provided that Child had forfeited "any right" that he 
might otherwise have "to require the conveyance to or for the benefit of Debtor of 
acreage pursuant to the partial release provision of paragraph 2.6 of the Alpine 
Contract." This is the exact provision McKean claims was breached by Alpine and 
McBride. (Complaint, «I 11; R. 3.) Thus, the Plan provides that Mvron Child forfeited 
33
 At the trial, McKean's counsel had Gary Jubber, Child's bankruptcy lawyer, read 
this pan of the plan into evidence. (Tr. Vol. II, at 283-84.) 
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his right to receive the partial release of acreage for the 1979 payment.34 McKean, as 
Child's assignee, has no claim for failure to release property for the 1979 payment.35 
That right was specifically forfeited by Child when his Plan was confirmed. 
B. The Plan of Reorganization constituted a new contract between 
Child and his creditors. 
A plan of reorganization is res judicata because it represents an adjudication 
of all claims between a debtor and his creditors, whether or not they were raised. The 
filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an "estate" comprised of all legal or equitable 
interest of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 
541(a)(1). See generally. United States v. Whiting Pools. 462 U.S. 198 (1983). On 
confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan, the property of the estate revests in the debtor. 11 
U.S.C. § 1141(b). At that time, the bankruptcy estate, which was created by operation 
of law, ceases to exist. See In re Tri-L Corp., 65 B.R. 774, 777 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986). 
The pre-confirmation debt is then replaced with a new indebtedness to creditors as 
provided in the plan. In re Herron, 60 B.R. 82, 84 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986). See 11 
U.S.C. § 1141(c). 
As Gary Jubber testified at trial, a plan of reorganization is a new contract 
between a debtor and his creditors. (Tr. Vol. I, at 203.) Any claims not raised and 
34
 As shown below, the subsequent dismissal of Child's bankruptcy did not affect the 
validity of the Plan nor of the provision that Child had forfeited his right to receive any 
releases of property for the 1979 payment. 
35
 The lower court's conclusion that res judicata did not apply because there "was 
not an adjudication by the bankruptcy coun of the claims involved in this lawsuit which 
would preclude plaintiff from proceeding against defendants" (Conclusion of Law No. 7) 
is plainly contradicted by Article XVI of the Plan, under which Child forfeited his right 
to any releases under the Alpine Contract. 
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dealt with under a confirmed plan are waived. "A confirmed plan is a court approved 
contract. If the debtor defaults, creditors will have their rights under the contract, but 
will not be revested with their original claim." M. Bienenstock, Bankruptcy 
Reorganization 702 (1987) (emphasis added). See Paul v. Monts, 906 F.2d 1468, 1471 
(10th Cir. 1990). Thus, according to the court in In the Matter of The Stratton Group, 
Ltd., 12 B.R. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), by assenting to a confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization, "a creditor extinguishes a previous duty of the debtor to himself, and 
simultaneously extinguishes his previous right against that party." Id. at 473.36 See In 
re White Farm Equipment Company. 38 B.R. 718, 724 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (court held 
that a confirmed plan created "a contractual relationship between [the debtor] and its 
creditors which delineated their respective rights and duties"); Matter of Depew, 115 
B.R. 965, 966 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (court held that confirmation of the plan of 
reorganization "effectively replaces debtor's pre-petition obligations to creditors, which 
were discharged, with the obligations to those creditors set forth in the confirmed 
plan"). When Judge Clark confirmed Child's Third Amended Plan, all previous claims 
between the parties were extinguished. All that remained were the claims set forth in 
38
 The court in Stratton Group elaborated: 
Confirmation fixes the reach of claims that are allowed and that 
the debtor treats in the plan. Where the debtor effects a 
composition [plan of reorganization!, he is relieved of his old debts 
and simply has the burden of achieving the promises made in the 
composition. The composition thus operates as an absolute 
settlement, and the failure to pay unpaid obligations created by the 
plan will not revive old debts. 
Id. at 474 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
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the Plan. At that point, any claims that Child had against Alpine for failure to release 
the property for the 1979 payment were released, including claims for a refund of the 
money paid. The Plan represented a new contract between all of the parties, which 
extinguished all prior obligations and embodied the new relations between them. 
As noted above, the parties negotiated the forfeiture of Child's right to partial 
releases of property under paragraph 2.6 of the Alpine Contract.37 Even if the issue of 
Child's entitlement to releases under the contract had not been raised, however, all such 
claims that could have been raised would be barred under the Plan on principles of res 
judicata.38 Had Child asserted a claim against Alpine for $330,000, Alpine could have 
asserted the right of set-off39 and treated the claim in the Third Amended Plan of 
37
 There was evidence at trial that the parties' agreement represented a compromise 
between Child and Alpine. According to Child's bankruptcy schedule (Exhibit D-23, at 
2), Child owed Alpine the total amount of $6,450,000.00. The Disclosure Statement 
(Exhibit D-62) filed in connection with Child's Third Amended Plan of Reorganization, 
however, indicated that the estimated amount of the Alpine lien was $4,437,683.93, an 
amount considerably less than that originally acknowledged by Child. The difference 
between the two figures (in the amount of $2,012,317) appears to have been the result 
of a compromise between Alpine and Child, which took into account the 1979 payment 
of $330,000. Gary Jubber testified that he recalled negotiations between Child and 
Child's creditors in the process of preparing and confirming the Plan, but could not 
recall any details. (Tr. Vol. II, at 298.) 
38
 Thus, for example, if Child believed that Alpine should have released some of the 
property free and clear of liens, he should have raised that issue before the Bankruptcy 
Court. If he believed that the Bankruptcy Court should have ordered the release of the 
property then and there because it had been paid for, he should have so moved or 
included such a provision in his Plan. Or, if Child believed that he was entitled to a 
$330,000 refund from Alpine, he should have listed that claim as a debt in his 
bankruptcy schedules. Once the Plan was in place, Child was barred from pursuing any 
other claims against Alpine that could have been addressed in the Plan. 
39
 As noted above, Child owed Alpine approximately $6,450,000 according to Child's 
bankruptcy schedules. (Exhibit D-23, at 2.) Had he raised the claim that Alpine owed 
(continued...) 
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Reorganization. Having missed the opportunity to deal with the claim in connection 
with the Plan, Child's claim is forever lost under the doctrine of res judicata. 
Southmark Properties v. Charles House Corporation, 742 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 
1984), involved a fact situation very similar to the present case in certain significant 
aspects.40 In Southmark, the Court examined the res judicata effect of the sale of 
property authorized under a plan of reorganization. Id. at 865. Charles House 
Corporation was the owner of real property, which it had mortgaged to Southmark. 
When Charles House found it could not make its payments to Southmark, it filed a 
reorganization petition in bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court ultimately confirmed 
a plan of reorganization under which the real property would be sold and Southmark 
would be allowed to credit bid the balance due on its mortgage. Id. at 867. The 
property was sold at an auction and was purchased by Southmark, the secured creditor. 
Because the sale had disposed of the only asset of Charles House, the bankruptcy was 
dismissed on motion of the trustee. Id.41 
39(...continued) 
him $330,000, the Bankruptcy Court could have set off the one debt against the other 
under 11 U.S.C. § 553(a), since Alpine and Child owed each other pre-petition mutual 
obligations. See In re IML Freight, Inc.. 65 B.R. 788 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986). 
40
 Although Southmark arose under the prior Bankruptcy Act, that fact made no 
difference in the Court's analysis. Because the principles of res judicata are the same 
under both acts, the same result would have obtained under the present Bankruptcy 
Code. 
41
 The Court in the present case should not overlook the fact that the Charles House 
bankruptcy was dismissed after the sale of the property. In the present case, McKean 
contends that the dismissal of Child's bankruptcy somehow undid the Third Amended 
Plan of Reorganization. The dismissal of Child's bankruptcy, however, is a red herring 
which occurred three years after McKean commenced this case. The real issue is 
(continued...) 
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After the dismissal of the bankruptcy, Charles House sued Southmark in state 
court alleging that it had breached its contract by engaging in fraudulent and 
extortionate activities prior to the bankruptcy. Southmark responded by filing its own 
suit in federal court against Charles House for declaratory relief, alleging that Charles 
House's claims were barred by the reorganization sale of the property. Id. at 868. 
Charles House filed a counterclaim in the federal action. The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Southmark, which was affirmed by the Circuit Court. 
Recognizing that res judicata principles apply "with full force" to reorganization orders 
of the bankruptcy court, id. at 869, the Circuit Court analyzed the elements of res 
judicata. The Court held: (1) that the parties were the same in the bankruptcy 
proceeding as in the case at issue, id. at 869-70; (2) that the reorganization order was 
a "final judgment on the merits," id. at 870; and (3) that the reorganization proceedings 
and the trustee's sale of the property involved the same cause of action asserted by 
Charles House in its state court action and counterclaim, id. at 870-72. 
With respect to the third element of res judicata, the Court held that because 
Charles House could have raised the same issues in the bankruptcy proceeding, the sale 
could be said to involve the same cause of action set forth in Charles House's post-
bankruptcy claims. Noting that the issues raised by Charles House all involved "a 
common nucleus of operative fact" with the sale, the Court held: 
41
 (...continued) 
whether Child should have raised his claims against Alpine in his bankruptcy and failed 
to do so. The sale of the Traverse Mountain property - which McKean concedes cannot 
be undone by the dismissal - was binding on Child and his creditors and resolved all 
claims that related in any way to the property. 
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If appellants' challenge to Southmark's right to thus take 
ownership of the property [at the trustee's sale] was extinguished 
by the prior reorganization action, as we hold it was, then 
appellants' remedies against Southmark "with respect to all or any 
part of the transaction, or series or connected transactions, out of 
which the action arose," also were extinguished. . . . 
Because appellants' present claim and the prior judgment 
involved the same principal transaction, appellants' claim is barred 
by res judicata, if the procedural system available to appellants in 
the reorganization proceedings permitted appellants to raise that 
claim in those proceedings. . . . Appellants had an "absolute and 
unlimited" right to be heard in the reorganization proceedings. 
Id. at 871 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). 
The Court concluded that because Charles House could have asserted its 
fraud and breach of contract claims against Southmark in the bankruptcy proceedings, it 
was barred from raising them after the reorganization sale of the property: 
If Southmark had violated the terms of its mortgage agreement 
with appellants, and had committed various fraudulent and 
unlawful acts with respect thereto, as appellants now allege, 
appellants had ample opportunity to raise those facts as a defense 
to Southmark's claim, and to request that the trustee assert 
whatever cause of action the debtor possessed in that regard 
against Southmark. Appellants instead chose to forego any 
objections to the assertion of Southmark's secured claim, or the 
sale of The Charles House property to Southmark. As a result, 
Southmark's interest was recognized by the trustee and Southmark 
was allowed to bid in its mortgage debt for the property, without 
opposition. . . . Appellants cannot now undo a judicial decree 
which they had a full opportunity to contest, and chose not to. 
Id. at 872 (citations omitted; emphasis added).42 
42
 The Southmark Court cited the rule in Brown v. Felson, 442 U.S. 127, 99 S. Ct. 
2205, 60 L.Ed.2d 767 (1979), that "[r]es judicata prevents litigation of all grounds for, 
or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of 
whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding." 442 U.S. at 131, 
99 S. Ct. at 2209. This is the rule followed in Utah. Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 
P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978). 
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As in Southmark, if Myron Child had claims against Alpine for failure to 
release property for the 1979 payment, he was required to raise that issue in his 
bankruptcy case. Alpine was entitled to have that question raised and resolved in the 
context of the Third Amended Plan of Reorganization. Because Child did not raise the 
issue in his bankruptcy case, the issue cannot be raised in the present proceeding. In 
the words of the Southmark Court, McKean, as Child's successor, "cannot now undo a 
judicial decree which [he] had a full opportunity to contest, and chose not to." 742 
F.2d at 872. 
The res judicata doctrine was also applied to bar a claim in Miller v. 
Meinhard-Commercial Corp., 462 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1972). In Miller, an unsecured 
creditor brought an action against a secured creditor alleging that fraudulent 
representations had been made by the secured creditor regarding a confirmed plan. Id. 
at 359-60. The trial court dismissed the unsecured creditor's claim, holding that these 
claims should have been brought before the Bankruptcy Court and were barred under 
the doctrine of res judicata. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that 
an arrangement confirmed by a bankruptcy court has the effect of 
a judgment rendered by a district court, see Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 
U.S. 165 (1938), and any attempt by the parties or those in privity 
with them to relitigate any of the matters that were raised or could 
have been raised therein is barred under the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
Id. at 360. 
The Fifth Circuit found that the unsecured creditor's suit was "no more than a 
collateral attack upon the [bankruptcy court's] order confirming the plan of 
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arrangement; the integrity of the judgment is challenged. . . . the suit obviously turns 
upon what could or should have happened in the bankruptcy proceeding." Id.43 
McKean seeks to do precisely what the Court in Miller held he cannot do. He 
claims that defendants never conveyed the Traverse Mountain property to the Buyers 
under the Alpine Contract and therefore breached the contract. This is a direct attack 
on the Plan and on the Bankruptcy Court's Order confirming the Plan. If McKean's 
assignors, who were creditors of Child's estate and participated in the bankruptcy 
proceedings, had any objection to this transaction, they were required to raise their 
challenges before the Bankruptcy Court, not through a collateral attack by their 
assignee in the present action. 
This Court should hold that McKean's claims are barred under the doctrine of 
res judicata. 
C. The post-confirmation dismissal of Child's bankruptcy did not affect 
the validity of his Plan of Reorganization. 
McKean argues that Child's Plan of Reorganization was not res judicata 
because the bankruptcy case was subsequently dismissed. McKean contends that the 
dismissal, in effect, operated to vacate the order of confirmation and restore creditors to 
their original positions under 11 U.S.C. § 349. This is a misreading of the Bankruptcy 
43
 See also Hendrick v. Avent. 891 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1990) (an order of the 
Bankruptcy Court authorizing the sale of an asset of the bankrupt's estate is a final 
judgment which can only be attacked by an appeal or appropriate motion even if the 
order confirming the sale neither closes the bankruptcy case nor disposes of any claim); 
and In re Met-L-Wood Corp.. 861 F.2d 1012, 1016, cert, den. 109 S. Ct. 1642 (1989) 
(an order confirming the sale of a bankrupt's property is appealable as a final order and 
cannot be attacked in a new lawsuit brought by a party, successor to a party, or 
"anyone else so far identified with such a party as to be classified as being in privity 
with him"). 
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Code. Under Section 349(b) the dismissal of Child's bankruptcy had no effect on the 
prior sale of Traverse Mountain. Neither did the dismissal reinstate the claims of Cook, 
Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development against Alpine. The Plan was 
unaffected by the dismissal. 
While it may have been Congress' general intention that dismissal would 
undo a bankruptcy, Section 349(b) does not go that far. If Congress had intended that 
dismissal would completely undo the bankruptcy, Section 349(b) could have provided 
simply that dismissal vacates any order or judgment ever entered in the case. This is 
the way McKean would have the Court read the statute. Yet, Congress did not write 
Section 349(b) so broadly. Instead, it carefully identified those orders and judgments 
based upon specific sections of the Bankruptcy Code.44 Section 1129, dealing with 
confirmation of plans of reorganization is not among those listed in Section 349. Under 
a proper reading of Section 349(b), dismissal is limited in its effect to the sections of 
the Bankruptcy Code specifically identified therein. The dismissal thus had no effect on 
Child's Plan of Confirmation or on any matters resolved in accordance with the Plan. 
Section 349 does not provide that a plan confirmed under Section 1129 is somehow 
undone, set aside, or invalidated. 
The case of Matter of Depew. 115 B.R. 965 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989), 
addressed this issue. There, the court considered the effect of the subsequent dismissal 
44
 According to Section 349(b), a dismissal reinstates: proceedings superseded under 
Section 543; transfers avoided under Sections 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a), 
or preserved under sections 510(c)(2), 522(i)(2), or 551. It also vacates any order 
judgment, or transfer ordered, under sections 522(i)(l), 542, 550, or 553. Dismissal 
also revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such property was vested 
immediately before the commencement of the bankruptcy case. 
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of a chapter 11 bankruptcy case on a confirmed plan. The court held that the post-
confirmation dismissal of the Chapter 11 case "does not affect the finality of the 
confirmation order or the discharge that goes with it. . . . Both are effective 'without 
regard to whether the debtor pays according to the plan or not.' . . ." Id. at 967 
(citations omitted). 
In Depew one of the creditors argued, as McKean does in the present case, 
that the post-confirmation dismissal of the case vacated or revoked the order of 
confirmation. Id. at 968. The court held to the contrary that dismissal did not vacate 
or revoke the confirmed plan. The transactions that occurred pursuant to the plan 
remained imaffected. Section 349, held the court, should be restricted "to the sections 
of the Bankruptcy Code which it specifically refers to." Id. at 971 (citations omitted). 
Even if the dismissal somehow revested Child with claims against Alpine, it is 
undisputed that, at the time Child made the assignment to McKean in June of 1985, 
Child was still in bankruptcy and had a trustee appointed. The subsequent dismissal 
(which occurred after this case was commenced) did not somehow vest McKean with 
claim against Alpine, which Child had no authority to assign in 1985. 
III. 
McKEAN'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
A. A claim for refund of the 1979 payment arose on June 25, 1979, 
the day McKean paid $330.000.00 to Aha Title Company on behalf 
of the New Empire Group. 
"A cause of action arises the moment an action may be maintained to enforce 
a legal right. The statute of limitations then begins to run." Ash v. State of Utah. 572 
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P.2d 1374, 1379 (Utah 1977). See Duncan v. Gisborn. 17 Utah 209, 53 P. 1044, 1045 
(1898) (cause of action to recover payments made under contract to purchase real 
estate arises "the day after the vender should have tendered the deed" for purposes of 
the statute of limitations.) The New Empire Group's claims against Alpine and McBride 
arose when McKean made the $330,000 payment on behalf of the Buyers on June 25, 
1979, and demanded the release of specific acreage.45 The court found that Alpine and 
McBride breached their contract by failing to release the property on that date. 
(Finding of Fact No. 28.) Under that finding, the statute of limitations began to run on 
June 25, 1979. No action was commenced until June 21, 1985, almost 6 years later. 
B. McKean's claim against Alpine and McBride is subject to a four-
year statute of limitations and is time-barred. 
McKean's claim is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) (1992), which 
provides a four-year statute of limitations for "an action upon a contract, obligation or 
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing." Because McKean's claim is not 
founded on an instrument in writing, it should have been dismissed as untimely. The 
Court erred in failing to do so. 
In his Complaint, McKean alleged that he is entitled to recover the payment 
he made on behalf of the New Empire Group in 1979, yet there is no contractual 
provision giving this remedy. (Complaint, *| 12.) During the trial, McKean confirmed 
that he is seeking a refund of the $330,000 that he paid on behalf of the buyers on 
45
 The lower court found that McKean designated the property that was to be 
released and demanded its release on the day that he made the payment, June 25, 
1979, and that he made a second request on July 3, 1980. (Findings of Fact Nos. 14, 
27.) 
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June 25, 1979. (Tr. Vol. I, at 59.) In his Post-Trial Memorandum, McKean reiterated 
his position that he was suing "for recovery of funds he had paid." (R. 575; emphasis 
added.) The lower court spoke of Alpine's "obligation to convey land or refund all or 
part of the June 25, 1979, payment made by plaintiff." (Conclusion of Law No. 7; 
emphasis added.) 
Plaintiffs claim is not based on any provision in the Alpine Contract, but on 
an implied right to receive back the money paid. The Alpine Contract does not provide 
any remedies in the event of a breach by the Seller. It does not give the Buyers the 
right to recover any payments made. Without a provision in the Contract allowing the 
Buyers to recover the amount of their payments or to recover damages in that amount, 
plaintiffs claim can only be based on an implied right. The four-year statute in Section 
78-12-25(1) applies to all such claims, and renders plaintiffs action untimely. 
Utah case law supports this analysis. In Brown v. Cleverly, 93 Utah 54, 70 
P.2d 881 (1937), the plaintiff vendees had entered into a written contract for the 
purchase of property owned by the defendant vendors. The contract was executed on 
April 22, 1929, and provided for periodic payments by the vendees. In early 1931, the 
vendors declared the vendees in default and repossessed the property. Shortly 
thereafter, the vendees commenced an action for rescission and were ultimately 
successful in obtaining a judgment against the vendors. The vendees' judgment, 
however, could not be satisfied by the vendors' assets and on August 15, 1935, the 
vendees filed an action seeking to impose a vendee's lien on the subject property. The 
trial court held that the action was barred by Section 104-2-30, R.S. 1933, (the 
-37-
predecessor to section 78-12-25(1)), which imposed a four-year statute of limitations 
for claims not based on a written contract. 
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that if a seller breaches a written real 
estate sales contract the buyer may bring an action to rescind the contract and recover 
the amount paid to the seller. Id. at 885. The Court held, however, that such a claim 
is not considered to be on a written contract for the purpose of determining the statute 
of limitations. Observing that the contract of purchase and sale "does not contain any 
express provision giving plaintiffs, as purchasers, a right to recover the purchase money 
paid by them in the event of the defendants' failure or refusal to perform," id., the Court 
held that the claim was time-barred: 
We must consider first whether plaintiffs' right to recover the 
purchase money paid by them is founded upon the written contract 
although it contains no express provision covering such right. If 
founded upon such contract, then Section 104-2-22. R.S. 1933, 
fixing the limitation at six years, would be applicable. We are of 
the opinion that plaintiffs right to recover the payments made by 
them rests, not upon the written contract, but upon an implied 
promise, created by law, of defendants to repay the purchase 
money paid if they should default in the performance of the 
contract. The action could not be based upon the written contract, 
for it contained no promise by defendants to return the purchase 
price. While it is true that the payments were made under the 
written contract and the relations of the parties were to that extent 
affected by the writing, yet the instrument is not declared on in the 
action to recover the payments made as the basis of the right to 
recover. It is only an incident to an accrual of the right to recover. 
The basis for the recovery rests in the implied promise of 
defendants to return the purchase money which the law creates 
from their duty to return it upon failure by them to perform the 
contract and give plaintiffs what they contracted for. The action 
rests in implied assumpsit as for money had and received. 
-38-
70 P.2d at 885. (Emphasis added; citations omitted.) The Court analogized the right 
to impose a vendee's lien to the right to return of the money paid on the contract and 
applied the four-year statute of limitations to bar the claim. 
Similarly, in Duncan v. Gisborn, 17 Utah 209, 53 P. 1044 (1898), the 
plaintiff entered into a written contract to purchase certain real estate from the 
defendant. Before the final payment under the contract had been made, the plaintiff 
learned that the defendant was unable to convey the property. Plaintiff sued the 
defendant to recover all of the plaintiffs prior payments under the contract. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that the buyer's cause of action was not based on a written 
contract for purposes of the statute of limitations: 
The written contract did not provide for the repayment of the 
money advanced upon it. The vendee, under such a contract, 
cannot institute suit to recover back money paid as consideration 
for the land, and insist that it is still in force. Had the written 
contract provided for a return to the vendee of money advanced 
upon the land in case of the failure of the vendor to convey, an 
action might have been instituted on that provision without a 
rescission. . . . We hold that the action was barred by the statute 
of limitations, relied on, when this suit was commenced. 
Id. at 1045. (Emphasis added; citations omitted.) See also Petty and Riddle, Inc., v. 
Lunt, 104 Utah 130, 132, 138 P.2d 648, 650 (1942) (an obligation for return of money 
paid to another does not arise from a written contract but is implied in law for purposes 
of statute of limitations unless the contract explicitly provides for a return of the 
money). 
The holdings of Brown and Duncan control the present case and require 
dismissal as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts. In the present case, as in 
Brown and Duncan, the New Empire Group had no right under the Alpine Contract to a 
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return of the $330,000 that McKean paid on their behalf in 1979. The only right that 
New Empire had to a refund was an implied right, governed by the four-years statute of 
limitations. McKean's rights as an assignee can be no greater than that of Child, his 
assignor. The claim arose on June 25, 1979, the date of the payment and the demand 
for a release of acreage. Because McKean waited until June 21, 1986, to commence 
this action, it must be dismissed as untimely under the four-year statute of limitations 
provided in Section 78-12-25(1). 
The lower court held that McKean's claim is not barred by the statute of 
limitations because it was filed within six years after the duty to convey property arose. 
(Conclusion of Law No. 8.) This holding is error, since the claim was governed by the 
four-year statute of limitations. 
The lower court further held that "the parties' ability to convey and was 
stayed by the bankruptcy proceedings of Myron Child between February 25, 1982, and 
the time of conveyance by the trustee of its interest in the property on March 21, 1985. 
The statute of limitations was tolled during that time." (Conclusion of Law No. 8.) 
This holding was also in error. The automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 
11 U.S.C. § 362(a), did not stay any claims against McBride or Alpine. It only stayed 
claims against Child, the bankruptcy debtor. 
C. McKean's claims against Simons, Bodell and Geodvne are barred 
by the six-year statute of limitations. 
Even under the six-year statute of limitations argued by McKean, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-23(2) (1992), his claims must fail as against Simons, Bodell, and 
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Geodyne II, who were not added to this action until the Amended Complaint was filed 
in August 31, 1988, which was well after the six-year statute would have run. 
IV. 
McKEAN'S CLAIMS SHOULD BE SET OFF AGAINST 
THE AMOUNTS OWED BY HIS ASSIGNORS TO 
ALPINE UNDER THE ALPINE CONTRACT. 
The evidence at trial showed that Child and the other buyers were in default 
on their obligations under the Alpine Contract by an amount in excess of $4 million.46 
Defendants are entitled to set off that debt owed by Child and the other buyers against 
the debt the McKean claims is owed. 
In Chesnev v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 99 Utah 513, 108 P.2d 514 
(1941), the Utah Supreme Court followed the general rule that an assignee of a chose 
in action takes the assignment subject to rights of set-off that the debtor has against the 
assignor. In other words, a defendant may assert a set-off against the assignee based 
on claims that the defendant has against the assignor. Although the Court's opinion in 
Chesnev was based, in part, on a now-repealed provision of the Utah Code, the Court 
also stated that the rule is valid on principles of common law. The Court called the rule 
a "salutary one" "supported by the weight of judicial opinion." Id. at 518. The Court 
cited to several other cases that had adopted the rule as a matter of common law.47 
46
 According to the Disclosure Statement (Exhibit D-62) filed in connection with 
Child's Third Amended Plan of Reorganization the estimated amount owed to Alpine 
was $4,437,683.93. 
47
 For example, the Court quoted Nut House v. Pacific Oil Mills. 102 Wash. 114, 172 
P. 841, 842, as follows: 
(continued...) 
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Similarly, in First Investment Company v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683 (Utah 
1980), the Supreme Court held that an action by the assignee of two promissory notes 
was subject to the same defenses that the debtor had against the assignor, "for the 
assignor cannot give another a larger right than he has himself." Id. at 686.48 
Applied to the present case, this rule would allow Alpine to claim a set-off 
against McKearis claim in the amount owed by Child and the other buyers to Alpine 
under the Alpine Contract. The evidence at trial showed that Alpine was never paid in 
full under the Alpine Contract. At the time of the assignment by Child, Cook, 
Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire, they were all indebted to Alpine for an amount 
47(.. .continued) 
In an action by an assignee a claim against the assignor can be 
allowed as a set-off, counterclaim, or reconvention, only to the 
extent of the claim sued upon, and judgment cannot be rendered 
against the assignee for the excess. 
108 P.2d at 517. 
48
 See Pacific Northwest Life Insurance Company v. Turnbull. 51 Wash. App. 692, 
754 P.2d 1262, 1267 (1988) ("Ordinarily, an assignee takes a contract subject to any 
defenses or setoffs that an account debtor may have against a creditor/assignor"); 
National Bank of Commerce of Tulsa v. ABC Construction Co.. 442 P.2d 269, 276 
(Okla. 1966) (court held that assignee of a chose in action "acquires no greater right by 
virtue of the assignment than was possessed by the assignor at the time of the 
assignment, but simply 'stands in the shoes of the assignor,' and ordinarily is subject to 
any setoff or counterclaim available to the obligor against the assignor"); Pioneer 
Investment Corp. v. Kassler & Co.. 408 P.2d 803, 804-05 (Wyo. 1965) (court held that 
claims by assignee are subject to any set-off that the debtor has against the assignor). 
See also 80 C.J.S. Set-Off and Counterclaim § 54, at 98-99 ("A cause of action which is 
assigned is generally subject to any right of recoupment, set-off, cross demand or 
counterclaim, as well as being generally subject to any right of compensation held by 
the obligor against the assignor before and at the time of the assignment or notice 
thereof, and this rule applies, although the assignor is bankrupt") (emphasis added). 
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in excess of $4 million dollars. McKean's claims, if he has any, are subject to a set-off 
in that amount for McKean could obtain no greater right than his assignors had. 
The lower court erred in refusing to dismiss McKean's claims because they are 
exceeded by the amount of indebtedness owed by his assignors to Alpine. 
CONCLUSION 
McKean's claim should be dismissed on a variety of grounds, any one of 
which is fatal to his case. The Plan of Reorganization specifically provides that Child 
had forfeited any right to releases under the Alpine Contract. Even if the issue were 
not addressed in the Plan, Child, as the sole owner of the property after he purchased 
the property from his partners, should have raised the claim in his bankruptcy 
proceeding. Having failed to do so, McKean (as Child's assignee) is now barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. He cannot sue on grounds that should have been raised in 
connection with the Plan of Reorganization. In addition, McKean's claims are also 
barred by the statute of limitations, having failed to sue within four years after the 
demand was made for the release of property in 1979. Finally, his claims are subject to 
the set-off that Alpine has against his assignors, which exceed the amount claimed by 
McKean. 
DATED this _J day of December, 1992. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Attorneys for defendants/appellants 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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11 U.S.C. § 541 
11 U.S.C. § 549 
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11 U.S.C. § 1108 
11 U.S.C. § 1141 
Bankruptcy Rule 2002 
Bankruptcy Rule 6004 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) (1992) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2) (1992) 
§ 3 2 3 . Role and capacity of trustee 
(a) The trustee in a case under this title is the representative of the estate. 
(b) The trustee in a case under this title has capacity to sue and be sued. 
Pub.L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2562. 
Historical and Revision Notes 
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, 11 case, section 1107 gives the debtor in pos-
Senate Report No. 95-989. Subsection (a) of session these rights of the trustee: the debtor 
this section makes the trustee the representa- in possession becomes the representative of 
tive of the estate. Subsection (b) grants the the estate, and may sue and be sued. The 
trustee the capacity to sue and to be sued. If same applies in a chapter 13 case, 
the debtor remains in possession in a chapter 
Library References: 
CJ.S. Bankruptcy § 197. 
West's Key No. Digests, Bankruptcy <*=>3008, 3009. 
WESTLAW Electronic Research 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Bankruptcy Highlights. 
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§ 3 4 9 . Effect of dismissal 
(a) Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, the dismissal of a case 
under this title does not bar the discharge, in a later case under this title, of 
debts that were dischargeable in the case dismissed; nor does the dismissal of a 
case under this title prejudice the debtor with regard to the filing of a subse-
quent petition under this title, except as provided in section 109(f) of this title. 
(b) Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a case other 
than under section 742 of this title— 
(1) reinstates— 
(A) any proceeding or custodianship superseded under section 543 
of this title; 
(B) any transfer avoided under section 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 
or 724(a) of this title, or preserved under section 510(cX2), 522(iX2), or 
551 of this title; and 
(C) any lien voided under section 506(d) of this title; 
(2) vacates any order, judgment, or transfer ordered, under section 
522(iXl), 542, 550, or 553 of this title; and 
(3) revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such 
property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case 
under this title. 
Pub.L. 95^598, Nov. 6. 1978. 92 Stat. 2569; Pub.L. 98-353, Title ID, § 303, July 
10, 1984, 98 Stat. 352. 
Historical and Revision Notes 
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, 
Senate Report No. 95-B89. Subsection (a) 
specifies that unless the court for cause orders 
otherwise, the dismissaJ of s case is without 
prejudice. The debtor is not barred from re-
ceiving a discharge in a later case of debts 
that were dischargeable ID the case dismissed. 
Of course, this subsection refers only to pre-
discharge dismissals. If the debtor has al-
ready received a discharge and it is not re-
voked, then the debtor would be barred under 
section 727(a) from receiving a discharge in a 
subsequent liquidation case for six years. Dis-
missal of an involuntary on the merits will 
generally not give rise to adequate cause so as 
to bar the debtor from further relief. 
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Subsection (b) specifies that the dismissal 
reinstates proceedings or custodianships that 
were superseded by the bankruptcy case, rein-
states avoided transfers, reinstates voided 
hens, vacates any order, judgment, or transfer 
ordered as a result of the avoidance of a 
transfer, and revests the property of the estate 
in the entity in which the property was vested 
at the commencement of the case. The court 
is permitted to order a different result for 
cause. The basic purpose of the subsection is 
to undo the bankruptcy case, as far as practi-
cable, and to restore all property rights to the 
position in which they were found at the com-
mencement of the case. This does not neces-
sarily encompass undoing sales of property 
from the estate to a good faith purchaser. 
Where there is a question over the scope of 
the subsection, the court will make the appro-
Cross References 
Applicability of this section in chapter 
Library References: 
CJ.S Bankruptcy §§ 48, 299, 453. 
West's Key No. Digests, Bankruptcy *= 
priate orders to protect rights acquired in 
re 1 lance on the bankruptcy case. 
Legislative Statements. Section 349(bX2) 
of the House amendment adds a cross refer-
ence to section 553 to reflect the new right of 
recovery of setoffs created under that section. 
Corresponding changes are made throughout 
the House amendment. 
Effective Date of 1984 Amendments. See 
section 553 of Pub.L. 98-353, Title ID, July 10, 
1984, 98 Stat. 392, set out as an Effective Date 
of 1984 Amendment note preceding chapter 1 
of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
Separability of Provisions. For separa-
bility of provisions of Title III of Pub.L. 98-
353, see section 551 of Pub.L. 98-353 set out as 
a Separability of Provisions note preceding 
chapter 1 of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
9 cases, see section 901. 
,, 3275, 3718. 
WESTLAW Electronic Research 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Bankruptcy Highlights. 
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WESTLAW Electronic Research 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Bankruptcy Highlights. 
§ 3 6 2 . Automatic stay 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under 
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(aX3) 
of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(aX3)), operates 
as a stay, applicable to all entities, of— 
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceed-
ing against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the 
commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, 
of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this 
title; 
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor 
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the 
debtor; and 
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the Unit-
ed States Tax Court concerning the debtor. 
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or of an 
application under section 5(aX3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 
(15 U.S.C. 78eee(aX3)), does not operate as a stay— 
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continu-
ation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor; 
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of alimony, 
maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate; 
(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect an interest 
in property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to 
such perfection under section 546(b) of this title or to the extent that such 
act is accomplished within the period provided under section 547(eX2XA) of 
this title; 
(4) under subsection (aXl) of this section, of the commencement or 
continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce 
such governmental unit's police or regulatory power; 
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(5) under subsection (aX2) of this section, of the enforcement of a 
judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding 
by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or 
regulatory power; 
(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a commodity 
broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institutions, or 
securities clearing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in 
connection with commodity contracts, as defined in section 761(4) of this 
title, forward contracts, or securities contracts, as defined in section 741(7) of 
this title, that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a 
margin payment, as defined in section 101(34), 741(5), or 761(15) of this title, 
or settlement payment, as defined in section 101(35) or 741(8) of this title, 
arising out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts 
against cash, securities, or other property held by or due from such commod-
ity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institutions, or 
securities clearing agency to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle commodity 
contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts; 
(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a repo partici-
pant, of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with repurchase 
agreements that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a 
margin payment, as defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title, or 
settlement payment, as defined in section 741(8) of this title, arising out of 
repurchase agreements against cash, securities, or other property held by or 
due from such repo participant to margin, guarantee, secure or settle 
repurchase agreements; 
(8) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement of any 
action by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to foreclose a 
mortgage or deed of trust in any case in which the mortgage or deed of trust 
held by the Secretary is insured or was formerly insured under the National 
Housing Act and covers property, or combinations of property, consisting of 
five or more living units; 
(9) under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance to the debtor by a 
governmental unit of a notice of tax deficiency; 
(10) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act by a lessor to the 
debtor under a lease of nonresidential real property that has terminated by 
the expiration of the stated term of the lease before the commencement of or 
during a case under this title to obtain possession of such property; or 
(11) under subsection (a) of this section, of the presentment of a negotia-
ble instrument and the giving of notice of and protesting dishonor of such an 
instrument; 
(12) under subsection (a) of this section, after the date which is 90 days 
after the filing of such petition, of the commencement or continuation, and 
conclusion to the entry of final judgment, of an action which involves a 
debtor subject to reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of this title and 
which was brought by the Secretary of Transportation under the Ship 
Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 App U.S.C. 911 et seq.) (including distribution of any 
proceeds of sale) to foreclose a preferred ship or fleet mortgage, or a security 
interest in or relating to a vessel or vessel under construction, held by the 
Secretary of Transportation under section 207 or title XI of the Merchant 
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Marine Act, 1936 (46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and 1271 et seq., respectively), or 
under applicable State law; 
(13) under subsection (a) of this section, after the date which is 90 days 
after the filing of such petition, of the commencement or continuation, and 
conclusion to the entry of final judgment, of an action which involves a 
debtor subject to reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of this title and 
which was brought by the Secretary of Commerce under the Ship Mortgage 
Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 911 et seq.) (including distribution of any proceeds 
of sale) to foreclose a preferred ship or fleet mortgage in a vessel or a 
mortgage, deed of trust, or other security interest in a fishing facility held by 
the Secretary of Commerce under section 207 or title XI of the Merchant 
Marine Act, 1936 (46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and 1271 et seq., respectively); 
(14)J under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a swap 
participant, of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with any 
swap agreement that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for 
any payment due from the debtor under or in connection with any swap 
agreement against any payment due to the debtor from the swap participant 
under or in connection with any swap agreement or against cash, securities, 
or other property of the debtor held by or due from such swap participant to 
guarantee, secure or settle any swap agreement. 
(14)l under subsection (a) of this section, of any action by an accrediting 
agency regarding the accreditation status of the debtor as an educational 
institution; 
(15) under subsection (a) of this section, of any action by a State 
licensing body regarding the licensure of the debtor as an educational 
institution; or 
(16) under subsection (a) of this section, of any action by a guaranty 
agency, as defined in section 4350") of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
U.S.C. 1001 et seq.) or the Secretary of Education regarding the eligibility of 
the debtor to participate in programs authorized under such Act. 
The provisions of paragraphs (12) and (13) of this subsection shall apply with 
respect to any such petition filed on or before December 31, 1989. 
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this section— 
(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) 
of this section continues until such property is no longer property of the 
estate; and 
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section contin-
ues until the earliest of— 
(A) the time the case is closed; 
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or 
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title concerning an 
individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, the time a 
discharge is granted or denied. 
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the 
court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this 
section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such 
stay— 
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(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in 
property of such party in interest; or 
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) 
of this section, if— 
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and 
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this section for relief 
from the stay of any act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of 
this section, such stay is terminated with respect to the party in interest making 
such request, unless the court, after notice and a hearing, orders such stay 
continued in effect pending the conclusion of, or as a result of, a final hearing 
and determination under subsection (d) of this section. A hearing under this 
subsection may be a preliminary hearing, or may be consolidated with the final 
hearing under subsection (d) of this section. The court shall order such stay 
continued in effect pending the conclusion of the final hearing under subsection 
(d) of this section if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief 
from such stay will prevail at the conclusion of such final hearing. If the 
hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing, then such final hearing 
shall be commenced not later than thirty days after the conclusion of such 
preliminary hearing. 
(0 Upon request of a party in interest, the court, with or without a hearing, 
shall grant such relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section 
as is necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the interest of an entity in 
property, if such interest will suffer such damage before there is an opportunity 
for notice and a hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section. 
(g) In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section concerning relief 
from the stay of any act under subsection (a) of this section— 
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of proof on the issue 
of the debtor's equity in property; and 
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof on all other 
issues. 
(h) An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this 
section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in 
appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages. 
Pub.L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2570; Pub.L. 97-222, § 3, July 27, 1982, 96 
Stat. 235; Pub.L. 9&-353, Title III, §§ 304, 363(b), 392, 441, July 10,1984, 98 Stat. 
352, 363, 365, 371; Pub.L. 99-509, Title V, § 5001(a), Oct. 8,1986, 100 Stat. 1911; 
Pub.L. 99-554, Title II, §§ 2570'), 283(d), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3115, 3116; 
Pub.L. 101-311, Title I, § 102, Title II, § 202, June 25, 1990, 104 Stat. 267, 269; 
Pub.L. 101-508, Title m, § 3007(aXl), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 138&-28. 
1
 See Codification note below. 
Termination of Amendment 
Pub.L. 101-508, § 3008, provided that amendment by Pub.L. 101-508, 
§ 3007(aXD, amending subsec. (bX12) to (16) of this section, cease to be effective 
Oct. 1, 1996. See note below. 
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Historical and Revision Notes 
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, 
Senate Report No. 95-989. The automatic 
stay is one of the fundamental debtor protec-
tions provided by the bankruptcy laws. It 
gives the debtor a breathing spell from his 
creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all 
harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It 
permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or 
reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved 
of the financial pressures that drove him into 
bankruptcy. 
The action commenced by the party seeking 
relief from the stay is referred to as a motion 
to make it clear that at the expedited hearing 
under subsection (e), and at hearings on relief 
from the stay, the only issue will be the lack 
of adequate protection, the debtor's equity in 
the property, and the necessity of the property 
to an effective reorganization of the debtor, or 
the existence of other cause for relief from the 
stay. This hearing will not be the appropriate 
time at which to bring in other issues, such as 
counterclaims against the creditor, which, al-
though relevant to the question of the amount 
of the debt, concern largely collateral or unre-
lated matte re. This approach is consistent 
with that taken in cases such as In re Essex 
Properties, Ltd., 430 F.Supp. 1112 (N.D.Cal. 
1977), that an action seeking relief from the 
stay is not the assertion of a claim which 
would give rise to the right or obligation to 
assert counterclaims. Those counterclaims 
are not to be handled in the summary fashion 
that the preliminary hearing under this provi-
sion will be. Rather, they will be the subject 
of more complete proceedings by the trustee to 
recover property of the estate or to object to 
the allowance of a claim. However, this 
would not preclude the party seeking continu-
ance of the stay from presenting evidence on 
the existence of claims which the court may 
consider in exercising its discretion. What is 
precluded is a determination of such collateral 
claims on the merits at the hearing 
[For additional discussion, see Notes of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Report 
No. 96-989, set out under section 361 of this 
title.] 
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, 
House Report No. 96-595. Paragraph (7) (of 
subeec. (a) ] stays setoffs of mutual debts and 
credits between the debtor and creditors. As 
with all other paragraphs of subsection (a), 
this paragraph does not affect the right of 
creditors. It simply stays its enforcement 
pending an orderly examination of the debt-
or's and creditors' rights. 
Legislative Statements. Section 362(aXD 
of the House amendment adopts the provision 
contained in the Senate amendment enjoining 
the commencement or continuation of a judi-
cial, administrative, or other proceeding to 
recover a claim against the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the case. The 
provision is beneficial and interacts with sec-
tion 362(aX6), which also covers assessment, to 
prevent harassment of the debtor with respect 
to pre-petition claims. 
Section 362(aX7) contains a provision con-
tained in H.R. 8200 as passed by the House. 
The differing provision in the Senate amend-
ment was rejected. It is not possible that a 
debt owing to the debtor may be offset against 
an interest in the debtor. 
Section 362(aX8) is new. The provision 
stays the commencement or continuation of 
any proceeding concerning the debtor before 
the U.S. Tax Court. 
Section 362(bX4) indicates that the stay un-
der section 362(aXD does not apply to affect 
the commencement or continuation of an ac-
tion or proceeding by a governmental unit to 
enforce the governmental unit's police or reg-
ulatory power. This section is intended to be 
given a narrow construction in order to per-
mit governmental units to pursue actions to 
protect the public health and safety and not to 
apply to actions by a governmental unit to 
protect a pecuniary interest in property of the 
debtor or property of the estate. 
Section 362(bX6) of the House amendment 
adopts a provision contained in the Senate 
amendment restricting the exception to the 
automatic stay with respect to setoffs to per-
mit only the setoff of mutual debts and claims. 
Traditionally, the right of setoff has been lim-
ited to mutual debts and claims and the lack 
of the clarifying term "mutual" in H.R. 8200 
as passed by the House created an uninten-
tional ambiguity. Section 362(bX7) of the 
House amendment permits the issuance of a 
notice of tax deficiency. The House amend-
ment rejects section 362(bX7) in the Senate 
amendment. It would have permitted a par-
ticular governmental unit to obtain a pecunia-
ry advantage without a hearing on the merits 
contrary to the exceptions contained in sec-
tions 362(bX4) and (5). 
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Section 362(d) of the House amendment rep-
resents a compromise between comparable 
provisions in the House bill and Senate 
amendment. Under section 362(dXD of the 
House amendment, the court may terminate, 
annul, modify, or condition the automatic stay 
for cause, including lack of adequate protec-
tion of an interest in property of a secured 
party. It is anticipated that the Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure will provide that those 
hearings will receive priority on the calendar. 
Under section 362(dX2) the court may alterna-
tively terminate, annul, modify, or condition 
the automatic stay for cause including inade-
quate protection for the creditor. The court 
shall grant relief from the stay if there is no 
equity and it is not necessary to an effective 
reorganization of the debtor. 
The latter requirement is contained in sec-
tion 362(dX2). This section is intended to 
solve the problem of real property mortgage 
foreclosures of property where the bankruptcy 
petition is filed on the eve of foreclosure. The 
section is not intended to apply if the business 
of the debtor is managing or leasing real prop-
erty, such as a hotel operation, even though 
the debtor has no equity if the property is 
necessary to an effective reorganization of the 
debtor. Similarly, if the debtor does have an 
equity in the property, there is no require-
ment that the property be sold under section 
363 of title 11 as would have been required by 
the Senate amendment. 
Section 362(e) of the House amendment rep-
resents a modification of provisions in H.R. 
8200 as passed by the House and the Senate 
amendment to make clear that a final hearing 
must be commenced within 30 days after a 
preliminary hearing is held to determine 
whether a creditor will be entitled to relief 
from the automatic stay. In order to insure 
that those hearings will in fact occur within 
such 30-day period, it is anticipated that the 
rules of bankruptcy procedure provide that 
such final hearings receive priority on the 
court calendar. 
Section 362(g) places the burden of proof on 
the issue of the debtor's equity in collateral on 
the party requesting relief from the automatic 
stay and the burden on other issues on the 
debtor. 
An amendment has been made to section 
362(b) to permit the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development to 
commence an action to foreclose a mortgage 
or deed of trust. The commencement of such 
an action is necessary for tax purposes. The 
section is not intended to permit the continua-
tion of such an action after it is commenced 
nor is the section to be construed to entitle the 
Secretary to take possession in lieu of foreclo-
sure. 
Sections 362(bX8) and (9) contained in the 
Senate amendment are largely deleted in the 
House amendment. Those provisions add to 
the list of actions not stayed (a) jeopardy as-
sessments, (b) other assessments, and (c) the 
issuance of deficiency notices. In the House 
amendment, jeopardy assessments against 
property which ceases to be property of the 
estate is already authorized by section 362(c) 
(1). Other assessments are specifically stayed 
under section 362(aX6), while the issuance of a 
deficiency notice is specifically permitted. 
Stay of the assessment and the permission to 
issue a statutory notice of a tax deficiency will 
permit the debtor to take his personal tax case 
to the Tax Court, if the bankruptcy judge 
authorizes him to do so (as explained more 
fully in the discussion of section 505.) 
References in Text The National Hous-
ing Act, referred to in subsec. (bX8), is Act 
June 27, 1934, c. 847, 48 Stat. 1246, which is 
classified principally to chapter 13 (§ 1701 et 
seq.) of Title 12, Banks and Banking. 
Such Act, referred to in subsec. (bX16), is 
the Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub.L. 89-
329, as added and amended Pub.L. 99-498, 
Oct. 17, 1986, 100 Stat. 1278, which is classi-
fied principally to chapter 28 (section 1001 et 
seq.) of Title 20, Education. Section 435(j) of 
the Act is classified to section 1085(j) of Title 
20. 
Codification. Renumbering and con-
forming amendments by Pub.L. 101-647 failed 
to take into consideration prior renumbering 
and conforming amendments by Pub.L. 101-
311, thereby resulting in two pars, numbered 
"(14)". To accommodate such duplication, the 
renumbering reflects changes by Pub.L. 101-
311 set out first, and Pub.L. 101-647 set out 
second, but do not reflect the minor con-
forming amendments. 
Effective and Termination Dates of 1990 
Amendment Section 3007(aX3) of Pub.L. 
101-508 provided that: "The amendments 
made by this subsection [amending subsec. 
(bX12) to (16) of this section and section 
541(bXD to (3) of this title] shall be effective 
upon date of enactment of this Act [Nov. 5, 
1990]." 
Section 3008 of Pub.L. 101-508 provided 
that: "The amendments made by this subtitle 
[amending this section, sections 541 and 1328 
of this title, and sections 1078,1078-1,1078-7, 
98 
Title 11 CASE ADMINISTRATION § 363 
1085, 1088, and 1091 of Tide 20, Education, 
and enacting provisions set out as notes under 
this section, and section 1326 of this title, and 
sections 1001,1078, 107&-1, 1078-7, 1085, and 
1088 of Title 20] shall cease [sic] be effective 
on October 1, 1966." 
Effective Date of 1986 Amendments; 
Savings Provisions; Quarterly Fees. 
Amendment by Pub.L. 99-554 effective 30 
days after Oct. 27, 1986, except as otherwise 
provided for, see section 302(a) of Pub.L. 99-
554, set out as a note under section 581 of 
Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure. 
Amendments by Pub.L. 99-554, § 257(j) not 
to apply with respect to cases commenced 
under Title 11, Bankruptcy, before 30 days 
after Oct. 27,1986, see section 302(cXD of Pub. 
L. 99-554, set out as a note under section 581 
of Title 28. 
Cross References 
Applicability of this section in chapter 9 cases, see section 901. 
Assessment of taxes against estate, see section 505. 
Effect of this section on subchapter m of chapter 7, see section 742. 
Enforcement of claims against debtor in chapter 9 cases, automatic stay of, see section 
922. 
Extension of time generally, see section 108. 
Priorities, see section 507. 
Right of possession of party with security interest in 
Aircraft equipment and vessels, see section 1110. 
Rolling stock equipment, see section 1168. 
Setoff, see section 553. 
Turnover of property to estate, see section 542. 
Library References: 
OJ.S. Bankruptcy § 65 et seq. 
West's Key No. Digests, Bankruptcy «=»239l et seq. 
WESTLAW Electronic Research 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Bankruptcy Highlights. 
Section 5001(b) of Pub.L. 9&-509 provided 
that: 'The amendments made by subsection 
(a) of this section [amending this section] shaii 
apply only to petitions filed under section 362 
of title 11, United States Code, which are 
made after August 1, 1986." 
Effective Date of 1984 Amendments. See 
section 553 of PubX. 98-353, Title III, July 10, 
1984, 98 Stat. 392, set out as an Effective Date 
of 1984 Amendment note preceding chapter 1 
of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
Separability of Provisions. For separa-
bility of provisions of Title 111 of Pub.L. 98-
353, see section 551 of Pub.L. 98-353 set out as 
a Separability of Provisions note preceding 
chapter 1 of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
S U B C H A P T E R I I I — T H E E S T A T E 
§ 5 4 1 , Property of the estate 
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title 
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, 
wherever located and by whomever held: 
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (cX2) of this section, all 
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commence-
ment of the case. 
(2) All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community 
property as of the commencement of the case that is— 
(A) under the sole, equal, or joint management and control of the 
debtor; or 
(B) liable for an allowable claim against the debtor, or for both an 
allowable claim against the debtor and an allowable claim against the 
debtor's spouse, to the extent that such interest is so liable. 
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under section 
329(b), 363(n), 543, 550, 553, or 723 of this title. 
(4) Any interest in property preserved for the benefit of or ordered 
transferred to the estate under section 510(c) or 551 of this title. 
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(5) Any interest in property that would have been property of the estate 
if such interest had been an interest of the debtor on the date of the filing of 
the petition, and that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire 
within 180 days after such date— 
(A) by bequest, devise, or inheritance; 
(B) as a result of a property settlement agreement with the debtor's 
spouse, or of an interlocutory or final divorce decree; or 
(C) as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or of a death benefit 
plan. 
(6) Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of 
the estate, except such as are earnings from services performed by an 
individual debtor after the commencement of the case. 
(7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires after the com-
mencement of the case. 
(b) Property of the estate does not include— 
(1) any power that the debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of an 
entity other than the debtor; 
(2) any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease of nonresidential 
real property that has terminated at the expiration of the stated term of 
such lease before the commencement of the case under this title, and ceases 
to include any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease of nonresiden-
tial real property that has terminated at the expiration of the stated term of 
such lease during the case; or 
(3) any eligibility of the debtor to participate in programs authorized 
under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 
2751 et seq.), or any accreditation status or State licensure of the debtor as 
an educational institution. 
(cXD Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an interest of 
the debtor in property becomes property of the estate under subsection (aXD, (a) 
(2), or (aX5) of this section notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, 
transfer instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law— 
(A) that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the debtor; 
or 
(B) that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the 
debtor, on the commencement of a case under this title, or on the appoint-
ment of or talcing possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a 
custodian before such commencement and that effects or gives an option to 
effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the debtor's interest in 
property. 
(2) A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a 
trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a 
case under this title. 
(d) Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the case, 
only legal title and not an equitable interest, such as a mortgage secured by real 
property, or an interest in such a mortgage, sold by the debtor but as to which 
the debtor retains legal title to service or supervise the servicing of such 
mortgage or interest, becomes property of the estate under subsection (aXl) or (2) 
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of this section only to the extent of the debtor's legal title to such property, but 
not to the extent of any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does 
not hold. 
Pub.L. 95-698, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2594; Pub.L. 98-353, Title ffi, §§ 363(a), 
456, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 363, 376; Pub.L. 101-508, Title ffl, § 3007(aX2), Nov. 
5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388-28. 
Termination of Amendment 
Pub.L. 101-508, § 3008, provided that amendment by Pub.L. 101-508, 
§ 3007(aX2), amending subsec. (b) of this section, to cease to be effective Oct. 1, 
1996. See note under section 362 of this title. 
Historical and Revision Notes 
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, 
Senate Report No. 95-989. This section de-
fines property of the estate, and specifies what 
property becomes property of the estate. The 
commencement of a bankruptcy case creates 
an estate. Under paragraph (1) of subsection 
(a), the estate is comprised of all legal or 
equitable interest of the debtor in property, 
wherever located, as of the commencement of 
the case. The scope of this paragraph is 
broad. It includes all kinds of property, in-
cluding tangible or intangible property, causes 
of action (see Bankruptcy Act § 70a(6) [former 
section ll(XaX6) of this title]), and all other 
forms of property currently specified in sec-
tion 70a of the Bankruptcy Act § 70a [former 
section 110(a) of this title], as well as property 
recovered by the trustee under section 542 of 
proposed title 11, if the property recovered 
was merely out of the possession of the debtor, 
yet remained "property of the debtor." The 
debtor's interest in property also includes "ti-
tle" to property, which is an interest, just as 
are a possessory interest, or leasehold interest, 
for example. The result of Segal v. Rochelle, 
382 U.S. 375 (1966) [86 S.Ct. 511. 15 L.Ed.2d 
428], is followed, and the right to a refund is 
property of the estate. 
Though this paragraph will include choses 
in action and claims by the debtor against 
others, it is not intended to expand the debt-
or's rights against others more than they exist 
at the commencement of the case. For exam-
ple, if the debtor has a claim that is barred at 
the time of the commencement of the case by 
the statute of limitations, then the trustee 
would not be able to pursue that claim, be-
cause he too would be barred. He could take 
no greater rights than the debtor himself had. 
But see proposed 11 U.S.C. 108, which would 
permit the trustee a tolling of the statute of 
limitations if it had not run before the date of 
the filing of the petition. 
Paragraph (1) has the effect of overruling 
Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 
(1903) [23 S.Ct. 751, 47 L.Ed. 1061, 10 Am. 
Bankr.Rep. 107], because it includes as proper-
ty of the estate all property of the debtor, even 
that needed for a fresh start. After the prop-
erty comes into the estate, then the debtor is 
permitted to exempt it under proposed 11 
U.S.C. 522, and the court will have jurisdic-
tion to determine what property may be ex-
empted and what remains as property of the 
estate. The broad jurisdictional grant in pro-
posed 28 U.S.C. 1334 would have the effect of 
overruling Lockwood independently of the 
change made by this provision. 
Paragraph (1) also has the effect of overrul-
ing Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970) [91 
S.Ct. 113, 27 L.Ed.2d 124]. 
Situations occasionally arise where property 
ostensibly belonging to the debtor will actual-
ly not be property of the debtor, but will be 
held in trust for another. For example, if the 
debtor has incurred medical bills that were 
covered by insurance, and the insurance com-
pany had sent the payment of the bills to the 
debtor before the debtor had paid the bill for 
which the payment was reimbursement, the 
payment would actually be held in construc-
tive trust for the person to whom the bill was 
owed. This section and proposed 11 U.S.C. 
545 also will not affect various statutory pro-
visions that give a creditor of the debtor a lien 
that is valid outside as well as inside bank-
ruptcy, or that creates a trust fund for the 
benefit of a creditor of the debtor. See Pack-
ers and Stockyards Act § 206, 7 U.S.C. 196 
[section 196 of Title 7, Agriculture]. 
Bankruptcy Act § 8 [former section 26 of 
this title] has been deleted as unnecessary. 
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Once the estate is created, no interests in 
property of the estate remain in the debtor. 
Consequently, if the debtor dies during the 
case, only property exempted from property of 
the estate or acquired by the debtor after the 
commencement of the case and not included 
as property of the estate will be available to 
the representative of the debtor's probate es-
tate. The bankruptcy proceeding will contin-
ue in rem with respect to property of the 
state, and the discharge will apply in per-
sonam to relieve the debtor, and thus his 
probate representative, of liability for dis-
chargeable debts. 
The estate also includes the interests of the 
debtor and the debtor's spouse in community 
property, subject to certain limitations; prop-
erty that the trustee recovers under the avoid-
ing powers; property that the debtor acquires 
by bequest, devise, inheritance, a property set-
tlement agreement with the debtor's spouse, 
or as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy 
within 180 days after the petition; and pro-
ceeds, product, offspring, rents, and profits of 
or from property of the estate, except such as 
are earning from services performed by an 
individual debtor after the commencement of 
the case. Proceeds here is not used in a 
confining sense, as defined in the Uniform 
Commercial Code, but is intended to be a 
broad term to encompass all proceeds of prop-
erty of the estate. The conversion in form of 
property of the estate does not change its 
character as property of the estate. 
Subsection (b) excludes from property of the 
estate any power, such as a power of appoint-
ment, that the debtor may exercise solely for 
the benefit of an entity other than the debtor. 
This changes present law which excludes pow-
ers solely benefiting other persons but not 
other entities. 
Subsection (c) invalidates restrictions on the 
transfer of property of the debtor, in order 
that all of the interests of the debtor in prop-
erty will become property of the estate. The 
provisions invalidated are those that restrict 
or condition transfer of the debtor's interest, 
and those that are conditioned on the insol-
vency or financial condition of the debtor, on 
the commencement of a bankruptcy case, or 
on the appointment of a custodian of the debt-
or's property. Paragraph (2) of subsection (c), 
however, preserves restrictions on a transfer 
of a spendthrift trust that the restriction is 
enforceable nonbankruptcy law to the extent 
of the income reasonably necessary for the 
support of a debtor and his dependents. 
Subsection (d) [now (e)], derived from sec-
tion 70c of the Bankruptcy Act [former section 
110(c) of this title], gives the estate the benefit 
of all defenses available to the debtor as 
against an entity other than the estate, in-
cluding such defenses as statutes of limita-
tions, statutes of frauds, usury, and other per-
sonal defenses, and makes waiver by the 
debtor after the commencement of the case 
ineffective to bind the estate. 
Section 541(e) [now (d)] confirms the cur-
rent status under the Bankruptcy Act [former 
Title 11] of bona fide secondary mortgage mar-
ket transactions as the purchase and sale of 
assets. Mortgages or interests in mortgages 
sold in the secondary market should not be 
considered as part of the debtor's estate. To 
permit the efficient servicing of mortgages or 
interests in mortgages the seller often retains 
the original mortgage notes and related docu-
ments, and the purchaser records under State 
recording statutes the purchaser's ownership 
of the mortgages or interests in mortgages 
purchased. Section 541(e) makes clear that 
the seller's retention of the mortgage docu-
ments and the purchaser's decision not to 
record do not impair the asset sale character 
of secondary mortgage market transactions. 
The committee notes that in secondary mort-
gage market transactions the parties may 
characterize their relationship as one of trust, 
agency, or independent contractor. The char-
acterization adopted by the parties should not 
affect the statutes in bankruptcy on bona fide 
secondary mortgage market purchases and 
sales. 
Legislative Statements. Section 541(aX7) 
is new. The provision clarifies that any inter-
est in property that the estate acquires after 
the commencement of the case is property of 
the estate; for example, if the estate enters 
into a contract, after the commencement of 
the case, such a contract would be property of 
the estate. The addition of this provision by 
the House amendment merely clarifies that 
section 541(a) is an all-embracing definition 
which includes charges on property, such as 
hens held by the debtor on property of a third 
party, or beneficial rights and interests that 
the debtor may have in property of another. 
However, only the debtor's interest in such 
property becomes property of the estate. If 
the debtor holds bare legal title or holds prop-
erty in trust for another, only those rights 
which the debtor would have otherwise had 
emanating from such interest pass to the es-
tate under section 541. Neither this section 
nor section 545 will affect various statutory 
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provisions that give a creditor a lien that is 
valid both inside and outside bankruptcy 
against a bona fide purchaser of property from 
the debtor, or that creates a trust fund for the 
benefit of creditors meeting similar criteria. 
See Packers and Stockyards Act § 206, 7 
U.S.C. 196 (1976) [section 196 of Title 7, Agri-
culture]. 
Section 541(cX2) follows the position taken 
in the House bill and rejects the position tak-
en in the Senate amendment with respect to 
income limitations on a spend-thrift trust. 
Section 541(d) of the House amendment is 
derived from section 641(e) of the Senate 
amendment and reiterates the general princi-
ple that where the debtor holds bare legal 
title without any equitable interest, that the 
estate acquires bare legal title without any 
equitable interest m the property. The pur-
pose of section 541(d) as applied to the second-
ary mortgage market is identical to the pur-
pose of section 54 Ue} of the Senate 
amendment and section 541(d) will accomplish 
the same result as would have been accom-
plished by section 541(e). Even if a mortgage 
seller retains for purposes of servicing legal 
title to mortgages or interests in mortgages 
sold in the secondary mortgage market, the 
trustee would be required by section 541(d) to 
turn over the mortgages or interests in mort-
gages to the purchaser of those mortgages. 
The seller of mortgages in the secondary 
mortgage, market will often retain the original 
mortgage notes and related documents and 
the seller will not endorse the notes to reflect 
the sale to the purchaser Similarly, the pur-
chaser will often not record the purchaser's 
ownership of the mortgages or interests in 
mortgages under State recording statutes 
These facts are irrelevant and the seller's 
retention of the mortgage documents and the 
purchaser's decision not to record do not 
change the \raB\ees ob\vga\ion vo \urn \he 
mortgages or interests in mortgages over to 
the purchaser The application of section 
541(d) to secondary mortgage market transac-
tions will not be affected by the terms of the 
servicing agreement between the mortgage 
servicer and the purchaser of the mortgages 
Under section 541(d). the trustee is required to 
recognize the purchasers title to the mort-
gages or interests in mortgages and to turn 
this property over to the purchaser It makes 
no difference whether the servicer and the 
purchaser characterize their relationship as 
one of trust, agency, or independent contrac-
tor. 
The purpose of section 541(d) as applied to 
the secondary mortgage market is therefore to 
make certain that secondary mortgage market 
sales as they are currently structured are not 
subject to challenge by bankruptcy trustees 
and that purchasers of mortgages will be able 
to obtain the mortgages or interests in mort-
gages which they have purchased from trust-
ees without the trustees asserting that a sale 
of mortgages is a loan from the purchaser to 
the seller. 
Thus, as section 541(aXD clearly states, the 
estate is comprised of all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case. To the extent 
such an interest is limited in the hands of the 
debtor, it is equally limited in the hands of the 
estate except to the extent that defenses 
which are personal against the debtor are not 
effective against the estate. 
The Senate amendment provided that prop-
erty of the estate does not include amounts 
held by the debtor as trustee and any taxes 
withheld or collected from others before the 
commencement of the case. The House 
amendment removes these two provisions. As 
to property held by the debtor as a trustee, 
the House amendment provides that property 
of the estate will include whatever interest 
the debtor held in the property at the com-
mencement of the case. Thus, where the 
debtor held only legal title to the property and 
the beneficial interest in that property be-
longs to another, such as exists in the case of 
property held in trust, the property of the 
estate includes the legal title, but not the 
beneficial interest in the property. 
As to withheld taxes, the House amendment 
deletes the rule in the Senate bill as unneces-
sary since property of the estate does not 
include the beneficial interest in property 
held by the debtor as a trustee. Under the 
\nieTT*a\ Revenue Code of 1954 Section 7501 
(section 7501 of Title 26, Internal Revenue 
Code)), the amounts of withheld taxes are 
held to be a special fund in trust for the 
United States. Where the Internal Revenue 
Service can demonstrate that the amounts of 
taxes withheld are still in the possession of 
the debtor at the commencement of the case, 
then if a trust is created, those amounts are 
not property of the estate. Compare In re 
Shakesteers Coffee Shops, 546 F.2d 821 (9th 
Cir-1976) with In re Glynn Wholesale Building 
Materials, Inc. (S.D.Ga.1978) and In re Pro-
gress Tech Colleges, Inc., 42 Aftr 2d 78-5573 
(S.D.Ohio 1977). 
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WESTLAW Electronic Research 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Bankruptcy Highlights, 
§ 5 4 9 . Postpetition transactions 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, the trustee may 
avoid a transfer of property of the estate— 
(1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and 
(2XA) that is authorized only under section 303(f) or 542(c) of this title; 
or 
(B) that is not authorized under this title or by the court. 
(b) * In an involuntary case, a transfer made after the commencement of 
such case but before the order for relief to the extent any value, including 
services, but not including satisfaction or securing of a debt that arose before the 
commencement of the case, is given after the commencement of the case in 
exchange for such transfer, notwithstanding any notice or knowledge of the case 
that the transferee has. 
(c) The trustee may not avoid under subsection (a) of this section a transfer 
of real property to a good faith purchaser without knowledge of the commence-
ment of the case and for present fair equivalent value unless a copy or notice of 
the petition was filed, where a transfer of such real property may be recorded to 
perfect such transfer, before such transfer is so perfected that a bona fide 
purchaser of such property, against whom applicable law permits such transfer 
to be perfected, could not acquire an interest that is superior to the interest of 
such good faith purchaser. A good faith purchaser without knowledge of the 
commencement of the case and for less than present fair equivalent value has a 
lien on the property transferred to the extent of any present value given, unless 
a copy or notice of the petition was so filed before such transfer was so perfected. 
(d) An action or proceeding under this section may not be commenced after 
the earlier of— 
(1) two years after the date of the transfer sought to be avoided; or 
(2) the time the case is closed or dismissed. 
Pub.L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2601; Pub.L. 98-353, Title m, § 464, July 
10, 1984, 98 Stat. 379; Pub.L. 99-554, Title H, § 283(o), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 
3117. 
1
 See Codification note below. 
Historical and Revision Notes 
Note* of Committee on the Judiciary, 
Senate Report No. 95-989. This section 
modifies section 70d of current law [former 
section 110(d) of this title]. It permits the 
trustee to avoid transfers of property that 
occur after the commencement of the case. 
The transfer must either have been unautho-
rized, or authorized under a section that pro-
tects only the transferor. Subsection (b) pro-
tects "involuntary gap" transferees to the 
extent of any value (including services, but 
not including satisfaction of a debt that arose 
before the commencement of the case), given 
after commencement in exchange for the 
transfer. Notice or knowledge of the transfer-
ee is irrelevant in determining whether he is 
protected under this provision. 
Legislative Statements. Section 549 of 
the House amendment has been redrafted in 
order to incorporate sections 342(b) and (c) of 
the Senate amendment. Those sections have 
been consolidated and redrafted in section 
549(c) of the House amendment. Section 
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549(d) of the House amendment adopts a pro-
vision contained in section 549(c) of the Senate 
amendment. 
Codification. Section 464(aX3) to (5) of 
Pub.L. 9&-353 (H.R. 5174) purported to amend 
subsec. (a) of this section. Par. (3) directed 
that "made" be substituted for "that occurs". 
Par. (4) directed that ,Jto the extent" be substi-
tuted for "is valid against the trustee to the 
extent of Par (5) directed that "is" be in-
serted before "given". 
The predecessor bill to H.R. 5174 was S. 445. 
Section 361 of the predecessor bill set out the 
amendments to subsecs. (a) and (b) of this 
section in such a manner that indicated that 
Congress did not intend to amend subsec (a) 
of this section by Pub.L 98-353 § 464(aX3) to 
(5) 
S 445, § 361, contained subsecs. (a), (b), and 
(c) Only subsecs (a) and (b) thereof are perti-
nent here Such subsecs. (a) and (b) read as 
follows 
SEC. 361 (a) Section 549(a) of title 11 of 
the United States Code is amended— 
(1) by striking out "(b) and (c)" and in-
serting in lieu thereof "(b) or (c)"f and 
(2) in paragraph (2XA), by inserting "on-
ly" after "authorized". 
(b) Section 549(b) of title 11 of the United 
States Code is amended by— 
(1) inserting "the trustee may not avoid 
under subsection (a) of this section," after 
"involuntary case,"; 
(2) striking out "that occurs" and in-
serting in lieu thereof "made"; 
(3) striking out "is valid against the trus-
tee to the extent of and inserting in lieu 
thereof "to the extent"; and 
(4) inserting "is" before "given" 
Section 464 of Pub L 98-353 contained sub-
secs (a) and (c), no subsec (b) appeared there-
in Only subsec (a) is pertinent here Sub-
sec (a) read as follows 
SEC. 464. (a) Section 549(a) of title 11 of 
the United States Code is amended— 
(1) by striking out "(b) and (c)" and in-
serting in lieu thereof "(b) or (c)"; and 
(2) in paragraph (2XA), by inserting "on-
ly" after "authorized". 
(3) striking out "that occurs" and in-
serting in lieu thereof "made"; 
(4) striking out "is valid against the trus-
tee to the extent o f and inserting in lieu 
thereof "to the extent"; and 
(5) inserting "is" before "given" 
A comparison thus reveals that Congress 
had intended subsec. (bXD to (4) of section 361 
of S. 445 to amend subsec. (b) of this section 
and to restrict to subsec. (b) of this section the 
amendments directed to be made by Pub.L. 
98-353 § 464(aX3) to (5). Accordingly, the 
amendments specified by Pub.L. 98-353 
§ 464(aX3) to (5) were not executed to subsec. 
(a) of this section. Nor were the amendments 
specified by Pub.L. 98-353 § 464(aX3) to (5) 
executed to subsec. (b) of this section as the 
probable intent of Congress since this would 
result in an unintelligible provision being set 
out as subsec. (b) absent the unenacted amend-
ments which appeared only in the predecessor 
bill, i.e., S. 445, § 361(bXD and (2). 
Such amendments were later effectuated by 
Pub.L. 99-554. 
Effective Date of 1986 Amendments; 
Savings Provisions; Quarterly fees. 
Amendment by Pub.L. 99-554 effective 30 
days after Oct. 27, 1986, except as otherwise 
provided for, see section 302(a) of Pub.L. 99-
554, set out as a note under section 581 of 
Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure. 
Effective Date of 1984 Amendments. See 
section 553 of Pub.L. 9&-353, Title HI, July 10, 
1984, 98 Stat. 392, set out as an Effective Date 
of 1984 Amendment note preceding chapter 1 
of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
Separability of Provisions. For separa-
bility of provisions of Title IE of Pub.L 98-
353, see section 551 of Pub.L 98-353 set out as 
a Separability of Provisions note preceding 
chapter 1 of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
Cross References 
Applicability of subsecs (a), (c) and (d) of this section in chapter 9 cases, see section 
901 
Appointment of trustee upon debtor's refusal to pursue cause of action under this 
section, see section 926 
Commencement of involuntary cases by transferees of voidable transfers, see section 
303. 
Disallowance of claims of entity that is transferee of avoidable transfer, see section 
502. 
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Library References; 
CJ.S. Bankruptcy § 121. 
West's Key No. Digests, Bankruptcy *=2573. 
WESTLAW Electronic Research 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Bankruptcy Highlights. 
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Library References: 
C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 121. 
West's Key No. Digests, Bankruptcy «=>2573. 
WESTLAW Electronic Research 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Bankruptcy Highlights. 
§ 553. Setoff 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and 363 
of this title, this title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual 
debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of 
the case under this title against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case, except to the extent that— 
(1) the claim of such creditor against the debtor is disallowed other than 
under section 502(bX3) of this title; 
(2) such claim was transferred, by an entity other than the debtor, to 
such creditor— 
(A) after the commencement of the case; or 
(BXi) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and 
(ii) while the debtor was insolvent; or 
(3) the debt owed to the debtor by such creditor was incurred by such 
creditor— 
(A) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; 
(B) while the debtor was insolvent; and 
(C) for the purpose of obtaining a right of setoff against the debtor. 
(bXD Except with respect to a setoff of a kind described in section 362(bX6), 
362(bX7), 362(bX14), 365(hX2), or 365GX2) of this title, if a creditor offsets a 
mutual debt owing to the debtor against a claim against the debtor on or within 
90 days before the date of the filing of the petition, then the trustee may recover 
from such creditor the amount so offset to the extent that any insufficiency on 
the date of such setoff is less than the insufficiency on the later of— 
(A) 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and 
(B) the first date during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of 
the filing of the petition on which there is an insufficiency. 
(2) In this subsection, "insufficiency" means amount, if any, by which a 
claim against the debtor exceeds a mutual debt owing to the debtor by the holder 
of such claim. 
(c) For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been 
insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing 
of the petition. 
Pub.L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2602; Pub.L. 98-353, Title m, §§ 395, 467, 
July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 365, 380; Pub.L. 101-311, Title I, § 105, June 25, 1990, 
104 Stat. 268. 
Historical and Revision Notes 
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, serves, with some changes, the right of setoff 
Senate Report No. 95-989. This section pre- in bankruptcy cases now found in section 68 of 
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the Bankruptcy Act [former section 108 of this 
title]. One exception to the right is the auto-
matic stay, discussed in connection with pro-
posed 11 U.S.C. 362. Another is the right of 
the trustee to use property under section 363 
that is subject to a right of setoff. 
The section states that the right of setoff is 
unaffected by the bankruptcy code [this title] 
except to the extent that the creditor's claim 
is disallowed, the creditor acquired (other 
than from the debtor) the claim during the 90 
days preceding the case while the debtor was 
insolvent, the debt being offset was incurred 
for the purpose of obtaining a right of setoff, 
while the debtor was insolvent and during the 
90-day prebankniptcy period, or the creditor 
improved his position in the 90-day period 
(similar to the improvement in position test 
found in the preference section 547(cX5)). On-
ly the last exception is an addition to current 
law. 
Cross References 
Allowance of claims or interests, see section 502. 
Applicability of this section in chapter 9 cases, see section 901. 
Determination of secured status, see section 506. 
Effect of dismissal, see section 349. 
Recovered property as exempt, see section 522. 
Library References: 
C.J.S. Bankruptcy §§ 164 et seq., 245. 
West's Key No. Digests, Bankruptcy *=>2671-2680. 
As under section 547(f), the debtor is pre-
sumed to have been insolvent during the 90 
days before the case. 
Legislative Statements. Section 553 of 
the House amendment is derived from a simi-
lar provision contained in the Senate amend-
ment, but is modified to clarify application of 
a two-point test with respect to setoffs. 
Effective Date of 1984 Amendments. See 
section 553 of Pub.L. 98-353, Title III, July 10, 
1984, 98 Stat. 392, set out as an Effective Date 
of 1984 Amendment note preceding chapter 1 
of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
Separability of Provisions, For separa-
bility of provisions of Title m of Pub.L. 98-
353, see section 551 of Pub.L. 98-353 set out as 
a Separability of Provisions note preceding 
chapter 1 of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
§ 1108* Authorization to operate business 
Unless the court, on request of a party in interest and after notice and a 
hearing, orders otherwise, the trustee may operate the debtor's business. 
Pub.L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2629; Pub.L. 98-353, Title III, § 504, July 
10, 1984, 98 Stat. 384. 
Cross References 
Authorization to operate business in chapter 7 cases, see section 721. 
Executory contracts and unexpired leases, see section 365. 
Executory contracts in stockbroker liquidation cases, see section 744. 
Obtaining credit, see section 364. 
Retention or replacement of professional persons, see section 327. 
Treatment of accounts in 
Commodity broker liquidation cases, see section 763. 
Stockbroker liquidation cases, see section 745. 
Use, sale or lease of property, see section 363. 
Utility service, see section 366. 
Library References: 
C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 199. 
West's Key No. Digests, Bankruptcy *»3025, 3026. 
SUBCHAPTER III—POSTCONFIRMATION MATTERS 
§ 1 1 4 1 . Effect of confirmation 
(a) Except as provided in subsections (dX2) and (dX3) of this section, the 
provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor, any entity issuing securities 
under the plan, any entity acquiring property under the plan, and any creditor, 
equity security holder, or general partner in the debtor, whether or not the claim 
or interest of such creditor, equity security holder, or general partner is impaired 
under the plan and whether or not such creditor, equity security holder, or 
general partner has accepted the plan. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the 
plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the 
debtor. 
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(c) Except as provided in subsections (dX2) and (dX3) of this section and 
except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, 
after confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear 
of all claims and interests of creditors, equity security holders, and of general 
partners in the debtor. 
(dXD Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the plan, or in the 
order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan— 
(A) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of 
such confirmation, and any debt of a kind specified in section 502(g), 502(h), 
or 502(i) of this title, whether or not— 
(i) a proof of the claim based on such debt is filed or deemed filed 
under section 501 of this title; 
(ii) such claim is allowed under section 502 of this title; or 
(iii) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan; and 
(B) terminates all rights and interests of equity security holders and 
general partners provided for by the plan. 
(2) The confirmation of a plan does not discharge an individual debtor from 
any debt excepted from discharge under section 523 of this title. 
(3) The confirmation of a plan does not discharge a debtor if— 
(A) the plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the 
property of the estate; 
(B) the debtor does not engage in business after consummation of the 
plan; and 
(C) the debtor would be denied a discharge under section 727(a) of this 
title if the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title. 
(4) The court may approve a written waiver of discharge executed by the 
debtor after the order for relief under this chapter. 
Pub.L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2638; Pub.L. 98-353, Title m, § 513, July 
10, 1984, 98 Stat. 388. 
Historical and Revision Notes 
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, 
8enate Report No. 95-889. Subsection (a) of 
this section makes the provisions of a con-
firmed plan binding on the debtor, any entity 
issuing securities under the plan, any entity 
acquiring property under the plan, and any 
creditor, equity security holder, or general 
partner in the debtor, whether or not the 
claim or interest of the creditor, equity securi-
ty holder, or partner is impaired under the 
plan and whether or not he has accepted the 
plan There are two exceptions, enumerated 
in paragraph (2) and (3) of subsection (d) 
Unless the plan or the order confirming the 
plan provides otherwise, the confirmation of a 
plan vests all of the property of the estate in 
the debtor and releases it from all claims and 
interests of creditors, equity security holders 
and general partners. 
Subsection (d) contains the discharge for a 
reorganized debtor. Paragraph (1) specifies 
that the confirmation of a plan discharges the 
debtor from any debt that arose before the 
date of the order for relief unless the plan or 
the order confirming the plan provides other-
wise. The discharge is effective against those 
claims whether or not proof of the claim is 
filed (or deemed filed), and whether or not the 
claim is allowed. The discharge also termi-
nates all rights and interests of equity securi-
ty holders and general partners provided for 
by the plan. The paragraph permits the plan 
or the order confirming the plan to provide 
otherwise, and excepts certain debts from the 
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discharge as provided in paragraphs (2) and 
(3). 
Paragraph (2) of subsection (d) makes clear 
what taxes remain nondischargeable in the 
case of a corporate debtor emerging from a 
reorganization under chapter 11. Nondis-
chargeable taxes in such a reorganization are 
the priority taxes (under section 507) and tax 
payments which come due during and after 
the proceeding under a deferred or part-pay-
ment agreement which the debtor had entered 
into with the tax authority before the bank-
ruptcy proceedings began. On the other 
hand, a corporation which is taken over by its 
creditors through a plan of reorganization will 
not continue to be liable for nonpriority taxes 
arising from the corporation's prepetition 
fraud, failure to file a return, or failure to file 
a timely return, since the creditors who take 
over the reorganized company should not bear 
the burden of acts for which the creditors 
were not at fault. 
Paragraph (3) specifies that the debtor is 
not discharged by the confirmation of a plan if 
the plan is a liquidating plan and if the debtor 
would be denied discharge in a liquidation 
case under section 727. Specifically, if all or 
substantially all of the distribution under the 
plan is of all or substantially all of the proper-
ty of the estate or the proceeds of it, if the 
business, if any, of the debtor does not contin-
ue, and if the debtor would be denied a dis-
charge under section 727 (such as if the debtor 
were not an individual or if he had committed 
an act that would lead to a denial of dis-
charge), the chapter 11 discharge is not grant-
ed. 
Paragraph (4) authorizes the court to ap-
prove a waiver of discharge by the debtor. 
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, 
House Report No. 95-595. Paragraph (2) [of 
subsec. (d) ] makes applicable to an individual 
debtor the general exceptions to discharge 
that are enumerated in section 523(a) of the 
bankruptcy code [this title]. 
Legislative Statements. Section 1141(d) of 
the House amendment is derived from a com-
parable provision contained in the Senate 
amendment However, section 1141(dX2) of 
the House amendment is derived from the 
House bill as preferable to the Senate amend-
ment. It is necessary for a corporation or 
partnership undergoing reorganization to be 
able to present its creditors with a fixed list of 
liabilities upon which the creditors or third 
parties can make intelligent decisions. Re-
taining an exception for discharge with re-
spect to nondischargeable taxes would leave 
an undesirable uncertainty surrounding reor-
ganizations that is unacceptable. Section 
1141(dX3) is derived from the Senate amend-
ment. Section 1141(dX4) is likewise derived 
from the Senate amendment. 
Effective Date of 1984 Amendments. See 
section 553 of Pub.L. 98-353, Title m, July 10, 
1984, 98 Stat. 392, set out as an Effective Date 
of 1984 Amendment note preceding chapter 1 
of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
Separability of Provisions. For separa-
bility of provisions of Title HI of Pub.L. 98-
353, see section 551 of Pub.L. 98-353 set out as 
a Separability of Provisions note preceding 
chapter 1 of Title 11, Bankruptcy. 
Cross References 
Confirmation of plan filed under this chapter, see section 1129. 
Discharge under chapter 7, see section 727. 
Effect of confirmation of plans filed in 
Chapter 9 cases, see section 944 
Chapter 13 cases, see section 1327 
Effect of conversion, see section 348 
Effect of discharge, see section 524 
Exceptions to discharge, see section 523 
Failure of discharge as cause for conversion, see section 1112. 
Library References: 
CJS. Bankruptcy §§ 407. 408 
West's Key No Digests, Bankruptcy a3568(l-3). 
WESTLAW Electronic Research 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Bankruptcy Highlights. 
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NOTICES TO CREDITORS, EQUITY SECURITY HOLDERS, 
UNITED STATES, AND UNITED STATES TRUSTEE 
(a) Twenty-Day Notices to Partiei in Interest Except as provided in 
subdivisions (h), (i) and (/) of this rule, the clerk, or some other person as the 
court may direct, shall give the debtor, the trustee, all creditors and indenture 
trustees not less than 20 days notice by mail of (1) the meeting of creditors 
pursuant to $ 341 of the Code; (2) a proposed use, sale, or lease of property of the 
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estate other than in the ordinary course of business, unless the court for cause 
shown shortens the time or directs another method of giving notice; (3) the 
hearing on approval of a compromise or settlement of a controversy other than 
approval of an agreement pursuant to Rule 4001(d), unless the court for cause 
shown directs that notice not be sent; (4) the date fixed for the filing of claims 
against a surplus in an estate as provided in Rule 3002(cX6); (5) in a chapter 7 
liquidation, a chapter 11 reorganization case, and a chapter 12 family farmer 
debt adjustment case, the hearing on the dismissal of the case, unless the 
hearing is pursuant to § 707(b) of the Code, or the conversion of the case to 
another chapter; (6) the time fixed to accept or reject a proposed modification of 
a plan; (7) hearings on all applications for compensation or reimbursement of 
expenses totalling in excess of $500; (8) the time fixed for filing proofs of claims 
pursuant to Rule 3003(c); and (9) the time fixed for filing objections and the 
hearing to consider confirmation of a chapter 12 plan. 
Cb) Twenty-Five-Day Notices to Parties in Interest Except as provided 
in subdivision (Z) of this rule, the clerk, or some other person as the court may 
direct, shall give the debtor, the trustee, all creditors and indenture trustees not 
less than 25 days notice by mail of (1) the time fixed for filing objections and the 
hearing to consider approval of a disclosure statement; and (2) the time fixed for 
filing objections and the hearing to consider confirmation of a chapter 9, chapter 
11, or chapter 13 plan. 
(c) Content of Notice. 
(1) Proposed Use, Sale, or Lease of Property. Subject to Rule 6004 the notice 
of a proposed use, sale, or lease of property required by subdivision (aX2) of this 
rule shall include the time and place of any public sale, the terms and conditions 
of any private sale and the time fixed for filing objections. The notice of a 
proposed use, sale, or lease of property, including real estate, is sufficient if it 
generally describes the property. 
(2) Notice of Hearing on Compensation. The notice of a hearing on an 
application for compensation or reimbursement of expenses required by subdivi-
sion (aX7) of this rule shall identify the applicant and the amounts requested. 
(d) Notice to Equity Security Holders. In a chapter 11 reorganization 
case, unless otherwise ordered by the court, the clerk, or some other person as 
the court may direct, shall in the manner and form directed by the court give 
notice to all equity security holders of (1) the order for relief; (2) any meeting of 
equity security holders held pursuant to § 341 of the Code; (3) the hearing on 
the proposed sale of all or substantially all of the debtor's assets; (4) the hearing 
on the dismissal or conversion of a case to another chapter; (5) the time fixed for 
filing objections to and the hearing to consider approval of a disclosure state-
ment; (6) the time fixed for filing objections to and the hearing to consider 
confirmation of a plan; and (7) the time fixed to accept or reject a proposed 
modification of a plan. 
(e) Notice of No Dividend. In a chapter 7 liquidation case, if it appears 
from the schedules that there are no assets from which a dividend can be paid, 
the notice of the meeting of creditors may include a statement to that effect; 
that it is unnecessary to file claims; and that if sufficient assets become 
available for the payment of a dividend, further notice will be given for the filing 
of claims. 
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(f) Other Notices. Except as provided in subdivision (/) of this rule, the 
clerk, or some other person as the court may direct, shall give the debtor, all 
creditors, and indenture trustees notice by mail of (1) the order for relief; (2) the 
dismissal or the conversion of the case to another chapter; (3) the time allowed 
for filing claims pursuant to Rule 3002; (4) the time fixed for filing a complaint 
objecting to the debtor's discharge pursuant to § 727 of the Code as provided in 
Rule 4004; (5) the time fixed for filing a complaint to determine the dis-
chargeability of a debt pursuant to § 523 of the Code as provided in Rule 4007; 
(6) the waiver, denial, or revocation of a discharge as provided in Rule 4006; (7) 
entry of an order confirming a chapter 9, 11, or 12 plan; and (8) a summary of 
the trustee's final report and account in a chapter 7 case if the net proceeds 
realized exceed $1,500. Notice of the time fixed for accepting or rejecting a plan 
pursuant to Rule 3017(c) shall be given in accordance with Rule 3017(d). 
(g) Addresses of Notices. All notices required to be mailed under this rule 
to a creditor, equity security holder, or indenture trustee shall be addressed as 
such entity or an authorized agent may direct in a filed request; otherwise, to 
the address shown in the list of creditors or the schedule whichever is filed later. 
If a different address is stated in a proof of claim duly filed, that address shall be 
used unless a notice of no dividend has been given. 
(h) Notices to Creditors Whose Claims Are Filed. In a chapter 7 case, 
the court may, after 90 days following the first date set for the meeting of 
creditors pursuant to § 341 of the Code, direct that all notices required by 
subdivision (a) of this rule, except clause (4) thereof, be mailed only to creditors 
whose claims have been filed and creditors, if any, who are still permitted to file 
claims by reason of an extension granted under Rule 3002(cX6). 
(i) Notices to Committees. Copies of all notices required to be mailed 
under this rule shall be mailed to the committees elected pursuant to § 705 or 
appointed pursuant to § 1102 of the Code or to their authorized agents. Not-
withstanding the foregoing subdivisions, the court may order that notices re-
quired by subdivision (aX2), (3) and (7) of this rule be transmitted to the United 
States trustee and be mailed only to the committees elected pursuant to § 705 or 
appointed pursuant to § 1102 of the Code or to their authorized agents and to 
the creditors and equity security holders who serve on the trustee or debtor in 
possession and file a request that all notices be mailed to them. A committee 
appointed pursuant to § 1114 shall receive copies of all notices required by 
subdivisions (aXD, (aX6), (b), (f)(2), and (0(7), and such other notices as the court 
may direct. 
(j) Notices to the United States. Copies of notices required to be mailed to 
all creditors under this rule shall be mailed (1) in a chapter 11 reorganization 
case to the Securities and Exchange Commission at Washington, D.C., and at any 
other place the Commission designates in a filed writing if the Commission has 
filed a notice of appearance in the case or has made a request in a filed writing; 
(2) in a commodity broker case, to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
at Washington, D.C.; (3) in a chapter 11 case to the District Director of Internal 
Revenue for the district in which the case is pending; (4) if the papers in the case 
disclose a debt to the United States other than for taxes, to the United States 
attorney for the district in which the case is pending and to the department, 
agency, or instrumentality of the United States through which the debtor 
became indebted; or if the filed papers disclose a stock interest of the United 
States, to the Secretary of the Treasury at Washington, D.C. 
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(k) Notices to United States Trustee. Unless the case is a chapter 9 
municipality case or unless the United States trustee otherwise requests, the 
clerk, or some other person as the court may direct, shall transmit to the United 
States trustee notice of the matters described in subdivisions (aX2), (aX3), (aX5), 
(aX9), (b), (fXl), (fX2), (fX4), (fX6), (fK7), and (fX8) of this rule and notice of hearings 
on all applications for compensation or reimbursement of expenses. Notices to 
the United States trustee shall be transmitted within the time prescribed in 
subdivision (a) or (b) of this rule. The United States trustee shall also receive 
notice of any other matter if such notice is requested by the United States 
trustee or ordered by the court. Nothing in these rules shall require the clerk or 
any other person to transmit to the United States trustee any notice, schedule, 
report, application or other document in a case under the Securities Investor 
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa et seq. 
(/) Notice by Publication. The court may order notice by publication if it 
finds that notice by mail is impracticable or that it is desirable to supplement 
the notice. 
(m) Orders Designating Matter of Notices. The court may from time to 
time enter orders designating the matters in respect to which, the entity to 
whom, and the form and manner in which notices shall be sent except as 
otherwise provided by these rules. 
(n) Caption. The caption of every notice given under this rule shall comply 
with Rule 1005. 
(o) Notice of Order for Relief in Consumer Case. In a voluntary case 
commenced by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts, 
the clerk or some other person as the court may direct shall give the trustee and 
all creditors notice by mail of the order for relief within 20 days from the date 
thereof. 
Amended by Pub.L. 9&-353, § 321, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 333; amended by Mar. 
30, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 30, 1991, eff. Aug. 1, 1991. 
Advisory Committee Note 
Some of the notices required by this rule may be given either by the 
clerk or as the court may otherwise direct. For example, the court may 
order the trustee or debtor in possession to transmit one or more of the 
notices required by this rule, such as, notice of a proposed sale of property. 
See § 363(b) of the Code. When publication of notices is required or 
desirable, reference should be made to Rule 9008. 
Notice of the order for relief is required to be given by § 342 of the Code 
and by subdivision (fXD of this rule. That notice may be combined with the 
notice of the meeting of creditors as indicated in Official Form No. 16, the 
notice and order of the meeting of creditors. 
Subdivision (a) sets forth the requirement that 20 days notice be given 
of the significant events in a case under the Bankruptcy Code. The former 
Act and Rules provided a ten day notice in bankruptcy and Chapter XI cases, 
and a 20 day notice in a Chapter X case. This rule generally makes uniform 
the 20 day notice provision except that subdivision (b) contains a 25 day 
period for certain events in a chapter 9,11, or 13 case. Generally, Rule 9006 
permits reduction of time periods. Since notice by mail is complete on 
mailing, the requirement of subdivision (a) is satisfied if the notices are 
deposited in the mail at least 20 days before the event. See Rule 9006(e). 
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The exceptions referred to in the introductory phrase include the modifica-
tions in the notice procedure permitted by subdivision (h) as to non-filing 
creditors, subdivision (i) as to cases where a committee is functioning, and 
subdivision (k) where compliance with subdivision (a) is impracticable. 
The notice of a proposed sale affords creditors an opportunity to object to 
the sale and raise a dispute for the court's attention. Section 363(b) of the 
Code permits the trustee or debtor in possession to sell property, other than 
in the ordinary course of business, only after notice and hearing. If no 
objection is raised after notice, § 102(1) provides that there need not be an 
actual hearing. Thus, absent objection, there would be no court involvement 
with respect to a trustee's sale. Once an objection is raised, only the court 
may pass on it. 
Prior to the Code the court could shorten the notice period for a 
proposed sale of property or dispense with notice. This subdivision (a), 
permits the 20 day period to be shortened in appropriate circumstances but 
the rule does not contain a provision allowing the court to dispense with 
notice. The rule is thus consistent with the Code, §§ 363(b) and 102UXA) of 
the Code. See 28 U.S.C. § 2075. It may be necessary, in certain circum-
stances, however, to use a method of notice other than mail. Subdivision (a) 
(2) vests the court with discretion, on cause shown, to order a different 
method. Reference should also be made to Rule 6004 which allows a 
different type of notice of proposed sales when the property is of little value. 
Notice of the hearing on an application for compensation or reimburse-
ment of expenses totalling $100 or less need not be given. In chapter 13 
cases relatively small amounts are sometimes allowed for post-confirmation 
services and it would not serve a useful purpose to require advance notice. 
Subdivision (b) is similar to subdivision (a) but lengthens the notice time 
to 25 days with respect to those events particularly significant in chapter 9, 
11 and 13 cases. The additional time may be necessary to formulate 
objections to a disclosure statement or confirmation of a plan and prepara-
tion for the hearing on approval of the disclosure statement or confirmation. 
The disclosure statement and hearing thereon is only applicable in chapter 9 
cases (§ 901(a) of the Code), and chapter 11 cases (§ 1125 of the Code). 
Subdivision (c) specifies certain matters that should be included in the 
notice of a proposed sale of property and notice of the hearing on an 
application for allowances. Rule 6004 fixes the time within which parties in 
interest may file objections to a proposed sale of property. 
Subdivision (d) relates exclusively to the notices given to equity security 
holders in chapter 11 cases. Under chapter 11, a plan may impair the 
interests of the debtor's shareholders or a plan may be a relatively simple 
restructuring of unsecured debt. In some cases, it is necessary that equity 
interest holders receive various notices and in other cases there is no 
purpose to be served. This subdivision indicates that the court is not 
mandated to order notices but rather that the matter should be treated with 
some flexibility. The court may decide whether notice is to be given and 
how it is to be given. Under § 341(b) of the Code, a meeting of equity 
security holders is not required in each case, only when it is ordered by the 
court. Thus subdivision (dX2) requires notice only when the court orders a 
meeting. 
In addition to the notices specified in this subdivision, there may be 
other events or matters arising in a case as to which equity security holders 
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should receive notice. These are situations left to determination by the 
court. 
Subdivision (e), autnorizing a notice of the apparent insufficiency of 
assets for the payment of any dividend, is correlated with Rule 3002(cX5), 
which provides for the issuance of an additional notice to creditors if the 
possibility of a payment later materializes. 
Subdivision (f) provides for the transmission of other notices to which 
no time period applies. Clause (1) requires notice of the order for relief; this 
complements the mandate of § 342 of the Code requiring such notice as is 
appropriate of the order for relief. This notice may be combined with the 
notice of the meeting of creditors to avoid the necessity of more than one 
mailing. See Official Form No. 16, notice of meeting of creditors. 
Subdivision (g) recognizes that an agent authorized to receive notices for 
a creditor may, without a court order, designate where notices to the creditor 
he represents should be addressed. Agent includes an officer of a corpora-
tion, an attorney at law, or an attorney in fact if the requisite authority has 
been given him. It should be noted that Official Forms Noe. 17 and 18 do 
not include an authorization of the holder of a power of attorney to receive 
notices for the creditor. Neither these forms nor this rule carries any 
implication that such an authorization may not be given in a power of 
attorney or that a request for notices to be addressed to both the creditor or 
his duly authorized agent may not be filed. 
Subdivision (h). After the time for filing claims has expired in a 
chapter 7 case, creditors who have not filed their claims in accordance with 
Rule 3002(c) are not entitled to share in the estate except as they may come 
within the special provisions of § 726 of the Code or Rule 3002(cX6). The 
elimination of notice to creditors who have no recognized stake in the estate 
may permit economies in time and expense. Reduction of the list of 
creditors to receive notices under this subdivision is discretionary. This 
subdivision does not apply to the notice of the meeting of creditors. 
Subdivision (i) contains a list of matters of which notice may be given a 
creditors' committee or to its authorized agent in lieu of notice to the 
creditors. Such notice may serve every practical purpose of a notice to all 
the creditors and save delay and expense. In re Schulte-United, Inc., 59 F.2d 
553, 561 (8th Cir. 1932). 
Subdivision (j). The premise for the requirement that the district 
director of internal revenue receive copies of notices that all creditors 
receive in a chapter 11 case is that every debtor is potentially a tax debtor of 
the United States. Notice to the district director alerts him to the possibili-
ty that a tax debtor's estate is about to be liquidated or reorganized and that 
the debtor may be discharged. When other indebtedness to the United 
States is indicated, the United States attorney is notified as the person in the 
best position to protect the interests of the government. In addition, the 
provision requires notice by mail to the head of any department, agency, or 
instrumentality of the United States through whose action the debtor 
became indebted to the United States. This rule is not intended to preclude 
a local rule from requiring a state or local tax authority to receive some or 
all of the notices to creditors under these rules. 
Subdivision (k) specifies two kinds of situations in which notice by 
publication may be appropriate: (1) when notice by mail is impracticable; 
and (2) when notice by mail alone is less than adequate. Notice by mail may 
be impracticable when, for example, the debtor has disappeared or his 
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records have been destroyed and the names and addresses of his creditors 
are unavailable, or when the number of creditors with nominal claims is 
very large and the estate to be distributed may be insufficient to defray the 
costs of issuing the notices. Supplementing notice by mail is also indicated 
when the debtor's records are incomplete or inaccurate and it is reasonable 
to believe that publication may reach some of the creditors who would 
otherwise be missed. Rule 9008 applies when the court directs notice by 
publication under this rule. Neither clause (2) of subdivision (a) nor subdivi-
sion (k) of this rule is concerned with the publication of advertisement to the 
general public of a sale of property of the estate at public auction under Rule 
6004(b). See 3 Collier, Bankruptcy 522-23 (14th ed. 1971); 4B id. 1165-67 
(1967); 2 id. fl 363.03 (15th ed. 1981). 
Subdivision (m). Inclusion in notices to creditors of information as to 
other names used by the debtor as required by Rule 1005 will assist them in 
the preparation of their proofs of claim and in deciding whether to file a 
complaint objecting to the debtor's discharge. Additional names may be 
listed by the debtor on his statement of affairs when he did not file the 
petition. The mailing of notices should not be postponed to await a delayed 
filing of the statement of financial affairs. 
Advisory Committee Notes to 1987 Amendments 
Subdivision (a) is amended to provide that notice of a hearing on an 
application for compensation must be given only when the amount requested 
is in excess of $500. 
Subdivision (d). A new notice requirement is added as clause (3). When 
a proposed sale is of all or substantially all of the debtor's assets, it is 
appropriate that equity security holders be given notice of the proposed sale. 
The clauses of subdivision (d) are renumbered to accommodate this addition. 
Subdivision (f). Clause (7) is eliminated. Mailing of a copy of the 
discharge order is governed by Rule 4004(g). 
Subdivision (g) is amended to relieve the clerk of the duty to mail 
notices to the address shown in a proof of claim when a notice of no dividend 
has been given pursuant to Rule 2002. This amendment avoids the necessi-
ty of the clerk searching proofs of claim which are filed in no dividend cases 
to ascertain whether a different address is shown. 
Subdivision (n) was enacted by § 321 of the 1984 amendments. 
Advisory Committee Notes to 1991 Amendments 
Subdivision (aX3) is amended to exclude compromise or settlement 
agreements concerning adequate protection or which modify or terminate 
the automatic stay, provide for use of cash collateral, or create a senior or 
equal lieu on collateral to obtain credit. Notice requirements relating to 
approval of such agreements are governed by Rule 4001(d). 
Subdivision (aXS) is amended to include a hearing on dismissal or 
conversion of a chapter 12 case. This subdivision does not apply when a 
hearing is not required. It is also amended to avoid the necessity of giving 
notice to all creditors of a hearing on the dismissal of a consumer debtor's 
case based on substantial abuse of chapter 7. Such hearings on dismissal 
under § 707(b) of the Code are governed by Rule 1017(e). 
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Subdivision (aX9) is added to provide for notice of the time fixed for 
filing objections and the hearing to consider confirmation of a plan in a 
chapter 12 case. Section 1224 of the Code requires "expedited notice" of the 
confirmation hearing in a chapter 12 case and requires that the hearing be 
concluded not later than 45 days after the filing of the plan unless the time 
is extended for cause. This amendment establishes 20 days as the notice 
period. The court may shorten this time on its own motion or on motion of a 
party in interest. The notice includes both the date of the hearing and the 
date for filing objections, and must be accompanied by a copy of the plan or a 
summary of the plan in accordance with Rule 3015(d). 
Subdivision (b) is amended to delete as unnecessary the references to 
subdivisions (h) and (i). 
Subdivision (d) does not require notice to equity security holders in a 
chapter 12 case. The procedural burden of requiring such notice is out-
weighed by the likelihood that all equity security holders of a family farmer 
will be informed of the progress of the case without formal notice. Subdivi-
sion (d) is amended to recognize that the United States trustee may convene 
a meeting of equity security holders pursuant to § 341(b). 
Subdivision (f)(2) is amended and subdivision (f)(4) is deleted to require 
notice of any conversion of the case, whether the conversion is by court order 
or is effectuated by the debtor filing a notice of conversion pursuant to 
§§ 1208(a) or 1307(a). Subdivision (fX8), renumbered (fX7), is amended to 
include entry of an order confirming a chapter 12 plan. Subdivision (fX9) is 
amended to increase the amount to $1,500. 
Subdivisions (g) and (j) are amended to delete the words "with the 
court" and subdivision (i) is amended to delete the words "with the clerk" 
because these phrases are unnecessary. See Rules 5005(a) and 9001(3). 
Subdivision (i) is amended to require that the United States trustee 
receive notices required by subdivision (aX2), (3) and (7) of this rule notwith-
standing a court order limiting such notice to committees and to creditors 
and equity security holders who request such notices. Subdivision (i) is 
amended further to include committees elected pursuant to § 705 of the 
Code and to provide that committees of retired employees appointed in 
chapter 11 cases receive certain notices. 
Subdivision (k) is derived from Rule X-1008. The administrative func-
tions of the United States trustee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 586(a) and 
standing to be heard on issues under § 307 and other sections of the Code 
require that the United States trustee be informed of developments and 
issues in every case except chapter 9 cases. The rule omits those notices 
described in subdivision (aXD because a meeting of creditors is convened only 
by the United States trustee, and those notices described in subdivision (aX4) 
(date fixed for filing claims against a surplus), subdivision (aX6) (time fixed to 
accept or reject proposed modification of a plan), subdivision (aX8) (time fixed 
for filing proofs of claims in chapter 11 cases), subdivision (fX3) (time fixed 
for filing claims in chapter 7, 12, and 13 cases), and subdivision (fX5) (time 
fixed for filing complaint to determine dischargeability of debt) because 
these notices do not relate to matters that generally involve the United 
States trustee. Nonetheless, the omission of these notices does not prevent 
the United States trustee from receiving such notices upon request. The 
United States trustee also receives notice of hearings on applications for 
compensation or reimbursement without regard to the $500 limitation con-
tained in subdivision (aX7) of this rule. This rule is intended to be flexible in 
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that it permits the United States trustee in a particular judicial district to 
request notices in certain categories, and to request not to receive notices in 
other categories, when the practice in that district makes that desirable. 
Rule 6004 
USE, SALE, OR LEASE OF PROPERTY 
(a) Notice of Proposed Use, Sale, or Lease of Property. Notice ol u 
proposed use, sale, or lease of property, other than cash collateral, not in the 
ordinary course of business shall be given pursuant to Rule 2002(aX2), (cXD, (i)» 
and (k) and, if applicable, in accordance with § 363(bX2) of the Code. 
(b) Objection to Proposal. Except as provided in subdivisions (c) and (d) of 
this rule, an objection to a proposed use, sale, or lease of property shall be filed 
and served not less than five days before the date set for the proposed action or 
within the time fixed by the court. An objection to the proposed use, sale or-
lease of property is governed by Rule 9014. 
(c) Sale Free and Clear of Liens and Other Interests* A motion toi 
authority to sell property free and clear of liens or other interests shall be made 
in accordance with Rule 9014 and shall be served on the parties who have liens 
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or other interests in the property to be sold. The notice required by subdivision 
(a) of this rule shall include the date of the hearing on the motion and the time 
within which objections may be filed and served on the debtor in possession or 
trustee. 
(d) Sale of Property Under $2,500. Notwithstanding subdivision (a) of 
this rule, when all of the nonexempt property of the estate has an aggregate 
gross value less than $2,500, it shall be sufficient to give a general notice of 
intent to sell such property other than in the ordinary course of business to all 
creditors, indenture trustees, committees appointed or elected pursuant to the 
Code, the United States trustee and other persons as the court may direct. An 
objection to any such sale may be filed and served by a party in interest within 
15 days of the mailing of the notice, or within the time fixed by the court. An 
objection is governed by Rule 9014. 
(e) Hearing. If a timely objection is made pursuant to subdivision (b) or (d) 
of this rule, the date of the hearing thereon may be set in the notice given 
pursuant to subdivision (a) of this rule. 
(f) Conduct of Sale Not In The Ordinary Course of Business. 
(1) Public or Private Sale. All sales not in the ordinary course of business 
may be by private sale or by public auction. Unless it is impracticable, an 
itemized statement of the property sold, the name of each purchaser, and the 
price received for each item or lot or for the property as a whole if sold in bulk 
shall be filed on completion of a sale. If the property is sold by an auctioneer, 
the auctioneer shall file the statement, transmit a copy thereof to the United 
States trustee, and furnish a copy to the trustee, debtor in possession, or chapter 
13 debtor. If the property is not sold by an auctioneer, the trustee, debtor in 
possession, or chapter 13 debtor shall file the statement and transmit a copy 
thereof to the United States trustee. 
(2) Execution of Instruments. After a sale in accordance with this rule the 
debtor, the trustee, or debtor in possession, as the case may be, shall execute any 
instrument necessary or ordered by the court to effectuate the transfer to the 
purchaser. 
Amended Mar. 30, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 30, 1991, eff. Aug. 1, 1991. 
Advisory Committee Note 
Subdivisions (a) and (b). Pursuant to § 363(b) of the Code, a trustee or 
debtor in possession may use, sell, or lease property other than in the 
ordinary course of business only after notice and hearing. Rule 2002(a), (c) 
and (i) specifies the time when notice of sale is to be given, the contents of 
the notice and the persons to whom notice is to be given of sales of property. 
Subdivision (a) makes those provisions applicable as well to notices for 
proposed use and lease of property. 
The Code does not provide the time within which parties may file 
objections to a proposed sale. Subdivision (b) of the rule requires the 
objection to be in writing and filed not less than five days before the 
proposed action is to take place. The objection should also be served within 
that time on the person who is proposing to take the action which would be 
either the trustee or debtor in possession. This time period is subject to 
change by the court. In some instances there is a need to conduct a sale in a 
short period of time and the court is given discretion to tailor the require-
ments to the circumstances. 
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Subdivision (c). In some situations a notice of sale for different pieces of 
property to all persons specified in Rule 2002(a) may be uneconomic and 
inefficient. This is particularly true in some chapter 7 liquidation cases 
when there is property of relatively little value which must be sold by the 
trustee. Subdivision (c) allows a general notice of intent to sell when the 
aggregate value of the estate's property is less than $2,500. The gross value 
is the value of the property without regard to the amount of any debt 
secured by a lien on the property. It is not necessary to give a detailed 
notice specifying the time and place of a particular sale. Thus, the require-
ments of Rule 2002(c) need not be met. If this method of providing notice of 
sales is used, the subdivision specifies that parties in interest may serve and 
file objections to the proposed sale of any property within the class and the 
time for service and filing is fixed at not later than 15 days after mailing the 
notice. The court may fix a different time. Subdivision (c) would have little 
utility in chapter 11 cases. Pursuant to Rule 2002(i), the court can limit 
notices of sale to the creditors' committee appointed under § 1102 of the 
Code and the same burdens present in a small chapter 7 case would not 
exist. 
Subdivision (d. I If a timely objection is filed, a hearing is required with 
respect to the use, sale , oi lease of property. Subdivision (d) renders the 
filing of an objection tantamount to requesting a hearing so as. to require a 
hearing pursuant to §§ 363(b) and 102(lXBXi). 
Subdivision (e) is derived in part from former Bankruptcy Rule 606(b) 
but does not carry forward the requirement of that rule that court approval 
be obtained for sales of property. Pursuant to § 363(b) court approval is not 
required unless timely objection is made to the proposed sale. The itemized 
statement or information required by the subdivision is not necessary when 
it "w on Id be impracticable to prepare it or set forth the information. For 
example, a liquidation sale of retail goods although not in the ordinary 
course of business may be on a daily ongoing basis and only summaries may 
be available. 
The duty imposed by paragraph (2) does not affect the power of the 
bankruptcy court to order third persons to execute instruments transferring 
property purchased at a sale under this subdivision. See, e.g., In re Rosen-
berg, 138 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1943). 
Advisory Committee Notes tc 198' 3 Amenumei 
Subdivision (a) is amended to conform tc ! the 1984 amendments t :: 
: 363(bX2) of the Code. 
Subdivision (b) is amended to pro v tele that an objection to a proposed, 
use, sale, or lease of property creates a contested matter governed by Rule 
9014. A similar amendment is made to subdivision (d). which was formerly 
subdivision (c). 
Subdivision (c) m new. Section 363(f) provides that sales free and clear 
of liens or other interests are only permitted if one of the five statutory 
requirements is satisfied. Rule 9013 requires that a motion state with 
particularity the grounds relied upon by the movant. A motion for approval 
of a sale free and clear of liens or other interests is subject to Rule 9014, 
service must be made on the parties holding liens or other interests in the 
property, and notice of the hearing on the motion and the time for filing 
objections must be included in the notice given under subdivision (a). 
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Advisory Committee Notes to 1991 Amendments 
Jf^fl rule is amended to provide notice to the United States trustee of a 
proposed use, sale or lease of property not in the ordinary course of business 
Jsee Rule 2002(k). Subdivision (fXD is amended to enable the United States 
TSf?J° m o n i t o r t h e Progress of the case in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 
9 Ooo(aX3XG). 
ry. 
The words "with the clerk" in subdivision ((XI) are deleted as unnecessa-
See Rules 5005(a) and 9001(3). 
78-12-25, Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or ;*.ioi; jrmed upon 
an instrument in writing; also on an open account i< wares, and 
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an 
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at 
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last 
payment is received. 
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of 
Title 25, Chapter 6, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 Ma), which in specific situations limits the 
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(1 Kb); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1). 
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
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riant to do work so as not to damage grantor's 
property, was action for breach of contract, and 
hence limitation on action was controlled by 
this section. Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt 
Lake? City, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d 405 (1935). 
Where land contract contained no provision 
for return of payments in case seller should 
default, purchaser's action for payments was as 
one for money had and received, and conse-
quently four-year limitation on actions for re-
lief not otherwise provided for was applicable 
rather than predecessor to this section. Brown 
v. Cleverly, 93 Utah 54, 70 P.2d 881 (1938). 
Duty of stockholder to pay company's taxes 
arose out of implied contract and not an ex-
press contract; accordingly, it was not gov-
erned by this section. Petty & Riddle, Inc. v. 
Lunt, 104 Utah 130, 138 P.2d 648 (1942). 
Where parties entered into contract whereby 
defendant was to ship goods to plaintiff at a 
specific price "f.o.b." York, Penn., and plaintiff 
instructed defendant to ship some of the goods 
to a point close to York, freight collect, and 
*ru'.»i plaintiff paid the freight and also paid 
d-V'idant the specific price for the goods, an 
- • -\ by plaintiff to recover the freight 
res that he paid was founded on a contract 
i than an action to recover money paid 
jmn'i mistake. Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 
Utah 2d 320, 266 P.2d 494 (1954) 
il IS 
EXlliiSi lS 
jhe following documents and rxhihib. -m appends • ?• This "riff 
A Memorandur • - • •*.•-•-. . *.-* ,. .;.. 
l Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated September 18, 
1991. (R. 672-84.) 
Amended Judgment den,
 u .^cpicnu > ) 
I1 Uniform Real Estate Contract, (Exhibit D 9.) 
Child's bankruptcy Schedule A-2 showih/; ( • Hansen 
as secured creditors. (Exhibit D-23.) 
^. .:;iid's bankruptcy Schedule B-1, showing' his claim to Traverse 
M )untain as an asset. (Exhibit D-25.) 
51 cement between Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen, and Capitol Tlirift 
^d Loan and Franklin Financial. (Exhibit D-20.) 
I. :- rnier Confirming Third Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Debtor and I hud 
Amended Plan, from,,, Child's bankruptcy (Exhibit D-32.) 
J. Oi der of BanMupirv Coun. datru M i^ , ^ •** dppimmg >^ale or 
Traverse Moimiajn nront-rtv l>v Ch:tptt" : TUM^1 * • xhibir 1 SO 
K, Assignment 11» M u\ t a 11 (1, x 1111 n 1 r 1 2.) 
Tab A 
..^cioia; OiGi.'.ct 
JUN 1 0 1991 
Dopuiy uteri 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD F. McKEAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL W. McBRIDE, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-85-4003 
This case was tried to the Court without a jury. The 
plaintiff was represented by Ralph D. Tate. The defendants 
were represented by R. Stephen Marshall. The Court heard the 
testimony of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence, heard 
oral argument, read the post-trial Memorandum filed by counsel, 
and having taken the matter under advisement, the Court now 
enters its ruling. 
The following are the facts as stipulated to by counsel for 
plaintiff and defendant: 
1. Plaintiff Richard F. McKean (hereinafter "McKean") is 
an individual residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant Michael W. McBride (hereinafter "McBride") 
is an individual residing in Austin, Texas. 
r\Pic, nc\ 
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3. Defendant Alpine Ltd, is a limited partnership 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah 
which was formed between July 1972 and March 1973. 
4. Defendant Geodyne II is a partnership organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Utah. 
5. Defendant Dan C. Simons (hereinafter "Simons") is an 
individual residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
6. Defendant Arden J. Bodell (hereinafter "Bodell") is an 
individual residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
7. Defendants McBride, Simons and Bodell were the initial 
general partners of defendant Geodyne II. Geodyne II, a 
partnership, did not have limited partners. Geodyne II and its 
general partners McBride, Simons and Bodell were collectively 
the general partner of Alpine Ltd. There were no other general 
partners of Alpine Ltd. 
8. Defendants McBride, Simons and Bodell are the only 
remaining general partners of Geodyne II. Geodyne II has been 
the only general partner of Alpine Ltd. Each of the defendants 
have a one-third equal interest in Geodyne II. 
9. On or about June 1, 1978, Myron B. Child, Jr. 
(hereinafter "Child"), Ronald S. Cook (hereinafter "Cook"), Ray 
W. Lamoreaux (hereinafter "Lamoreaux") , Wendell P. Hansen 
(hereinafter "Hansen"), and New Empire Development Co. 
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(hereinafter "New Empire Development"), collectively entered 
into a written contract ("contract") to purchase certain real 
property located on Traverse Mountain (hereinafter "Traverse 
Mountain property") from defendant McBride. Plaintiff McKean 
was not a party to the contract. 
10. On November 20, 1978, McBride transferred all of his 
interest as seller under the contract, dated June 1, 1978, to 
Alpine Ltd., a Utah limited partnership. 
11. Alta Title Company was the escrow agent for defendants 
McBride and Alpine Ltd. and its general partners. Alta Title 
held the Traverse Mountain property in trust and was 
responsible for releasing title thereto when appropriate and 
authorized by McBride/Alpine under the contract. 
12. On June 7, 1979, McKean entered into an Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase pertaining to acquisition of the 
Traverse Mountain property from New Empire. Said earnest money 
agreement was subsequently amended. 
13. On June 25, 1979, McKean paid the annual installment 
payment in the amount of $330,000.00 to Alta Title Company, the 
escrow agent for defendants McBride and Alpine Ltd. 
14. At the time McKean made the $330,000.00 payment to 
defendant Alpine, McKean identified the particular land which 
nnssi 
McKEAN V. McBRIDE PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
was requested to be released under the contract in 
consideration of the $330,000.00 payment. Richard Walker and 
Richard McKean personally met with the president of Alta Title 
Company and then with the defendant McBride on or about June 
25, 1979, and designated the land which would be released by 
Alta Title Company/McBride to Richard McKean in consideration 
for $330,000.00. 
15. Counsel for Alpine Ltd. sent a letter to New Empire 
Development Company, dated October 15, 1979, concerning water 
rights. 
16. On July 3, 1980, McKean sent a letter to Alta Title 
Company demanding release of those specific parcels of the 
Traverse Mountain property that he claimed should have been 
released in consideration of the $330,000.00 payment made on 
June 25, 1979. The property that McKean requested be released 
in his letter was described as follows: 
All in Ts - 4S; R - IE, Salt Lake Base & Meridian 
Section 14 S 1/2 of SE 1/4 of SW 1/4 
SW 1/4 of SE 1/4 
Section 23 NW 1/4 of NE 1/4 
S 1/2 Of NE 1/4 Of NE 1/4 
17. On July 3, 1980, Cook, on behalf of buyers, sent a 
Notice of Default to McBride and Alpine Ltd. 
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18. Michael McBride sent a letter to Child, Cook, 
Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development, dated June 2, 
1980, Counsel for Alpine Ltd. sent Notices of Default to each 
of Child, Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development 
Company, dated June 25, 1980, July 3, 1980, June 25, 1981, and 
June 25, 1982. 
19. On February 25, 1982, defendant Child filed a Chapter 
11 Petition for Bankruptcy with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 
District of Utah. Child's bankruptcy schedule claimed that 
Child held an interest in the Traverse Mountain property valued 
at $36,000,000.00. 
20. On February 28, 1985, the bankruptcy trustee sold all 
of Child's interest in the Traverse Mountain property. The 
property was purchased by defendant Alpine Ltd. On March 16, 
1985, the bankruptcy court entered an order confirming the sale 
of the interest of Child in the Traverse Mountain property. On 
March 21, 1985, the bankruptcy trustee conveyed by trustee's 
deed the right, title and interest of the bankruptcy trustee in 
Traverse Mountain property to Alpine Ltd. 
21. On or about June 12, 1985, Child, Cook, Hansen, 
Lamoreaux, and New Empire Development, as assignors, executed 
an Assignment in favor of McKean, as assignee. 
D05S3 
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22. The Assignment, dated June 12, 1985, provided that the 
consideration for the assignment was "the payment by Assignee 
of the sum of $330,000.00 on June 25, 1979, to Alpine Ltd. or 
Michael W. McBride and other considerations." The "other" 
consideration for the Assignment was McKean's release of claims 
and included an agreement by plaintiff McKean not to sue Child, 
Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development for 
breaching the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase into 
which McKean had entered with Child, Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, 
and New Empire Development on June 7, 1979. 
23. The lawsuit was filed by McKean on June 21, 1985, 
against defendants Alpine and McBride. It was subsequently 
amended to name Geodyne II, Bodell, and Simons defendants as 
general partners of Alpine Ltd. 
24. Defendants have not refunded any of the $330,000.00 
payment made by McKean. 
The issue presented to the Court is whether or not 
plaintiff is entitled to recover any part of the $330,000.00 
paid on the contract for the purchase of the Traverse Mountain 
property together with interest, attorney fees and costs. 
The very nature of the transactions affecting this property 
left little doubt that this property transaction would result 
in litigation. 
OfifiS.! 
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The Court will address defendants' defenses and plaintiff's 
claims accordingly. 
Defendants contend that they are entitled to a set-off 
because an assignee of a chose in action takes the assignment 
subject to rights of set-off that the debtor has against the 
assignor. In other words, a defendant may assert a set-off 
against the assignee based on the claims that defendant has 
against the assignor. The Court agrees that this is a correct 
statement of the law, but in this case the buyers had fully 
performed and were entitled to land valued at 66-2/3% of the 
$330,000.00 payment. The buyers were not in default, 
nevertheless, defendant McBride refused to release the land. 
If it were not for McBride's wrongful acts, the land would have 
been conveyed and this case would not be before the Court. 
However, defendants are entitled to set-off for the remaining 
33-1/3% of the payment. 
Defendants argue that McKean received nothing from Cook, 
Lamoreaux, Hansen and New Empire Development by the June 12, 
1985 assignment because Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen and New Empire 
Development executed a Uniform Real Estate Contract by which 
they sold their interest in Traverse Mountain to Child. 
r\n^o-
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The credible evidence indicates that, at best, the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract entered into by Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen 
and New Empire Development was no more than an option which 
Child never exercised. 
The contract between Cook, et al. and Child had the 
appearance of validity, but the Court found it to be an 
exercise in futility. The fact that Cook, et al. didn't file a 
claim in the Child bankruptcy proceedings is indicative of the 
worthlessness of the contract mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph. 
In the Court's opinion the defendant's reliance upon the 
particular Uniform Real Estate Contract to defeat plaintiff's 
claim as an assignee is not well-founded. 
Defendants contend that plaintiff's claim for any part of 
the $330,000.00 is barred by the doctrine of res judicata 
The Court disagrees with defendants' analysis of the facts and 
law applicable to this case. The Court believes that the 
doctrine of res judicata is not applicable because the 
bankruptcy proceedings did not release Alpine from its 
obligation to convey land or refund all or part of the June 25, 
1979 payment made by plaintiff. Furthermore, Child's 
bankruptcy plan failed. As a result there was not an 
adjudication of the claims which would preclude plaintiff from 
proceeding against defendants. 
MCKEAN V. MCBRIDE PAGE NINE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Defendants raise the issue of the statute of limitations 
and laches as defenses to plaintiff's claim. The Court has 
heretofore ruled on these defenses and allowed this case to go 
to trial. The Court finds that the applicable statute of 
limitations is six years, and that the statute was tolled by 
the bankruptcy proceedings; therefore, plaintiff's claim was 
filed timely. 
As to the doctrine of laches, the Court finds that 
defendants were not adversely affected by plaintiff's delay in 
filing his action because defendants had the use of plaintiff's 
money and the land. 
The Court stated from the bench that this is an equitable 
proceeding and in order to do equity it would have a difficult 
time rationalizing how it could allow the defendant to retain 
the money and keep the property. The testimony of Mr. McBride 
was clear and convincing that he arbitrarily, and without 
cause, made the decision not to release the land to plaintiff. 
If it were not for Mr. McBride's wrongful acts, the property 
would have been conveyed to plaintiff. 
The Court understands that in some cases a party can 
benefit from his wrongful acts because of certain legal 
nnc;c 
McKEAN V. McBRIDE PAGE TEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
defenses, but in this case the defendants did not come into 
Court with "clean hands" and raise defenses which would 
preclude plaintiff from recovering part of his money. 
The Court awards Judgment in favor of plaintiff and 
against defendant in the sum of $220,000.00, together with 
interest and costs, and awards a set-off of $110,000.00 in 
favor of defendants and against plaintiff. The parties are to 
bear their own attorney's fees. 
This Memorandum Decision does not purport to encompass all 
of the findings and conclusions. Counsel for plaintiff shall 
prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment 
accordingly. 
Dated this / \ day of June, 1991. 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
n n r n ^ 
McKEAN V. McBRIDE PAGE ELEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this IP day of June, 1991: 
Ralph R. Tate 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Ronald W. Goss 
Attorneys for Defendants 
50 S. Main, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
n n e: o r, 
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RALPH R. TATE, JR. (#3192) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 278-4747 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD F. MCKEAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL W. McBRIDE, ALPINE LTD., 
and FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, GEODYNE II, 
a Utah general partnership, 




FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C85-4003 
Hon. John A. Rokich 
The above matter came on for trial beginning March 7, 
1991, before the Hon. John A. Rokich. Plaintiff was represented by 
Ralph R. Tate, Jr., Attorney at Law. Defendants were represented 
by R. Stephen Marshall, Attorney at Law. The court heard the 
testimony of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence, heard oral 
arguments, and read post-trial memoranda. The court entered its 
FINDINGS OF FACT on August 2, 1991. Defendants filed Objections to 
Proposed Findings and Conclusions and oral arguments were heard on 
August 12, 1991. The objections having been considered, the court 
now enters the following AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The following facts were stipulated by counsel for 
plaintiff and defendants: 
1. Plaintiff Richard F. McKean (hereinafter "McKean") is 
2 
an individual residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant Michael W. McBride (hereinafter "McBride") 
is an individual residing in Austin, Texas. 
3. Defendant Alpine Ltd. is a limited partnership 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah which 
was formed between July 1972 and March 1973. 
4. Defendant Geodyne II is a partnership organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Utah. 
5. Defendant Dan C. Simons (hereinafter "Simons") is an 
individual residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
6. Defendant Arden J. Bodell (hereinafter "Bodell") is 
an individual residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
7. Defendants McBride, Simons and Bodell were the 
initial general partners of defendant Geodyne II. Geodyne II, a 
partnership, did not have limited partners. Geodyne II and its 
general partners McBride, Simons and Bodell were collectively the 
general partner of Alpine Ltd. There were no other general 
partners of Alpine Ltd. 
8. Defendants McBride, Simons and Bodell are the only 
remaining general partners of Geodyne II. Geodyne II has been the 
only general partner of Alpine Ltd. Each of the defendants have a 
one-third equal interest in Geodyne II. 
9. On or about June 1, 1978, the "New Empire Group" 
consisting of Myron B. Child, Jr. (hereinafter "Child"), Ronald S. 
Cook (hereinafter "Cook"), Ray W. Lamoreaux (hereinafter 
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"Lamoreaux"), Wendell P. Hansen (hereinafter "Hansen"), and New 
Empire Development Co. (hereinafter "New Empire Development"), 
collectively entered into a written contract ("contract") to 
purchase certain real property located on Traverse Mountain 
(hereinafter "Traverse Mountain property") from defendant McBride. 
Plaintiff McKean was not a party to the contract. 
10. On November 20, 1978, McBride transferred all of his 
interest as seller under the contract, dated June 1, 1978, to 
Alpine Ltd., a Utah limited partnership. 
11. Alta Title Company was the escrow agent for 
defendants McBride and Alpine Ltd. and its general partners. Alta 
Title held the Traverse Mountain property in trust and was 
responsible for releasing title thereto when appropriate and 
authorized by McBride/Alpine under the contract. 
12. On June 7, 1979, McKean entered into an Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase pertaining to acquisition of 
the Traverse Mountain property from New Empire. Said earnest money 
agreement was subsequently amended. 
13. On June 25, 1979, McKean paid the annual installment 
payment in the amount of $330,000.00 to Alta Title Company, the 
escrow agent for defendants McBride and Alpine Ltd. 
14. At the time McKean made the $3 30,000.00 payment to 
defendant Alpine, McKean identified the particular land which was 
requested to be released under the contract in consideration of the 
$330,000.00 payment. Richard Walker and Richard McKean personally 
4 
met with the president of Alta Title Company and then with the 
defendant McBride on or about June 25, 1979, and designated the 
land which would be released by Alta Title Company/McBride to 
Richard McKean in consideration for $330,000.00. 
15. Counsel for Alpine Ltd. sent a letter to New Empire 
Development Company dated October 15, 1979, concerning water 
rights. 
16. On July 3, 1980, McKean sent a letter to Alta Title 
Company demanding release of those specific parcels of the Traverse 
Mountain property that he claimed should have been released in 
consideration of the $330,000.00 payment made on June 25, 1979. 
The property that McKean requested be released in his letter was 
described as follows: 
All in Ts - 4S; R - IE, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 14, S 1/2 of SE 1/4 of SW 1/4 
SW 1/4 of SE 1/4 
Section 23 NW 1/4 of NE 1/4 
S 1/2 of NE 1/4 of NE 1/4 
17. On July 3, 1980, Cook, on behalf of buyers, sent a 
Notice of Default to McBride and Alpine Ltd. 
18. Michael McBride sent a letter to Child, Cook, 
Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development, dated June 2, 1980. 
Counsel for Alpine Ltd. sent Notices of Default to each of Child, 
Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development Company dated 
June 25, 1980, July 3, 1980, June 25, 1981, and June 25, 1982. 
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19. On February 25, 1982, defendant Child filed a 
Chapter 11 Petition for Bankruptcy with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 
District of Utah. Child's bankruptcy schedule claimed that Child 
held an interest in the Traverse Mountain property valued at 
$36,000,000.00. 
20. On February 28, 1985, the bankruptcy trustee sold 
all of Child's interest in the Traverse Mountain property. The 
property was purchased by defendant Alpine Ltd. On March 16, 1985, 
the bankruptcy court entered an order confirming the sale of the 
interest of Child in the Traverse Mountain property. On March 21, 
1985, the bankruptcy trustee conveyed by trustee's deed the right, 
title, and interest of the bankruptcy trustee in Traverse Mountain 
property to Alpine Ltd. 
21. On or about June 12, 1985, Child, Cook, Hansen, 
Lamoreaux, and New Empire Development, as assignors, executed an 
Assignment in favor of McKean, as assignee. 
22. The Assignment, dated June 12, 1985, provided that 
the consideration for the assignment was "the payment by Assignee 
of the sum of $330,000.00 on June 25, 1979, to Alpine Ltd. or 
Michael W. McBride and other considerations." The "other" 
consideration for the Assignment was McKean's release of claims and 
included an agreement by plaintiff McKean not to sue Child, Cook, 
Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire Development for breaching the 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase into which McKean had 
entered with Child, Cook, Lamoreaux, Hansen, and New Empire 
6 
Development on June 7, 1979. 
23. The lawsuit was filed by McKean on June 21, 1985, 
against defendants Alpine and McBride. It was subsequently amended 
to name Geodyne II, Bodell, and Simons defendants as general 
partners of Alpine Ltd. 
24. Defendants have not refunded any of the $330,000.00 
payment made by McKean. 
The court also finds the following Findings of Fact: 
25. On July 11, 1972, defendant Simons entered into a 
real estate contract for the purchase of certain real estate at 
Traverse Mountain. On March 19, 1973, defendant Simons assigned to 
Alpine Ltd. his interest in the July 11, 1972, real estate 
contract. Under the assignment Alpine Ltd. acquired by contract 
purchase certain real estate interests known as Traverse Mountain 
consisting of approximately 5,000 acres located between Salt Lake 
and Utah Counties. Said property is the same property which was 
subject matter of the June 1, 1978, contract referred to in Finding 
of Fact No. 9. On November 28, 1978, defendant Alpine assumed the 
responsibility of fulfilling the contract with the New Empire 
Group. 
26. The June 1, 1978, contract between defendants and 
The New Empire Group (plaintiff's assignors) provided in part that 
buyers would have the right to have designated land released having 
a value of 2/3 of the amount of payments made on the contract. The 
contract also specified the manner of land selection. 
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27. At a meeting between defendant McBride, plaintiff 
Richard McKean, and plaintiff's attorney Richard Walker held on 
June 25, 1979, land was selected and defendant McBride agreed to 
release specific land to plaintiff located on Traverse Mountain 
having a value of 66-2/3% of the $330,000 payment ($220,000). The 
land which McBride promised to release was never released to 
plaintiff or his assignors. The payment of $330,000 had been made 
by plaintiff McKean in behalf of himself and the New Empire Group 
to the defendant Alpine pursuant to the terms of the June 1, 1978, 
contract. 
28. As of June 25, 1979, the New Empire Group was 
current in all of its payments and was not in default in the 
material conditions of the June 1, 1978, contract with defendants 
Alpine and Michael McBride. Alpine Ltd. and Michael McBride 
breached their contract with the New Empire Group by failing to 
release property having 2/3 of the value of the $330,000 payment 
made by Richard McKean and New Empire on June 25, 1979. Of the 
$330,000 paid by plaintiff to defendants on June 25, 1979, 
defendants are entitled to set off $110,000, but remain liable to 
plaintiff for $220,000.00. 
29. On September 20, 1980, New Empire Development, 
Hansen, Cook, and Lamoreaux as sellers entered into an agreement 
with defendant Child whereby Child had an opportunity to acquire 
the remaining interest of Hansen, Cook, and Lamoreaux in the June 
1, 1978, contract with Alpine upon payment of $1.5 million. Said 
00678 
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Contract and an assignment were to be placed in escrow conditional 
upon not being released until Child paid said sum. Said payment of 
$1.5 million was to be paid within 18 months. Child made no 
payments pursuant to said agreement either as consideration or as 
payment under the agreement. The Contract and assignment were not 
delivered. No consideration was paid by Child for said option 
agreement. Child's bankruptcy was filed before the option period 
expired. The agreement was at best no more than an option that was 
never exercised by Myron Child or the bankruptcy trustee. 
30. Because Myron Child claimed an interest in the 
subject real estate, plaintiff or his assignors were stayed by the 
bankruptcy proceedings from taking legal action affecting the real 
estate from February 25, 1982, until the conveyance of the land by 
the bankruptcy trustee to defendant Alpine Ltd. on March 21, 1985. 
31. The bankruptcy sale of the Traverse Mountain 
property on February 25, 1982, and the conveyance on March 21, 
1985, sold and conveyed the Traverse Mountain property to defendant 
Alpine "free and clear" of liens. Valid liens were to attach to 
proceeds. However, proceeds in excess of interests of lien holders 
senior to plaintiff were insufficient to pay any creditors other 
than bankruptcy administration costs. 
32. Any remaining interest of Myron Child in the 
Traverse Mountain property sold by the bankruptcy trustee was 
abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee pursuant to a court order 
entered July 10, 1985. The bankruptcy trustee had not exercised 
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any option of Child to acquire the interest of others in the 
Traverse Mountain property or the June 1978 contract. 
33. The Child bankruptcy was dismissed without discharge 
by the U.S. bankruptcy trustee on February 25, 1988. The U.S. 
bankruptcy trustee took no action to void the June 12, 1985, 
assignment given by Child McKean. 
34. Defendants Michael McBride or Alpine Ltd. have never 
conveyed the real estate they were required to convey to New Empire 
or Richard McKean as a result of the June 25, 1979, payment of 
$330,000, nor have they ever refunded the $330,000 paid. 
35. As a result of the breach of contract by defendants, 
plaintiff and his assignors were damaged in the sum of $220,000.00 
together with interest as provided by law calculated from June 25, 
1979. 
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court determines 
the following Amended Conclusions of Law: 
1. Defendants Simons, Bodell, and McBride were general 
partners of Geodyne II which in turn was the sole general partner 
of Alpine Ltd. As a result of this general partnership 
arrangement, each of the defendants is jointly liable for the 
judgment to be awarded in this matter. However, the partnership 
assets should be exhausted before plaintiff recovers against any of 
the general partners. Plaintiff should be required to schedule a 
nnccn 
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court hearing to determine that partnership assets have been 
exhausted so that an order may be entered that the partnership 
assets have been exhausted before satisfying the debt from the 
partners1 assets. 
2. Upon payment of the $330,000 on June 25, 1979, and 
the designation of property to be released, plaintiff satisfied the 
New Empire Group's obligations under the Contract with the 
defendants. As of June 25, 1979, defendant Alpine had an 
unconditional duty to either convey land or refund the $330,000 
payment Alpine received that day. Defendant Alpine Ltd. breached 
its contract by failing to convey land of $220,000 value as 
contracted or to refund the $330,000 payment paid on June 25, 1979. 
3. After defendants McBride and Alpine Ltd. breached 
their contract with New Empire by failing to release land, New 
Empire and Richard McKean were not obligated to perform other 
duties under the contract or make other payments until Alpine Ltd. 
had performed its duties to release designated land as per the 
terms of the contract. 
4. The bankruptcy sale of the Traverse Mountain property 
free and clear of liens to the defendant Alpine Ltd. did not 
extinguish the legal obligation which defendants had to plaintiff 
or his assignors to convey land or refund the $330,000 payment. 
5. The option to assign the interest of New Empire and 
Cook, Lamoreaux, and Hansen to Myron Child on September 30, 1980, 
was never exercised or consummated. The proposed assignment was 
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subject to Child giving consideration, exercising the option, and 
meeting escrow conditions for document delivery. Consideration was 
not paid and the documents placed in escrow were not delivered to 
Child. The conditions of escrow were not met and the transaction 
was not consummated. The effect of the purported assignment was to 
create an option with Myron Child which was never exercised. The 
interest of Myron Child that became subject to the bankruptcy 
proceeding of Myron Child did not include the interests of other 
partners of New Empire. However, the bankruptcy court had and 
exercised authority to sell the entire Traverse Mountain property 
free and clear of liens without adjudication of claims and 
interests. 
6. The claims of Cook, Lamoreaux, Child, Hansen, and New 
Empire against Alpine were assigned for good and valuable 
consideration to Richard McKean on June 12, 1985. 
7. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to this 
case because the bankruptcy proceedings did not release defendants 
McBride and Alpine from their obligation to convey land or refund 
all or part of the June 25, 1979, payment made by plaintiff. 
Furthermore, Child's bankruptcy plan failed. There was not an 
adjudication by the bankruptcy court of the claims involved in this 
lawsuit which would preclude plaintiff from proceeding against 
defendants. 
8. Plaintiff's claim is not barred by the statute of 
limitations. Plaintiff's action was filed within six years of the 
12 
time the initial duty to convey property was incurred. 
Furthermore, the parties' ability to convey land was stayed by the 
bankruptcy proceedings of Myron Child between February 25, 1982, 
and the time of conveyance by the trustee of its interest in the 
property on March 21, 1985. The statute of limitations was tolled 
during that time. 
9. The court finds that the equitable defense of laches 
does not apply. The defendants were not adversely affected by 
plaintiff's delay in filing his action. This is in part because 
defendants had the use of both plaintiff's money and the land 
during the entire time period of the breach. 
10. As a matter of equity the property should have been 
conveyed to plaintiff. The defendants Michael McBride and Alpine 
Ltd. did not come into court with "clean hands." Defendants 
Michael McBride and Alpine Ltd. should not be able to benefit from 
the wrongful acts of their partner. Defendants Michael McBride and 
Alpine Ltd. should not be able to retain both the land and the 
payment for the land. The equitable issues should be found in 
favor of plaintiff. 
11. Plaintiff should have judgment entered in his favor 
against each of the defendants for the sum of $220,000 together 
with interest as provided by law calculated from June 25, 1979. 
12. The court determines that each party should bear his 
own attorney's fees. Plaintiff should be awarded his other legal 
costs incurred herein. 
DATED this 
13 
/o day of September 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
A 
NOTICE OF MAILING 
I mailed copy of the foregoing Amended Findings of Fact, 
postage prepaid, this ^z-i* day of fWmLiuubsrr- IQQI
 f to defendants1 
attorney, addressed as follows: //u£«< 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Jeremy M. Hoffman 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Ralph R. Tate, Jr. 
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD F. McKEAN, : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : AMENDED JUDGMENT 
MICHAEL W. McBRIDE, ALPINE LTD., 
and FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, GEODYNE II, 
a Utah general partnership, 
DAN C. SIMONS, and ARDEN J. 
BODELL, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C85-4003 
Hon. John A. Rokich 
The above matter came on for trial beginning March 7, 
1991, before the Hon. John A. Rokich. Plaintiff was represented by 
Ralph R. Tate, Jr., Attorney at Law. Defendants were represented 
by R. Stephen Marshall, Attorney at Law. The court heard the 
testimony of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence, heard oral 
arguments, and read post-trial memoranda. The court entered its 
Judgment on August 2, 1991. Defendants filed Objections to 
Judgment and oral arguments were heard on August 12, 1991. The 
objections having been considered, the court now enters the 
following AMENDED JUDGMENT: 
1. Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff and against 
Alpine Ltd., a Utah limited partnership, Geodyne II, a Utah general 
partnership acting as general partner of Alpine Ltd., Michael W. 
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McBride, Dan C. Simons, and Arden J. Bodell in the sum of 
$220,000.00, together with interest calculated from June 25, 1979, 
through July 22, 1991, in the sum of $265,689.76 and $60.27 per day 
for each day after July 22, 1991, until entry of judgment, and at 
the rate of 12% per annum thereafter on the entire judgment. The 
assets of the partnership defendants must be exhausted before 
plaintiff recovers against any of the general partners. Plaintiff 
shall schedule a hearing before the court to establish the fact 
that the partnership assets have been exhausted. Upon the court 
entering an order that the partnership assets have been exhausted, 
plaintiff can proceed to satisfy the debt from the partners1 
assets. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded his costs incurred herein as 
shall be established by affidavit in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure of the court. 
DATED this /& day of September 1991. 




NOTICE OF MAILING 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Amended Judgment, 
postage prepaid, this 2-7** day of OcuLciulier 1991, to defendants' 
attorney, addressed as follows: /T>u*»i 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Jeremy M. Hoffman 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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REAL ESTATE SALES AGREEMENT 
THIS REAL ESTATE SALES AGREEMENT (hereinafter 
sometimes referred to as the "Agreement"), made and entered into 
this First day of June, 1978, by and between MICHEAL W. McBRIDE 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Seller"), and RONALD S. COOK, 
MYRON B. CHILD, JR., RAY W. LAMOREAUX, WENDELL P. HANSEN, 
and NEW EMPIRE DEVELOPMENT CO., a Utah Corporation (hereinafter 
sometimes collectively referred to as "Buyers"). 
I. 
RECITALS AND DEFINITIONS 
1.1 Subject Property -- Exhibit "A". Attached to 
this Agreement and by reference incorporated therein and nude a 
part hereof, as Exhibit "A", is a docurpent captioned "Legal 
Description of the Subject Property'', which sees forth by metes 
and bounds the legal description of certain rea| property located in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, consisting of approximately ,cive 
thousand (5, 000) acres. The real property described in Exhibit ''A" 
will sometimes be referred to as the "Subject property". 
1. 2 Water Rights. The expression "Water Rights ' a§ 
used in this Agreement shall mean and refer to and include the 
Water Rights described in Application No. 34652, a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
1.3 All Properties Deing Sold. The expression "All 
Properties Being Sold" as used in this Agreement shall, mean and 
refer to and include the Subject Property (legally described In Exhibit 
"A"), and the Water Rights described in Exhibit "BM. 
*•"' 'ntenc of Agreement. Ic is t!ie purpose and intent: 
of Seller to seP, convey, assist!, transfer and deliver to Buyers, 
and the purpose and'intont of Buyers co purchase, acquire ai'.J receive 
from Seller AP Properties Being Sold, subject, however, to the te rms, 
conditions and understandings as provided in this Agreement, 
1. 5 Closing. The sale of All Properties Being Sold 
shall take place at the closing referred to herein as the "Closing", 
to be held at the offices of McCam Land Company, 2010 Beneficial 
' lower Building, Salt La!;c City, Utah on the \ day of ^ U i w . 
1978, or at such other place and within such oP JV time as may be 
mutually agreed upon by Buyers and Seller. Tlie date of Closing, 
however fixed, is throughout this Agreement sometimes referred to 
as the "Closing Date". 
II. 
COVENANTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS 
In consideration oj the mutual promises and covenants; 
herein contained, and other goi.d ancl valuable yonsidera.ior., ulie 
receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, IT IS 
AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD BY 'PIE PARTIES HERETO AS J-OLLQWS, 
to-wtt; 
2. i Sel ler ' s Agreement to Sell All Properties Being Sold. 
Seller, for t! e consideration described In Paragraph 2. 2 her:of, agrees 
to >ell and convey to Buyers the Subject Proper?/ described i;\ Exhibit 
"A" attaclied lereto. Conveyance of said Subject Property shall bo 
made by Sel'et* to Buyers, as provided in Paragsaph 2. 13 of this 
Agreement, . v i l e r further agrees to sell, assign, couvcy, transfer 
and deliver to liuycrs all of their ri •Mt, '.i:!e and interest in ?.M to 
the Water K'. ' i ts, as provided in Paragraph 2.5 of this Agreement, 
2. J Buyer-'* Agreement ?o l^ .u-cl'* «>e ..nd Payment o r 
Purchase Pr :ee. Buyers agree to purchase A" Properties Being 
Sold and a g u e to pay to .Seller, as t!ie total, fvV. LMM} complete 
purchase price lor All Properties Being Sold, consisting of the 
Sub; i'ro|»rrty descr ied in Paragraph 1. 1 (Lixhibit "A") and tlie 
Water Rights described in Paragraph 1.2 (Fxhibit "IT), the sum 
of Seven Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($7, 500, 000. 00), 
payable strictly within the following times and in the following manner; 
A. Fifty-Five Thousand Dollars ($55, 000.00) 
earnest money deposit, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged. 
B. Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500, 000. 00), 
in cash or certified ^heck or cashier's check, to be paid to the 
• ' ; ! / 
escrow holder on or before the Closing. 
c!. Three Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Dollars
 1J(jfX 
($345, 000. 00, on or before Junw , 1978, *MVA> 
D. The unpaid principal balance of the purchase 
price in the .sum of Six Million
 kSL\ hundred Thousand Dollars 
($6,600,000.00) shall be paid in annual principal payments of Three 
Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars ($330, 000,00), with the first payment 
of Three Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars ($333, 000.00) to Le 
made on May 2\ 1979, to be followed by .such a payment of Three 
Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars ($330, 000.00) un May 25, U'SO 
and a like payment on May 25, I9S1, T! uvv.ftcr the unpaid b:ilar-.ce-
of nvc Million Six Hundred Ten Thousand IX.liais ($5, 610, 00J. Q\)\ 
s!?a!i be paid i • twenty (20) equal amortized pniitul installment 
of Five Hundred Sixty Thousand Light Hundred Two Dollars on J 
Fourteen Cents ''',560, 802.14), lx?aring interest at the rate of seven 
a.id iree cuarvrs percent (7.75',") per annum, payable on May 25 
of each year, commencing May 25, 19S2 until the principal balance 
and interest thereon-is paid in full, in this regard, the parties do 
*iereby confirm ;nd acknowledge that "Itls their mutual- intent that 
the obligation of both Seller and Clivers under this Agreement shall 
be firm and binding according to the terms of this Agreement and 
Buyers shall be lirmly obligated to purchase All IYo;*?rtics Being 
-3-
SolJ and pay said purchase price iherefore as specifically set 
forth her m, the obligations of Buyers being joint and several. 
!:. Interest shall accrue and become payable on 
the unpaid balance of the purchase price as provided in this 
Paragraph 2.2 a: ihe rate of seven and three quarters percent 
(7.75%) per annum, from and after May 25, 1981. No interest 
shall accrue or be payable prior to May 25, 1981. All payments 
made by Buyers hereunder prior to or on May 25, 19?I shall be 
applied to princ.pa!. Accrued interest shall be paid as part of the 
annua! amor, ized payment, with the first such payment to be made 
on Vay 25, ln'l? and as part of each amortized payment to be made 
on May 25 of eac'. year thereafter. 
!\ Alter M iy 25, 1';S1, Buyers, at their option, may 
pay amounts in excess of the principal payments provided for .here-
under; provided, however, that Buyers shall not !»e entitled :o pay 
in excess of ten percent (If>,^ ) of the total remaining principal balance 
In any one calendar year, without the consent t f the Seller. All 
prepayments of principal shall ripply to the next succeeding principal 
payment due, and a!l payments and prepayments of principal nhtil 
apply to land releases as provided fur in Paragraph 2.6 hereafter, 
-• •* l*^*vury o f Pesscssion to Duyjrii, Possession, 
risk of damage and responsibility for All Properties Doing Sold 
shall be delivered to Buyers upon payment therefore and conveyance 
as hereinartcr provided. Buyers acknowledge aad agree that ihey 
have examined All Properties Being Sold and conducted such 
investigations and studies with relation thereto is they deem 
advisable and have satisfied themselves as to the natuuc and 
condition of said premises and all pertiticr' factors with relation 
thereto. It is expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto 
that Seller has made no warranties, representations, covenants 
or agreements as to said premises of any tyjx? whatsoever, except 
to convey good and marketable title as provided in Paragraph 2.13 
lereafter. Buyers r.give to accept said premises in rhn rnmUriA-
iii which they ::uw exist williout representation 01 warranty, 
express or imp' A), in fact or b\ law, by Seller and without 
recourse against Seller ah to the nature, condition or usability 
thereof or the uses to wluch said premises may be put, except 
to convey good and marketable title as provided in Paragraph 
2. 13 hereafter. Buyers hereby agree to fully indemnify SelTcr and 
hold Seller harmless from and against any and all claims, demands 
and/or causes of action, including costs, expenses and reasonable 
a t rorney 's fees, which may be asserted against and/or incurred 
by Seller relating, in any manner to Buyers' use and/or occupancy 
of All Proj>ert;es Idling Sold. During the life of this Agreement, 
Buyers agree, :.c theirexpc nsc, to maintain public liability rjnu 
property damage insurance on said properties with a ca r r i e r 
approved by .Seller, with limits nf One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
( ^00 , 000. 00) covering property damage, and One Million Dollar;; 
(§1, 000,000.00) covering public liability and personal injury. 
Seller will be made as Co-Insured en said policy. 
2.4 Taxes and Assessments . Vyithout amipng specific 
provisions of this Agreement felatir.g to si|ch matters , Buyers 
ag rce to pay anyand all taxes and a s se s smen t of every klEiL^ 
and nature, real and personal, wljich are or w.iich may be assessed 
and which may become due on or in connection with All Properties 
Being Sold from and after the Closing pate to Rubers. Buyers 
r hall pay any c.w^ all addit'-cMial ta:,es resulting ' rom the roll back 
o axes under the Gnv n be l t Amendment. Th:> taxes for 1978 will 
be prorated as of the Closing Date. Seller r.\\a)[ pay or cause to be 
paid all genera! taxes and assessments on all parcels of the 
""Subject Propcny prior to jmuiary 1, ttJTbV^^cr^vent the Buyers** 
shall default \\\ the pay men: of any special or genera! taxes, 
assessments or msurance premiums as herein provided, Che Seller 
may, at itu op r 'o", pay said taxes, assessments ?.\\{} insurance 
premiums or e t t ' e r of them, and if Seller e 'ecrs i.o to do, then :!ie 
Buyers agree to repay the Seller upon demand all such sums so 
advanced and paid by it, together with interest thereon from date 
oi payment of ^iid sums at the rate of one percent (1%) per month 
until paid, .'iel'or represents iliac all taxes and assessments 
levied or impeded prior to December 31, 1977 on the Water 
Rights, if any, have been paid in full, and that Seller agrees that 
it will pay any taxes or assessments levied or imposed thereon, 
•f any, until the date of delivery of possession to the Buyers. 
2.5 Water Rights. When the entire purchase price 
hereunder and all interest thereon has been paid in full, Seller 
shall assign and transfer to Buyers the Water Rights unless other-
wise agreed by t.ic part ies . 
Pending the payment in full by Buyers to Seller of the 
complete and ' n \ d purchase price hereunder and all interest 
payments rc tpi red hereunder, and as long as Buyers are pot in 
('el.mlt under ih: , Agreement, Buyers shall have the right to use 
the Water KrV: . . During such period, Buyers agree to maintain 
said Water Rights in good stand5,!g% I-urthcr, Jtiri g ti • term of 
this Agreement, Buyers shall pay all trxes, feej and assessments , 
real or personal, which may be levied 3r z\ aived against sag. V/a.ff;: 
Right;. S'IOUV fnyCi'S d e i n m i n e rjiat ;:ome of % x: Water Rifles 
are needed in .-."••unct :<"i widi the deve'opmem m
 :;a!e of the 
.Subject P roper^ . Buyers ,-hall have the right to tvek the conse n r 
o! Seller to a : aV of the i eeded Water Rights. Seller agrees th.'t 
it \ ;||
 a c t l C J ..n.iiily in j'.ivmg U v ; r coMi.en1. ai wi! 1 not unreasonably 
withhold t!:e s am- . If a sale is approved a:: herem provided, Seller 
shall t ransfer a»«d assign die pertinent Water Rights to Buyers and 
Bmers shall foriSwith pay to Seller all of the consideration received 
therefor by Buyc*j or such amotuu ;.s shall be mutually agreed, 
which payment s \al l operate as a prepayment of purchase price 
under Paragraph 2. 2 of this Agreement. 
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2. 6 Release of Acreage During Period of Purchase. 
A. The Buyers shall be entitled to the release of 
two hundred (200) acres of the Subject Property upon payment of 
the amount uf l'ive Hundred Fifty Five Thousand Dollars ($555,000.00) 
due and payable at the Closing as provided in Paragraph 2. 2, A 
and B above The Seller shall select the acres to be released, 
provided ih.it such acreage released shall have access to the county 
road o:i the Subject Proixjrty; provided further, however, the 3uyers 
shall be eivit'cd to exchange the two hundred (200) acre parcel.for 
other acres in die Subject Property at the, rate of one hundred fifty 
percent (,r',"<) or iV appraised value of the new parcels as provided 
in Pa rag raj '• 't below. 
H. At the exjvnsc of Buyer, the Subject ?ro;>er:y 
will be- forthwith appraised a'ter payment' of t'^ rphree Hundred 
/-/# Forty-Five T'juusar.J Dollars ($345, 000. 00) payable on or before Ad 
June^t; 197K herein by an appraiser or appraisers acceptable to v w ' ^^ 
both Seller and Buyers for the purpose of asceit lining the value pf 
the Subject Property on an acreage basis proportionate to an assumed 
valuation for the whole acreage thereof of Svvcp Million Five Jmdf^d 
Thousand Dollars ($7, 500, 000.00). V\rjn obtaining such appraisal, a 
schedule of appraised values per acre will be appended as Exhibit 
"C" to this Agreement. Thereafter, the Buyers shall be Immediately 
entitled to the conveyance of Sand by Seller which Buyers shall have? 
the right to select of the value as shown by such appraisal of Six 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($600,000.00) in exchange for such land in 
one parcel, ' 'he Buyers shall also have the righ; to receive a conveyance 
of land of sixiy-stx and two-thirds percent (66-2/3%) o£ the value ^ 
of all payments on principal made subsequent to the Three Hundred . ^A 
Forty-Five Thousand Dollar ($315, 000.00) payment to be made on ^/I'j ^ 
or before JuncX 197.x, as provided in this Agreement, subject, /J^L^ 
however, to the following conditions. 
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!. A': payments of principal and interest 
r
uv the nppLcaVe periods theretofore due under this Ag'vemert m.u^: 
!,ave l«een paid, and ntiyers must not otherwise be in default. 
2. 'I'!"/ land to be released may be selected 
by Buyers, but shall be contiguous to that previously re Teased and 
not in s n u ' l e r parcels than forty (40) acres , unless otherwise 
agreed to bv Seller. The i ,!it to partial re leases may be accumulated 
and when so accumulated shall be released at the request of 
iiuyers. All prepayments made for partial re leases shall be 
applied against the next installment 6uc hereunder. 
3. That the Subject Property has theretofore 
been appr.u-.ee! as provided in this Paragraph „\ 6 and a schedule 
of appraised values has been approved by the parties and affixed 
to tin.-. Agreement as Lxhibit MCM. 
C. Seller shall be entitled to such rights-of-way 
over released land as may be necessary to provide reasonable 
ingress and egress to the unconveyed portion of the Subject Property 
(remaining 'and) and to a!low &?l!cf to rnake any proper use of the 
Remaining Land. It is understood and ;greed that public roadways 
shall be used for such purpo^ea when available. If access to the 
Remaining Land is not reasonably AV'M able by public roadway, in 
the sole and absolute discre.ion of Seller, then Seller shall have 
the right to reserve a right-of-way sixty (61)) feet wide with regard 
to any rc le .^e and conveyance, so aj t j provide such reasonable 
access ; prov ded, however, that such i ig'r.-.-uf-way J ia l l no:, to 
the extent •vasonab'y »ossib!e, impair or ••r.erL'rc with Stivers 
development ut the Sts>ject Property. Any rig/'ts-of-way reserved 
by Seller shs'l not be subject to any limitations as to burden, and 
Seller sha1 ' '»avc th" r !ght to enmity ^ue'' r^g/'-s-^f-wny ror my 
purpose re l-.enably necessary to ma'<e mv ;••' »;vr use of the 
Remaining La'-d. Such righ rs-u r-way :. , ,. t" io »v\! remain appurtenant 
t o ' h e Rem.nrug Land until a::-1 us 'ess •••.•eh rVhts-of-wny a;e 
rights-of-way as may be contained within or functionally replaced 
by dedicated public roadways. Seller furtiier agrees to extinguish 
all u( such rights-of-way reservations, and to convey the same to 
Buyers, together with all unreleased and unconvcyed portions of 
the property upon fe l le r ' s receipt of payment in r,:!l of aH of the 
sums provided to be paid lie rounder. 
2. 7 Prior Agreements Affecinff All Properties Being 
Sold. It is understood by the parties that the Subject Property 
is subject to the following unrecorded real estate contracts, and 
Buyers ag.ee to take the property subject to the said contracts: 
A. An unrecorded Real Estate Contract dated 
July U, 1V72 by and between Jay V. Heck UIK! 1-aye I:. Beck, 
husband a»\* wife; Kenneth J. Ik'ck and Vlarylin Beck, husband and 
wife; /\rt<Mi \V. Bullock, Cladys Beck and Shirley B. Nash, as Sellers; 
ard ')an C. N-mors, tor himself and as agent for undisclosed 
principals, :»:•• Buyer. The Buyer's rights to s-vlcl contract were 
asvgned by en unrecorded Assignment dated \ i r c h 14, 1973 
by ar/J between Dan C\ Simons, for himself and as agent for 
•/.KU-.c'uscd principal-;, . . j Assignors, nd A!pii,e, Ltd. as A^slg've. 
' l i e .Vller.V rights to said concracr \ \e /e deeded in trust to 1 eck 
Land, Inc. '»y two W./ranty !X'Ct!s dated Sentem' : 19, 197; 
and records d ' he jva^er in the offke.: tf ' V ',,..,,» and Salt Lr'.:o 
Cuuiry Kee«»i J e r s . 
B. An unrecorded agreement entitled Superseding 
Agicement dated July 13, 1972 by and between Beehive Investment 
Company, a Utah corporation, as Seller and Dan C. Simons, for 
himself and a:, agent for other, individuals, as Buyer. .£aid Superseding 
Agreement w.t-: nsi;;gned by an unrecorded Assignment dated March 
14, 1973 by and between Dan C. Simons, for himself and as agent 
for undisclo: ed principals, as Assignors, and Alpine, Ltd., as 
Assignee. 
2. 8 vJ3rokeragbsgnd Real" Estate Commas ions. Seller 
repres^H^s that he^kas agreeatopay a reaTe^tate commission 
/ith respect rakthis transaction to MfcCJarq Land Company an 
SelleKqgrees to satts^v said coKrniission.^&Md real estate 
commissionsstiall be paid as^follows^aqd the trushse shall be 
authorized to make>s^id payment^: (a) Fih^-Five Thotts^nd 
Dollars ($-^000.00) on e^^ution of t h i ^ g r e e m b ^ (b) Thre 
Thousand DbRars ($345, 08Q. 00) upbo payment 
amoliqx by the Bu^e^s on or befdbejune 5, l ^ f ^ s hereinabove 
the Suci of Fifty Tfhpusand Dolla>sJ$50, 000. Oajon 
rhousand Doh^rs ($50, OC&JOO) 
Kf*}c25, 1980 and^May 25, 19£k.and (d) ttossum of TwoHundred 
Thousand D^Rars ($200, OOO>«0) on May 25, 1982 
2. 9 Waste. Buyers agree that they will not commit or 
suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
the Subject Property. Buyers agree not to remove or cause fo be 
removed any soil or o».her materials from t\\e Subject Property 
until such time as title to that portion of the propeity affected has 
been conveyed to Buyers. 
2.10 Time is of the Essence, Af3 cpncerns all matters 
of performance agreed upon hereunder It is cctenanted by the 
parties that time is strictly of the essence of this Agreement, 
2. 11 Short Form of Contract, If desired by Buyers, 
Seller agrees to execute a short form of real estate sales contract 
su. marizlng the making of this Agreement, Sv> that Buyers may 
have the same placed of record in the office of the County Recorder, 
Salt Lake and Utah County, State of Utah, if Buyers so desire. 
Provided, that i r i s "agreed -and uudeisiuud if there is-any vaiiatton— 
between the provisions of the short form of real estate sales contract 
and this Agreement, the provisions of this Agreement shall govern 
and control. Nothing contained herein shall prohibit Buyers from 
recording a notice of interest with the County Recorder of Salt Lake 
County, and Utah County, State of-Utah. 
2.12 Default Provisions. In the event of any failure on 
the part of Buyers to comply with the terms hereof, or upon the 
failure on the part of Buyers to make any payment or payments 
when the same shall become due, or within thirty (30) days there-
after, Seller shall be entitled to receive conveyance of the unconveyed 
portion of the Subject Property on demand, and Seller, at its option, 
shall have the following alternative remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of 
Buyers to remedy the default within five (5) days after written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey 
any then unconveyed portion of All Properties Being Sold, and all 
payments which may have theretofore been made under this 
Agreement by Buyers shall be forfeited by Seller as liquidated 
damages for the non-performance of this Agreement; and Buyers 
agree that Seller may, at its option, re-enter and take possession 
of any then unconveyed portion of All Properties Being Sold without 
legal processes as in their first and former estate together with 
all improvements and additions made by Buyers thereon, ancj said 
additions and improvements shall remain \vith 1^1 Properties Being 
Sold and become the property of Seller, Buyers becoming at once 
a tenant at will of Seller; or 
B. Seller may bring suit and recover judgement 
for all sums then owing hereunder, including cpsts and attorney's 
f ee . (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not 
prevent Seller, at its option, from resorting to one of the other 
remedies hereunder in the event of any other or subsequent default; 
or 
C. Seller shall have the right, at Its option and 
upon written notice to Buyers, to declare the entire unpaid balance 
then owing hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to 
treat this Agreement as a note and mortgage, and pass title to any 
then unconveyed portion of All Properties Being Sold to Buyers, 
subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same 
in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, and have said 
portion of All Properties Being Sold sold and the proceeds applied 
toward the payment of the balance then owing, including costs and 
attorney's fees and Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency 
which may remain. In the case of foreclosure, Seller hereunder, 
upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of the then 
unconveyed portion of All I'roperties Being Sold and collect the 
rents, issues and profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment 
of the obligations of Buyers hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to the order of the Court; and Seller, upon entry of judgment of 
foreclosure, shall be entitled to possession of the unconveyed 
portion of All Properties Being Sold during the period of redemption. 
2. 13 Appointment of Trustee and Conveyance of Subject 
Property Upon Receipt of Payments and Title Insurance. 
A. The Seller hereby agreep to use its best 
efforts to obtain the agreement of Beck Lane}, Inc., the grantee 
in trust of the Seller's interest In the unrecorded real estate 
contract described in Subparagraph 2,7 A above, to convey tq 
ALTA TITLE COMPANY, 433 Soutf) 40Q East, £alt Lake City, U»li 
(designated as Escrow Agent herein and hereinafter also sometimes 
referred to as "Trustee") as Trustee, by Warranty Deed the Interest 
of Beck Land, Inc. In and to the Subject Property so that ALTA TITLE 
COMPANY as said Trustee can receive and disburse payments and 
convey title to the Subject Property in accordance with the acreage 
release provisions of Subparagraph 2. 6 hereof _and^thejk)llowing 
additional provisions directly relath^ to the appointment of said 
Trustee: 
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1. The Seller and the Buyers hereby mutually 
appoint ALTA TITLE COMPANY, 433 South 400 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah as Trustee for the following purposes and with the 
following powers and obligations: 
(a) Seller shall execute or cause to 
be executed and delivered Quit-Claim Deeds to the Subject Property 
naming Alpine, Ltd. as grantor and ALTA TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, Trustee, as grantee. 
(b) The original Quit-Claim Deeds 
shall be held by said Trustee until directed to be recorded by 
the Seller but in no event later than the payment of the amount 
of Five Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand Dollars ($555, 000.00) due 
and payable at the Closing. Upon payment of such amount by the 
Buyers and, if the trust arrangements with Beck Land, Inc. are 
consummated, the Trustee shall record the original Quit-Claim 
Deeds in the offices of the Utah and the Salt Lake County Recorders, 
together with the Warranty Deed from Beck Land, Inc. described 
above. 
(c) All payments du^ under this Agreerpent; 
shall be made to the Trustee. 
(d) As payments an? made under this 
Agreement and Buyers become entitled to releases and conveyances 
of acreage in accordance with the provisions hereof, the Trustee 
shall convey to Buyers by Special Warranty Deed the acreage tq 
w!::ch Buyers are entitled. 
(e) If thp above-described trust arrangement 
cannot be arranged with Beck Land, Inc., ALTA TITLE COMPANY 
shall still serve as Escrowagenrfor purposes-of receiving and 
disbursing payments under this Agreement in accordance with 
the above payment provisions and for purposes of making conveyances 
and releases as herein provided. 
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(f) In the event Buyers shall default 
under the terms of this Agreement and not cure said default in 
the time provided herein, and Seller shall, through exercise of 
its default remedies hereunder become entitled to a reconveyance 
of acreage not yet released hereunder, the Trustee shall reconvey 
to Seller the acreage not previously released hereunder. 
B. Attached hereto as Exhibits "D" and "E" and 
incorporated herein by this reference as Title Insurance Commitment 
No. 44-3-6485 and Title Insurance Commitment No. 44-3-6485B 
prepared by ALTA TITLE COMPANY of Salt Lake City, Utah 
dated February 10 and 16, 1978. Seller shall furnish good and 
marketable tirle to the Subject Property, in fee simple. Buyers 
shall accept such title as evidenced by a policy of title insurance 
on the standard form of ALTA TITLE COMPANY with the normal 
printed exceptions to coverage as set forth on said standard form 
and subject to the additional exceptions set forth on the Title 
Insurance Commitments attached hereto as Exhibits "D" ancj "E", 
except that Seller shall pay or otherwise satisfy th° fol7 owing 
obligations sen forth 4s exceptions on the attached Commitments, 
and indemnify and hold Buyers harmless frpm qosts, damages 
or expenses arising from said matters; Items 17, 18, 19, +Q, ?l, 
22, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28 in Schedule B of Copimitment No, 44-3-6485; 
and Items 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, ,20, and 21 In Sct>equle 
B of Commitment No. 44-3-6485B. 
It Is agreed that Buyers may, at their option, pay and 
discharge any or all of the above obligations, if not paid by the 
Seller, which payment shall be credited to the balance then remaining 
and due hereunder; and, at Buyers' option, such payments ma^ Lhe 
withheld or deducted from principal installment payments then due 
or to become due in the future as provided herein. Buyers agree to 
Indemnify and hold Seller harmless from liens or encumbrances 
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accruing or imposed against the Subject Property as a result of the 
acts or neglect of Buyers. The above-de scribed title insurance 
policy shall be provided by Seller at Seller's expense to Buyers 
at such time as Buyers are entitled to conveyance of each parcel 
as herein provided, but in no event later than at the time of the 
final conveyance of Special Warranty Deed hereunder after payment 
in full of all amounts of principal and interest due hereunder. Said 
title insurance policy shall be issued for the full amount of the 
purchase price described in this Agreement or the pro rata 
portion thereof as applicable if provided on separate parcels. 
Seller further agrees to pay or otherwise satisfy and 
indemnify and nold Buyers harmless from costs, damages or 
expenses arising from all items set forth in Paragraphs 10 and 
11 of the July 13, 1972 Superseding Agreement described in Sub-
paragraph 2. 7B above to the same extent and upon the same terms 
as provided by said Agreement with the same option hereinabove 
given to Buyers to pay and discharge any or all of said obligations 
and receive credit for any such paymenps against tl.j balance 
then remaining and due hereunder. 
*^ ^  Survey. Jt is acknowledged thqt a survey of 
the Subject Property has not been made. Buyer^ agree to have 
a survey made of the Subject Property, at thplr p\yn expense, 
by a surveyor certified by the State of Utah. The description 
set forth in the survey shall be substituted in lieu of the description 
ci tie Subject Property set forth in Exhibit "A" and shall be inserted 
in the Deed of Conveyance by Seller to the extent insurable. 
2.15 No Prior Sale. The Buyers warrant that they 
have not made nor accepted any offers for sale or purchase of all 
or any part of the Subject Property prior to the Closing Date. 
2.16 Demands and Notices. All demands and notices 
to be given hereunder, if any, shall be sufficient if given in writing 
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by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, or if given by 
Western Union Telegraph, and in either case addressed to the 
respective party at his postal address or to such other address 
or addresses as each may hereafter designate in writing. The 
present postal address of Seller is 809 Edgehill Road, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84103, and the present postal address of Buyers is 
166 West Main Street, American Fork, Utah, 84003, Notices 
by mail shall be deemed effective and complete at the time of 
posting and mailing in accordance herewith. Notices by telegraph 
shall be deemed effective and complete at the time of delivery 
thereof to the telegraph company for transmission. 
2. 17 Additional Documents. The parties hereby agree 
to execute such additional documents as may be necessary or 
desirable to carry out the intent of this Agreement. 
2. 18 Interpretation of Agreement. This Agreement 
shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State 
of Utah. 
2.19 Payment of Costs apd Expenses* Uprn E)efault, 
Buyers and Seller each a^ree that should they default in any pf 
the covenants or agreements contained herein, phe defaulting 
party shall pay all costs and expenses, incljidipg a reasonable 
attorney's fee, which rnay afise or accrue from enforcing this 
Agreement, or in obtaining possession of the piemlses covered 
hereby, or In pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by 
trie statutes or other law of the State of Utah, whether such remedy 
is i jrsued by filing a suit or otherwise and whether such costs 
and expenses are incurred with or without suit or before or after 
judgment. 
2. 20 Assignability. Bu>ers may not assign, by operation 
of law or otherwise, their interest under this Agreement without 
the prior written consent of Seller which shall not be unreasonably 
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withheld. In the event of any such assignment without Seller's 
consent, Seller shall have the right upon notice and demand to 
declare the entire remaining unpaid balance then owing hereunder 
at once due and payable and to thereupon exercise any of the remedies 
provided in Subparagraph 2.12 A, B, and C above. 
2.21 Effect of Agreement. This Agreement shall 
entirely supersede any discussions, negotiations, arrangements 
or proposals which may heretofore have occurred between the parties 
with respect to All Properties Being Sold or any portion thereof. 
2. 22 Successors in Interest. The stipulations aforesaid 
shall to the extent permitted by the provisions hereof, apply to 
and be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, successors 
and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this Agreement 
have hereunto signed their names the day and year first above 
written. 
SELLER: 
UlCHEA^ W. McBRLDE ^ 
BUYERS: 
RAY to. LAMOREAUX 
WENDELL lv HANSEN 
y 
NEW EMPIRE DEVELOPMENT CO. 
By 
RAY W. LAMOREAUX, PRESIDENT 
ATT 
RONALD S. COOK, ^SECftETARY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
/ * ' day of KJAA^UL-^ 1978 On the 
personally appeared before me MICHEAL W. McBRIDE, th§ signer 
of the within Instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that foe 
executed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing \*yt-sjj*{£**-Cjtj. Ut' 
My Commission Expires; 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the /S day of \JA^JL^ , 1978, 
personally appeared before me RONALD S. COOK, MYRON B. 
CHILD, JR., RAYW. LAMOREAUX, and WENDELL P. HANSEN, 
the signers of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to 
me that they executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public 
Residing yxiyhjjrfJt, Cjh . (M* 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. 
On the day of , *97& 
personally appeared before me RAY W. LAMOREAUX, President 
of NEW EMPIRE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, the signer of t|ie 




My Commission Expires: 
TabE 
. . I™ 
!• ' 
EXHIBIT 
1MIS IS A UGAHY BINDING CONTRACT If NOT UNDSHSTOOO SEtK COMPETENT ADVICE" 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
i /-v ^  September SO 1. THIS AGKKEMENT, made in duplicate this «*-° day of r A. D.. 19 
New Empin- Development Corporation,Wendell P. Hansen, Ronald S. Cook an<j hv and. between . ~ * * • • — — \ ftiy W LamofcaTfi? 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and Myron B. Chi ld , J r . 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of . Sa l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 
2 WITNESSETH That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to tell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned afrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
t h t f f f r„y ,»/ Sa l t Lake and Utah c t H..I. . ;•. Beck Land Inc . - Traverse Mountain) State of Utah, to-wit. . 
If ore particularly described as follows: 




J - - . • \ e q u i t y 
3 Said Bu/er hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described JfiVJtKfcaa the sum of "NE 
MILLIOM FIVE HUNPRED THOUSAND AND NO/100 TMIm tt 1,500,000.Op 
payable at the oificc of Seller, /fis'^f'figna or order _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ « _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - _ — _ _ - - _ _ _ _ ^ _ - - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ 
strictly within the following zfmes, Vo-wit: <$-
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of i 1 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
 a H a )j ^ ^ M M f 0 | j , i v t 
The t o t a l amount w i l l be paid in f u l l wi th in e i g h t e e n (18) months ftorn the date hereojn 
Monies w i l l be~*paid regu lar ly s tar ing on or before February 1, 1981 from the pro f i t s 
the Buyer i s to r e c e i v e from the s a l e of condominiums on the Plumtree V i l l a g e and 
Forest Park Condominium p r o j e c t s located in RockSprings, Wyoming. A minimum of 
$5 ,000 .00 w i l l bepaid from the proceeds of each condominium so ld and c l o s e d on the 
f i r s t $450 ,000 .00 pa id . (See attached copy of promissory no te s marked Exhibi t "B" 
!! Possession of said premises shall (*• delivered to buyer on the . 20 w . r „, September 19. 80 
j 4. Said monthly payments arc to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
September ?0, 1980
 o n . , , u n p „ d fn%lam „ l h t principal Inteiest shall be charged from 
purchase price at the rate of . per cent (_ -T*) par annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or In prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be mad* at the time the excess payment is made. 
6 It is understood and agrr«d that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of Ue seller 
6. Il is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of " I k e McBride 
and Alpine LTD plus o thers indent i f i e d by Western S t a t e s T i t l e in T i t l e report ,dated 
May 5* 1980T- l « u u i I #lh- IH60fj ~ w f t * ** unpaia*balanc« of 
t approx. $ 1 2 . 2 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 9 as of September 20. 1980 
7 Seller represents that tht rr are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering Improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of U mc installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following e x c e p t a s i d e n t i f i e d i n a b o v e d e s c r i b e d t i t l e r e p o r t ( I t e m # 6 ) 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rale of not to »«r»*d percent 
( ~iL%) per annum ami payable in regular monthly installments, provided that the agregata monthly installment 
paymenu required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be znmhrr than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages 
9 If the Buyer desires to eirrnsr his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of thin agrecniini against said properly, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said properly incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
••id obligations are assumed or approved by buyer 
10 The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount s» can bt secured under the regulations ol said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above mention* d, and to execute the papers required and pay one-ha If the expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one half, provided however, that the monthly payments »n4 
interest rate required. »hail not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11 The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of 9>/tTy kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which msy bttome due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
No except ions 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations againat said properly 
I U es afte Buyers agree to pay ALL taxes now due. 
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all Insurable building *»»d improvements on said premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in Ihc amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or t -
snd to assign satd insurance to the Seller as his interest * may appear and to deliver the insurance policy to him. 
14 In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general Uses, assessments or insurance 
premium* as herein provided, the Siller may. at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
and paid by him. together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rats of % of one percent per 
ith i until psid 
16. Buyer street that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in food condition 
16. In the event of s failurr to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
any-payment or payment* when Ihr same shall become due, or within T h i r t y ( 3 0 )
 d l J r i thereafter, the 
/ Seller, at hi* option shall have Hie following alternative remedies: 
N
"*~"~ A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within fi»e days after written notice. 
to bcrelessed from »ll obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have 
DecFTTnaoe Iherelolofe on thin contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option ro-«nUF~an<rUke 
possession of ssid premises without legal processes ss in its first and former estate, together with all improve* 
menu and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the lend become the property •>( the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller msy bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies* hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at hi* option, and upon written "Qtice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may eleet to tr»»t this contract mm a not* ****( mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to forecloseThe same in accordance with the laws of 
the Slate of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney* fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court, snd the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It ts agreed that time is the essence of thin agreement 
IB In the event there sre any liens or encumbrances against ssid premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to. or in the event any hens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer msy, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the smount then remeining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be made may, •< the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
payments shsli equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to eieruu and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
SO. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
la Its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto W o E x c e p t i o n s 
V 
f 1. The Buyer snd Seller each agree that should they default In any of the covenants or agreements contained here* 
roasonabls attorney's fee, whieh may trite 
remises covered hereby, or In pursuing sny 
In, that the defeulting party shall pay all costs snd expenses, Including a e e c
, __,__. ,__. . . ,#re#ment. or in obtaining possession of the pre ises covered hereby, or In pursuing sny 
"by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing • suit 







ulstions aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, sue-
parties hereto, 


















Schedule A-2 — Creditors holding security 
Name of creditor and residence or place 
of business (if unknown so state); in* 
elude zip code. 
TRAVERSE MOUNTAIN 
Cape T r u s t & F r a n k l i n 
F i n a n c i a l and C a p i t o l 
T h r i f t & Loan and 
R i c h a r d C h r l s t e n s e n 
Description of security and date when 
obtained by creditor 
1) 2nd and 3 r d mor tgages 
on home l o c a t e d a t 
3006 T h a c k e r a y P l a c e 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 
2) E i g h t p r o p e r t i e s l o c a t e d i 
f rom "A" S t r e e t t o Canyon 
! Road between 3 r d and 4 t h 
Avenue, SLC, U t a h . 
A p p r o x i m a t e l y 2^ a c r e s . 
A p r i l 1 and 1 5 . 1978 . 
3 ) June 1 1 , 1978 borrowed 
cash t o purchase 5 , 0 0 0 
a c r e s o f l and $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 
4 ) Judgement on K i m b a l l 
a p a r t m e n t s . 
Specify when claim was incuncd and 
the consideration therefor; when 
claim is contingent, unliquidated, 
disputed, subject to setoff, evidenced i 
by a judgment, negotiable instru-
ment, or other writing, or incurred as 
partner or joint contractor, so in-
dicate; specify name of any partner or 
joint contractor on any debt 
2nd and 3 r d mortgages on home 
a t 3006 T h a c k e r a y P l a c e , SLC 
t o t a l w i t h i n t e r e s t at 107. 
over pr ime a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
$ 1 3 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
P r o p e r t y purchased A p r i l 1 and i 
15 . 1978 , f o r Harden F a l l s 
Condominium p r o j e c t was down- ' 
zoned . P r o p e r t y f o r e c l o s e d 
but may be i n g r a c e p e r i o d . 
Secured by 4 , 4 0 0 r e m a i n i n g 
a c r e s of l a n d . Lo.in was f o r 
$ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 p l u s 2 payments o f 
$ 3 3 0 , 0 0 0 - 6 6 0 . 0 0 0 
$ 1 , 1 6 0 , 0 0 0 p lus i n t e r e s t 
a t 107. over p r i m e . 
$ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Total 
Market value 
$ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
$ 1 , 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 3 6 . 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 < 
N I L 
1* 
Pane 1 
Amount of claim with 
out deduction of valui 
of security 
$ 1 3 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
approx i n u t e l y 
$ 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$1 . 1 6 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
p l u s 
i n t e r e s t 
$ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
p lus 
i n t e r e s t 
f 2 , 1 9 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
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Schedule A-2 — Creditors holding security 
Name of creditor and residence or place 
of business (i f unknown so state); in-
clude zip code. 
TRAVERSE MOUNTAIN Continued 
Alpine Limited Mike McBride 
c/o Alta Title 
202 West 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
J. McDonald 6 
Scott Brubaker 
c/o Myron Sorensen 
330 South 3rd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul Rubey 
968 Military Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
BEC Development, Inc. 
555 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Description of security and date when 
obtained by creditor 
4,400 acres of land in 
Salt Lake and Utah county 
Secured by Assignment of 
Contract on 4,400 acres. 
Assignment of Contract on 
4,400 acres of land -
November 22, 1978, signed 
Promissory Note for 
$375,000. 
Deed given as security for 
advance made to debtor on 
4,400 acres of land, 
June 22, 1981. Total advance 
to date $365,384.62. 
Specify when claim was incurred and 
the consideraiioti therefor; when 
claim is contingent, unliquidated, 
disputed, subject to setoff, evidenced 
by a judgment, negotiable instru-
ment, or other writing, or incurred as 
partner or joint contractor, so in-
dicate; specify name of any partner or 
joint contractor on any debt 
Purchase contract dated June 1, 
1978. First lien on 4,400 acres 
subject only to property taxes. 
Promissory Note dated 
August, 1978. 
Claim occurred November 22, 1978. 
Secured by Assignment of Contract 
in 4,400 acres and Promissory 
Note. 
Various advances as listed in the 








Amount of claim with-
out deduction of value 
of security 
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Schedule A-2 — Creditors holding security 
Page 4 
Name of creditor and residence or place 1 
of business (if unknown so state); in- 1 
elude zip code. 1 
HAVERSE MOUNTAIN C o n t i n u e d . . 
Ronald S. Cook 
821 North 610 East 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Ray Lamoreaux 
166 West Ma in S t r e e t i 
A m e r i c a n F o r k . U tah 84003 
W e n d e l l Hansen 
Route 1 . Box 32 -B 
A m e r i c a n F o r k , U t a h 84003 
R i c h a r d Hawks Assoc. 
232 West 8 t h S o u t h , S u i t e D 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U tah 8 4 1 0 1 
Description of security and date when 
obtained by creditor 
Promissory Note d a t e d ' 
September 1 9 , 1 9 8 0 . 
Secured by 4 , 4 0 0 a c r e s 
under U n i f o r m R e a l 
E s t a t e C o n t r a c t . 
P r o m i s s o r y Note d a t e d 
September 1 9 . 1980 s e c u r e d 
by 4 , 4 0 0 a c r e s . 
P romissory no te d a t e d 
September 1 9 . 1 9 8 0 . 
Secured by 4 , 4 0 0 a c r e s . 
June 4 , 1980 C o n t r a c t 
Assignment o f c o n t r a c t on 
4 , 4 0 0 a c r e s I n D r a p e r , U t a h 
Specify when claim was incurred and 
the consideration therefor; when 
claim is contingent, unliquidated, , 
disputed, subject to setoff, evidenced 
by a judgment, negotiable instru-
ment, or other writing, or incurred as 
partner or joint contractor, so in-
dicate; specify name of any partner or 
joint contractor on any debt 
4 , 4 0 0 a c r e s purchased under 
U n i f o r m Rea l E s t a t e C o n t r a c t 
d a t e d September 1 9 , 1980 . 
4 , 4 0 0 a c r e s purchased under 
Un i fo rm Rea l E s t a t e C o n t r a c t 
d a t e d September 1 9 , 1980. 
Secured by 4 , 4 0 0 acres under a 
U n i f o r m Rea l E s t a t e C o n t r a c t 
d a t e d September 1 9 , 1980. 
A r c h i t e c t u r a l S e r v i c e s r e n e d e r e d 
on Plum T r e e V i l l a g e . 
Total 
Market value 
$ 3 6 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . O f 
$ 3 6 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 3 6 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 3 6 . 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 C 
1* 
Amount of claim with 
out deduction of value 
of security 
$ 5 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
p l u s 
i n t e r e s t a t 
67. u n t i l 
$ 5 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
p l u s 
I n t e r e s t a t 
6Z . 
$ 5 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
p l u s 
! I n t e r e s t a t 
| 6 1 . 
$ 5 9 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
l l 
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Schedule B — Statement of all Property of Debtor 
Schedules B-I, B-2. B-3, and B-4 must include all property of the debtor as of the date of the filing of the petition by or against him 
(If a joint petition Is fdcd, a seperaie Schedule B must be filled out and filed foi each debtor.J 
Schedule B-l — Real Property 
Description and location of all real property in which debtor has an in-
terest (including equitable and future interests, interests in estates by 
the entirety, community property, life estates, leaseholds, and rights 
and powers exercisable for his own benefit) 
See L e g a l D e s c r i p t i o n s A t t a c h e d 
1 . A c r e a g e , 4 , 4 0 0 a c r e s l o c a t e d between D r a p e r C 
and A l p i n e C i t y i n S a l t Lake and U t a h count 
2 . Homee, 3006 Thackeray P l a c e , SLC, 
3 . Home, 1375 C a n t e r b u r y D r i v e , SLC 
4 . M o u n t a i n v i l l e H e i g h t s , A l p i n e , U t a h 
5 . M a n i l a Meadows, P l e a s a n t G r o v e , UT 
6 . Garden P a l l s Condos, SLC, UT 
7 . Sawyer S p r i n g s , Harmony, UT 
8 . S e t t l e m e n t Canyon, T o o e l e , UT 
9 . L o t s i n M t . P l e a s a n t 
Nature of interest 
(specify all deeds and written instruments relating thereto) 
i t y Ass igned p r o p e r t y t o BEC c o r p o r a t i o n 
i e s ! 
Occupy and own t h e home but deeded t o BUd 
B a i l e y Cor S e c u r i t y on loan 
So ld home t o Almnzo L e a v i t t 
63 l o t s impooted e x c e p t f o r roads not p a v e d . 
24 l o t s improved e x c e p t f o r roads not paved 
F o r e c l o s u r e o n , but i n redempt ion p e r i o d 
F o r e c l o s e d on ( 2 , 3 4 9 acres f 
20% i n t e r e s t i n 10 a c r e s , L i m i t e d p a r t n e r only 
7 l o t s i n P i n e Creek Ranch 
Mafkct value of debtor's inn rest 
without deduction for secured 
claims listed in Schedule A-2 or ex-
emptions claimed in Schedule B <i 
$ 3 6 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
1 2 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
1 , 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
4 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
1 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
2 , 3 0 0 , 9 0 0 . 0 0 
2 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Total 
4 n j 9 n n , n n n n 
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Legal Descriptions 
for Schedule B 
1. Acreage 
A,400 acres located between Draper City and 
Alpine City in Salt Lake and Utah counties. 
See legals attached as Exhibit MAM. 
2. Home 3006 Thackeray Place 
All of Lot 14, THE NEIGHBORHOOD, according to 
the official play thereof, recorded in the 
office of the Salt Lake County Recorder 
3. Home 1375 Canterbury Drive. 
Commencing at a poinc which is 85 feet South from the 
Northeast corner of Lot 21, ST. MARY HILLS PLAT "C", 
according to the official plat filed in Book S, Plats at 
Page 81, records of Salt Lake County, Utah and running 
thence South 49.40 feet; thence South 9 % 1 8 ' 0 0 M West 
46.20 feet; thence West 118.68 feet to the Easterly line 
of Canterbury D r i v e ; thence Northerly along the arc of a 
curve to the left (radlu* 880.0 feet, bearing North 
8 1 % 5 7 ' 4 7 M East) 95.40 feet; thence gaat 117.95 feet to 
the poinc of b e g i n n i n g . 
4. Mountainville Heights 
Coircnencing South 310.69 feet and East 642.85 feet from 
the North quarter corner of Section 24, Township 4 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence 
as follows: East 212.68 feet; thence South 30 deg. 00'00" 
Test 42.38 feet; thence South 55 deg. 00'00M West 500.00 
feet; thence South 12 deg. OO^OO" East 70.00 feet; thence 
South 85 deg. 44'00" East 300.00 feet; thence South 20 deg. 
30'00" West 169.00 feet; thence South 36 deg. 12'00" West 
53.00 feet; thence South 31 deg. 25'0" West 157.00 feet; 
thence South 28 deg. 39*00" West 95.00 feet; thence South 
16 deg. 10'19H West 173.18 feet; thence South 01 deg. 55'00" 
west 50.00 feet; thence North 96 deg. 09'30" East 48.32 
feet; thence South 36 deg. 03,20" West 460.07 feet; thence 
South 26 deg, 46'20" West 394,47 feet; thence South 88 deg. 
23'55" West 865.02 feet; thence North 01 deg. 04'00" East 
140.14 feet along Mountainville Road; thence North 02 deg. 
40'00" East 893.05 feet along Mountainville Road; thence 
north 52 deg. 33'00w East 473.84 feet; thence North 37 deg. 
:7,00" West 104.14 feet; thence North 75 deg. 36f00" East 
550.00 feet; thence North 64 deg. 01*56H East 612.14 feet 
to the point of beginning. Utah county state of Utah 
5. Manila Meadows 
All of Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, a, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 
Plat "A", MANILA MEADOWS SUBDIVISION, in the City of 
Pleasant Grove, County of Utah, State of Utah 
according to the official plat thereof on file in 
the office of the Recorder of said County. 
6. Garden Falls 
183 3rd Avenue 
Cownonclng a t the Southeast corner of Lot ( 1 ) , njoch 43, nj*f "n" 
S a l t Lnki» City fiurvny, Ami running Ut«nc« Vl%%nt. lo-rrvln, Ttmnc* 
North 5-rodn, TJmncn Vj\nti lO-ro«1«, rimim* rottUi !i-ro«tn to lit* po int 
bf beg inn ing . 
136 4th Avenue 
Commencing 57-3/4 feet WEst from the Southeast corner of Lot 10, 
Block 4, Plat "I", Salt Lake City, Survey, and running thence West 
57-3/4 feet; thence North 165 feeti thence East 57-3/4 feet; thence 
South 165 feet to the place of beginning. 
161 3rd Avenue 61 156 4 th Avenue 
TRACT 1: Beginning 55 feet East of the S w corner of Lot 2, Block 43, Plat " 
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North 10 Rods, thence East 53 feet, 
thence South 10 Rods, thence West 53 feet to the point of beginning. 
TRACT 2: Beginning 36.42 feet East of the N.W. Corner of Lot 3, Block 43, PI 
"DH, Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence East 36.42 feet, thence South 
10 Rods, thence West 36.42 feet, thence North 10 Rods to the point of begmni 
together with and subject to a 10 foot right of way on the West. 
147 and 155 3rd Avenue 
Tract li 
Beginning at the Southwest comer of Lot 2, Block 43, Plat WD", Salt Lake Ci 
Survey, and running thence North 10 rods; thence East 55 feet; thence South 
reds; thence West 55 feet to the point of beginning. 
Tract 2t 
Coroencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 4, Plat "I", Salt Lake CI 
Survey, and running thence West 46 feet; thence North 10 rods; thence East < 
feet: thence South 10 rods to the point of beginning. 
164 - 166 4th Avenue 
COMMENCING at the Northeast corner of Lot 3, Block 43, Plat 
NDM, Salt Lake City Survey, thence East 3 rods; thence South 
5 rods; thence West 3 rods; thence South 5 rods; thence West 
2-*j rods? thence North 10 rods; thence East 2-*j rods to the 
place of beginning. 
167 3rd Avenue 
Beginning at the Southeast comer of Lot 2, Block 43, 
Plat "D", Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence West 
57 feet; thence North 16S feet; thence East 57 feet; 
thence South 165 feet to the place of beginning. 
Together with all furniture and furnishings and equipment 
now situated on the premises belonging to the owner and 
use in the operation of the apartment house. 
4th Avenue 
BEGINNING 72 feet 10 inches East from the 
Northwest comer of Lot 3, Block 43, Plat 
"D M f Salt Lake City Survey and running thence 
East 50 feet 11 inches; thence South 165 
feet; thence West 50 feet 11 inches; thence 
North 165 feet to the place of beginning. 
7. Sawyer Springs 
Lots 1 and 2, Section 1, Township 39 South, 
Range 13 West, S. L. M. containing 53.88 
acres more or less. 
BUT LESS THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED TRACT OF 
LAND: 
All that portion of Ash Creek Valley 
lying below an elevation of 4755 feetf 
in Sections 6 and 7, Township 39 South, 
Range 12 West, S. L. M. as shown on the 
official map of Ash Creek Resevoir on 
file in the office of the State Road 
Commission of the State of Utah, 
CONTAINING 288 acres, more or less. 
TOGETHER with all improvements thereon and 
all rights, privileges and appurtenances 
appertaining to the above land to be con-
veyed, including the right to the waters 
decreed to the owners of the property above 
described as set forth in the Decree dated 
December 12, 1925 in the District Court of 
Washington County, Utah in the case entitled 
"St. George and Washington Canal Company, a 
corporation, plaintiff, vs. Hurricane Canal 
Company, a corporation, defendant". Said 
water rights include the following: 
Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 and the East 3/4 of Section 
31, Township 38 South, Range 12 West, S. L. M. 
containing 640.72 acres, less 11.9 acres con-
veyed for highway, leaving 628.82 acres, more 
or less. 
Lots 3 and 4 and 'the N1/2SE1/4 and E1/2NE1/4 
of Section 36, Township 38 South, Range 13 
West, S. L. M. containing 262.65 acres, more 
or less. 
Wl/2 of Section J2, Township 38 South, Range 
12 West S. L. M. containing 320 acres, less 
1.6 acres conveyed for highway and less 37.9 2 
acres conveyed for a highway, leaving 280.48 
acres, more or less. 
W1/2NW1/4, NW1/4SW1/4 of Section 5, Township 
39 South, Range 12 West, S. L. M. containing 
120 acres, less 24.95 acres conveyed for a 
highway, leaving 95.05 acres, more or less. 
Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7; the SE1/4NW1/4, 
S1/2NE1/4, E1/2SW1/4 and SE1/4 of Section 6, 
Township 39 South, Range 12 West, S. L. M. , 
less 22.28 acres conveyed for highway, leav-
ing a balance of 605.72 acres, more or less. 
NE1/4, E1/2NW1/4; Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
9, 10, 12, M , 14 and 15, all in Section 7, 
Township 39 -outh, Range 12 West, S. L. M., less 
26.7 acres i «nveyed for a highway, leaving a 
balance of 710.57 acres, more or less. 
11.16 c.f.s. Class 3 in Ash Creek Award 
Nos. 117, 118, 119, 120 & 122 
.49 c.f.s..Class 1 in Ash Creek Award 
No. 123 
2.16 c.f.s. from Sawyers Springs (Class 3) 
Award No. 121 
.59 c.f.s. Class 3 from Waterfall Canyon 
Award No. 125 
.235 c.f.s. Class 3 from Mud Springs 
Wash Award No. 124 
1.05 c.f.s. Class 3 from Kanarra Creek 
Award No. 92 
ALSO, Underground Water application No. 20013, 
a-4416. Cert. No. 6680 for 0.424 c.f.s., 
Priority right of November 23, 1954. 
ALSO, subject to approval from the Utah State 
Engineer, the transfer of 2.0 c.f.s. of water 
to the purchaser under application No. 33029, 
filed in the office of the State Engineer, 
PROVIDED that all expense incurred in de-
veloping the water and proving up on the ap-
plication shall be borne by the purchaser. 
8. Settlement Canyon 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of the Northwest quarter 
of Section 33, Township 3 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian; running thence West 116.33 feet to the 
Northerly right of way line of the Settlement Canyon Road; 
thence 4 courses along said right of way line, North 30° 
24* 30" West 105 feet; thence on a curve to the left with 
a radius of 620.31, a central angle of 10° 41' a distance of 
115.66 feet; thence North 41° 06' 30" West 160.75 feet; thane 
North 3° 07' 30- West 181.86 feet to the most Southerly 
corner of the Humphrey's property; thence North 58© 18' 
East 217.5 feet; thence North 456 25' West 211 feet to the 
Easterly right of way line of Highway U-36; thence along 
said right of way line 429.5 feet; thence South 78© 21' East 
219.88 feet; thence South 9° East 385 feet; thence South 
30° west 551.16 feet to the point of beginning. 
Tooele City, County o* Tooele. 
9. Lots in Mount Pleasant 
Pine Creek Meadows, a Summer Home Subdivision in Snnpctc Councy, Utah, 
Lot 29, 63, 64, 65 and 71.A^^> CmH 
Pine Creek Oak Crest, A Summer Home Subdivision in Snnpctc County, Utah, 
Lot #60. San Pete County, State of Utah. 
EXHIBIT MAM 
The following described properties are located in Salt Lake and Utah Counties, 
State of Utah: 
Land slcuatc in Township 4 South, Range 1 East. Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, as follows: 
PARCEL l: 
.The South 1/2 of the Southeast quarter, and Northeast quarter of 
the Southeast quarter of Section 7, Sale Lake Councy, Utah. 
JPARCEL 2: 
The Northwest quarter or tne souehwese quarter of Section 8, 
Salt Lake Councy, Utah. 
^ R C E L 3: 
The Southeast quarter, and South 1/2 of che Souchwest quarter 
and the Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 9, 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
"PARCEL 4: 
All of Lots 3 and 4 and the West 1/2 of the Southwest quarter of 
Section 10, In Salt Lake County, Utah. 
PARCEL 5: 
All of that part of Lot 1, and that part of che Northwest quarter of 
^Section 15, lying in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
^PARCEL 6: 
VAjJLof chat part of Section 16 lying in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
PARCEL 7: 
AlLoi thac pare of' Secclon 17 lying in Sale Lake Councy, Utah. 
''PARCEL 8: 
All of tnat pare of che Norch 1/2 of Section IS lyine in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
JARCEL 9: 
"That part of L05S 3 and 4, Secclon 10, lying in Utah Councy. 
.PARCEL 10: 
All of che Southwest quarter of Section 10, In Utah County, excepting 
therefrom the following: A SO foot scrip as deeded co che Metropolitan 
' Water Districc,. the center line of which is described as follows: 
Commencing at a point on che South line of Section 10. from which 
point the Northwest corner bears North 5078. 2 feet and West 2667. 8 
feet; thence Norch 30 30' West 2829.7 feet to a point, and from 
which point the Northwest corner of said Section 10 bears North 
2640 feet and West 1231. 6 feet. 
f PARCEL 11: 
(a) That part of the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter and 
the Northwest quarter of the Souchwest quarter of Section 11, lying 
in Utah County. 
(b) That part of'the North 1/2 of Che North 1/2 of Section 11, lying 
In Utah County. 
(c) That part of the Southeast quarter of the Northwest quarter of 
EXHIBIT MA" 
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(d) The .Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter, the South I 2 
of the Southwest quarter, and the Northeast quarter of the Southwest 
quarter of Section 11. 
PARCEL 12: 
All of Section 14, except the Ease 1/2 of the Northeast quarter. 
PARCEL 13: 
All of Section 15, including Lots I. 2, 3, and 4, in Utah County, • 
excepting therefrom the 50 foot strip now owned by the United 
States of America. 
PARCEL 14: 
All of .Section 16, in Utah County. 
PARCEL 15: 
All of Section 17, in Utah County. 
PARCEL 16: 
ATI or the North 1/2 of Section 18, in Utah County. 
PARCEL 17: 
All of Section 21; 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the following: 
COMMENCING 3765 feet West from the Southeast corner of said 
Section 21, North"1170 feet: thence East 375 feet; thence South 1170 
feet: thence West 375 feet to COMMENCEMENT. ALSO COMMENCING 
3015 feet West and 1170 feet North from the Southeast corner of 
said Section 21, North 585 feet: thence West 375 feet; thence South 
585 feet; thence East 375 feet to the point of COMMENCEMENT. 
PARCEL 18: 
(a) COMMENCING 2.04 chains West from the Northeast corner 
of Seciion 22, in Utah County, and running thence South 62 46' 
West 8.94 chains: thence South 54 39' West 12.28 chains; thence 
North 11.19 chains; thence East 17.96 chains to COMMENCEMENT. 
(b) COMMENCING 33.54 chains West and 20 chains South from the 
Northeast corner of said Section 22; and running thence South 66 29' 
West 20.13 chains; thence South 73 57' West 8. 64 chains; thence 
North 10. 38 chains; thence East 26. 64 chains to COMMENCEMENT. 
in Utah County. 
(c) COMMENCING 20 chains West from the Northeast corner of 
said Section 22, Utah County, and running thence South 11.19 chains; 
thence South 54 39' West 13.01 chains; thence South 66 29* West 
3. 21 chains; thence West 26. 46 chains; thence South 10. 38 chains; 
thence South 73 57' West 4. 99 chains; thence South 28 01' West 3.12 
chains; thence South 30 -13' West 8.55 chains; thence South 31 IT 
West 2.60 chains; thence South 31 47* West 15.92 chains; thence 
North 56. 29 chains; thence East 60 chains to the point of COMMENCEMENT. 
PARCEL 19: 




(a) COMMENCING ac the Northeast corner of Section 28: thence 
South 20 chains; thence South 76 West 41.59 chains: rhence North 
30 chains; thence Ease 40 chains to the pome of COMMENCEMENT. 
(b) The Northwest quarter of Section 28, In Utah County; 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the following: 
COMMENCING at the Northeast corner of Section 28, and running 
thence South 1320 feet; thence South 76 West 1496.50 feet: thence 
North 1682 feet to the North line of saiJ .Section: thence Last 1452 
feet to the point of COMMENCEMENT. 
PARCEL 21-
(a) The Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter, and the Northwest 
quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 29, in Utah County. 
(b) COMMENCING at the Northwest corner of the Southeast quarter 
of the Northwest quarter of said Section 29, Utah County, and running 
thence Ejst 20 chains; thence South 8. 68 chains: thence North 7 2 
05' West 4.80 chains; thence North 64 12' West 16.58 chains; 
thence South 0 20' East 9.81 chains* thence South 66 41' Hast 16. 20 
chains; thence South 72 05' Last 4.75 chains; thence South 2. 29 
chains; thence West 20 chains; thence North 20 chains to the point 
of COMMENCLMLNT. 
(c) COMMENCING 9.90 chains East and 1.14 chains North from 
the Southwesr corner of Section 20, and running thence East 70. 10 
chains; thence South 21.48 chains; thence West 59.12 chains; 
thence North 25 West 6.85 chains; thence North 33 45' West 7. 88 
chains; thence North 32 15' West 5. 68 chains; thence North 9 15' 
West 3. 98 chains to the point of COMMENCEMENT. 
Excepting from all of the foregoing all land heretofore conveyed for 
purposes of the Alpine-Draper Tunnel and all Patent Reservations, 
notices of location, mineral rights, and rights of ingress and egress 
pertaining thereto. 
Schedule B-2 — Persona/ Property 
Type of Property Description and location 
Market value of debtor's interests without 
deduction for secured claims listed on Schedule A-2 
or exemptions claimed on Schedule B-4 
a. Cash on hand 
b. Deposits of money with banking institutions, savings 
and loan associations, credit unions, public utility com-
panies, landlords, and others. 
c. Household goods, supplies, and furnishings 
d. Books, pictures, and other art objects; stamp, coin and 
other collections 
e. Wearing apparel, jewelry, firearms, sports equipment, 
and other personal possessions 
f. Automobiles, trucks, trailers, and other vehicles 
g. Boats, motors, and their accessories 
h. Livestock, poultry, and other animals 
i. Farming supplies and implements 
j . Office equipment, furnishings and supplies 
Cash on p e r s o n 
NONE 
$ 480.00 
Furniture on all kinds (Including drapes, etc. ,| located 
at 3006 Thackeeray Place, SLC, UT 84108 
Books, picbures and schulpture located at 
3006 Thackeray Place, SLC, UT 




Four vehicles located at 3006 Thackeray Place 
1976 Merc. Sta. Wagons , 1979 300 SD MerceH 
being purchased, 1978 300 SD Mercedes Leased, 
Champ 
One Searay 1976 Boat, Hooper, UT 
NONE 
NONE 
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AGREEMENT 
TII1S AGREEMtOT node and en te red i n t o on the /cf day of _ _ ^ 
19S3, by and between CAPIIDL WRIFT AND LOAN, a Utah corporation-, and FRANKLIN 
FINANCIAL, a Utah corporation, co l lec t ive ly referred to herein as "Franklin", 
and l/tflDALL P. HANSEN, RAY W. LAMOREAUX and RONALD S. COOK, col lect ively 
referred to herein as "Cook, Lamoreaux and Hansen"; 
.•JIEREA5, in April or ear ly May, 1978, Cook, Lamoreaux and Hansen 
decided to purcliasc through their conpany, New Empire Development, a five 
thousand (5,000) acre parcel of land, herein referred to as 'Traverse 
fountain", from Michael W. McBride; and 
WHEREAS, on or about May 11, 1978, Cook, Lamoreaux and Hansen and 
Mow Empire Development borrowed a to ta l of Five FSundred 'Ihousand and No/100 
($500,000.00) Dollars from Franklin and secured that loan with their i n t e r e s t 
in Traverse Mountain; and 
WHEREAS, the debt from Cook, Lamoreaux and Hansen to Franklin has 
L i ;.creascd by advances made by Franklin to bring the contract with McBride 
c:.-: . by legal fees and other costs incurred in attempting to co l lec t the 
•J.- •••; .aid by in t e re s t which has accrued a t eighteen percent (18%) per annum 
i;?**;."1 vcn.hjr 1, 1979, and thereafter a t ten ( lo) percentage points in excess 
i.i ..I: |•••!::;-.- rate of in te res t or a t eighteen (13%) percent per annum, whichever 
• : , . . • . -J r ; C'I t ivi 
WHEKFAS, Franldin also advanced One Hundred and Forty Thousand and 
\ix>/\-*j Cri-^.OOO.OO) Dollars to Richard F. McKean v;hich McKean used to apply on. 
the C'.'wii^cA. with McBride,and which Franklin may not be able to* recover;-and 
WHEREAS, the in te res t of Cook, Lamoreaux and Hansen in Traverse 
Mounuiin lias subsequently been transferred to Myron B. Q\i ld, J r . who i s now 
die debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding and lias 
proposed a plan of reorganization; and 
WHHIEAS, Franklin and Cook, Lamoreaux and Hansen are the Class 6 
and 3 c r e d i t o r s , respect ively, in that pLin of reorganization; and 
W1ID-EAS, i t is not l ikely that the proceeds which wil l flow to 
Franklin under the plan wil l be sufficient to extinguish the debt incurred by 
New Empire Dcvelopiuitit and Cook, Lamoreaux and Hansen together with the 
acJvauc.es', i n t e r e s t , fees and cos t s ; and 
WHEREAS, Franklin i s about to re jec t tlie proposed plan of Myron B. 
O d l d , J r . on the basis that some unjustif ied claims are to be paid under the 
plan which wi l l diminish the amount to be paid to Franklin; and 
WHEREAS, Cook, Lamoreaux and Hansen may liavej\o other way to 
benefi t from thei r i n t e r e s t in Traverse Mountain and would possibly suffer 
great loss if the plan were rejected by Franklin; and 
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WUEREAS, Cook, Lamoreaux and Hansen wish to pay, in fu l l , their 
obligation to Franklin; and 
WHEREAS, Etarikliiuis-willing-to waive any.jfcfociency,duft,t£ca!iU&ak> 
Lamoreaux, and.Han sen after .receipt of amounts due, .itLuw^JL tb© pfao^&gi 
amended by this Agreement. 
i 
i 
NOW, THEREFORE, i t i s mutually agreed between the parties hereto as 
follows: 
1. In the event that, inder the proposed plan,- Franklin does not 
recover: 
(a) Its original $500,000.00 loan; 
(b) Its advance to Alpine, Litnited^for payments on the 
f^ JcDride contract; 
(c) The $140,000,00 loan, together with interest thereon made to 
Richard McKenn, which money was used to pay on the fnokf Tamoreaux and Hansen 
obligation; 
(d) Interest at 18% per annum on said obligation until October 1, 
1979, and, thereafter, at the greater of 18% or 10 percentage points in excess 
of the [A-i«ru2 rate of interest, said rate slvall apply on a l l advances and shall 
apply until uhe principal of the Cook, Lamoreaux and Hansen obligations are 
paid in ful l or until the interest of Cook, Lamoreaux and Hansen in ..Traverse 
Mountain i s exhausted, whichever occurs sooner; 
then the distributions which are due Cook, Lamoreaux and Hansen under 'paid 
plan shal l , to the extent of Franklin1 s de f i c i t , be paid to Ftanklin. 
2. The terms of this Agreement shall be incorporated into'the 
proposed plan in order to provide for the direct payment of th$ amounts 
necessary to pay Franklin's de f ic i t . 
3. In the event that the payments made to Franklin from the approved 
plan pursuant to the above Agreement do not pay in fu l l the Cook, lamoreaux and 
Hansen obligation, Franklin wi l l waive and hold Cook, lamoreaux and'Hansen 
harmless, from anyjrurths.r.payment.jdue p\\ .thejr/pbUgflUoniiAo..£i:anklinr. ioMfcbe 
e^.0ti>l^^pl^ni-ia4.nQt..#yproyed .Qjv*if -approved,r^ifS/tSfcaveraair^unJ^ajProperty 
-*£. QQt-SokLpursuant.ta..itf&,plar\, Cook,. Lamgreaux and.Hanseni^greaXQ 0tJrRl43tP 
t9w£j:oreclosureiagain$tKtnei Traverse -Mountain property-b^Franldiniianri ,. 
Fr^nkliD.pgree5{,tq.,Vfaiv^tAcdeficiency.rights.agaio6Ja£ookftLamQC£aux and 
Hansen.-
4. Franklin agrees to accept the Second Amended Plan of Reorganiza-
tion proposed by Myron B. Child, Jr. in his Q\apter 11 Fjankruptcy, as amended 
by incorporating the terms of this agreement, unless Cook, Lamoreaux and Hansen 
reject such plan. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereto signed their names, or 
have caused the names of their duly authorized officers or agents to be signed 
hereunder. The officers of any corporation who sign this Agreement hereby 
certify, represent and warrant that this Agreement and all the terms hereof 
have been duly authorized and agreed to by said corporation by a resol .t ion 
duly adopted by the Board of Directors of such corporation at a lawful meeting 
duly Jield and attended by a quorum. 
FRANKLIN FINANCIAL, 
a Utah corporation, 
By. \I.J!CJL£D 
I ts /><J ^IMjl-^X 
CAPITOL THRIFT AND LOAIJ, 
a Utah corporation, 
\ , ^QL^CL 
WLNDAU. P." HANSEN 
•HKAY/U. LAM)U£AUX 
Tab I 
P e t e r W. B i l l i n g s , J r . 
Gary E. J u b b e r 
FABAIN & CLENDENIN, 
A P r o f e s s i o n a l C o r p o r a t i o n 
800 C o n t i n e n t a l Bank B u i l d i n g 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 531-8900 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
In the m a t t e r of : ) 
) ORDER CONFIRMING THIRD 
MYRON B. CHILD, J R . , ) AMENDED CHAPTER 11 PLAN 
) OF DEBTOR 
D e b t o r . ) 
_,) B a n k r u p t c y No. 82 004 75 
The a b o v e - c a p t i o n e d d e b t o r , and d e b t o r - i n - p o s s e s s i o n 
( " t h e Deb to r" ) h a v i n g f i l e d a C h a p t e r 11 P e t i t i o n wi th t h e 
Cour t p u r s u a n t to S e c t i o n 301 of T i t l e 11 ( t h e "Bankrup tcy 
Code") , of t h e Un i t ed S t a t e s Code on or a b o u t F e b r u a r y 2 5 , 
1982, and h a v i n g f i l e d i t s T h i r d Amended C h a p t e r 11 P l an of 
R e o r g a n i z a t i o n on September 7 , 1983 (as s u b s e q u e n t l y amended on 
September 2 8 , 1983 in open c o u r t by i n t e r l i n e a t i o n th rough d a t e 
h e r e o f , t h e " P l a n " , a copy of which i s annexed h e r e t o as 
E x h i b i t A) and an Order a p p r o v i n g the Amended D i s c l o s u r e 
S t a t e m e n t of t h e Debtor ( " D i s c l o s u r e S t a t e m e n t " ) in r e s p e c t of 
t h e P l a n h a v i n g been i s s u e d by t h e C o u r t on September 2 , 1983 , 
and t h e D i s c l o s u r e S t a t e m e n t c o n t a i n i n g a summary of t h e P l a n , 
b a l l o t s for a c c e p t i n g or r e j e c t i n g t h e P l a n and N o t i c e of 
H e a r i n g on c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e P l a n ( t h e "Hear ing" ) h a v i n g been 
t r a n s m i t t e d to a l l p a r t i e s in i n t e r e s t ( t ime for n o t i c e of such 
h e a r i n g h a v i n g been s h o r t e n e d by C o u r t Order of September 6 , 
1 9 8 3 ) , and a h e a r i n g h a v i n g been h e l d on September 2 8 , 1983 on 
due n o t i c e , w i t h a p p e a r a n c e s of a l l p a r t i e s in i n t e r e s t h a v i n g 
been n o t e d in t h e r e c o r d , and a f t e r due d e l i b e r a t i o n and 
s u f f i c i e n t c a u s e a p p e a r i n g t h e r e f o r , 
IT IS ORDERED, FOUND, DECREED AND DETERMINED a s 
f o l l o w s : 
1. The Plan complies with the appl icable versions of 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
2. That the Debtor as proponent of the Plan, complies 
with a l l applicable provisions of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code . 
3. That the Plan has been proposed by the Debtor in 
good fai th and not by any means forbidden by law. 
4. All payments made or promised by the Debtor or by 
any person acquiring property under the Plan for services or 
costs and expenses in, or in connection with, the Debtor's 
Chapter 11 case, or in connection with the Plan and incident to 
t h i s case have been fully disclosed to the Court or are 
payments to nonprofessionals to be made in the ordinary course 
of business , and a l l such payments made before confirmation of 
the Plan wi l l be subject to approval of the Court as reasonable. 
5. The Debtor as proponent of the Plan has disclosed 
tbe iden t i t y of any ins iders that w i l l be employed or re ta ined 
by the Debtor and the nature of any compensation of such 
ins ider . 
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6. The Plan has been accepted in writ ing by the 
r equ i s i t e number and amount of the claims by the claimholders 
who voted in each class of Classes 1, 2, 3, 4, and Classes 6 
through 28, and Classes 30 and 31 under the Plan. Class 29 has 
not voted. 
7. With respect to Class 5, the Plan does not 
discriminate unfair ly and is fair and equi table and otherwise 
meets the requirements of Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
8. With respect to Class 29, the Court finds the 
holder of th is claim is more properly c l a s s i f i ed as a Class 26 
unsecured c r ed i to r . There are therefore no c red i to r s in Class 
29. 
9. With respect to each class under the Plan, e i ther 
each holder of the claim or i n t e r e s t in the c lass w i l l receive 
or obtain under the Plan property of a value, as of the 
effect ive date of the Plan (as defined by Ar t ic le I of the Plan 
"the Effective Date") tha t is not less than the amount that 
such holder would receive or re ta in if the Debtor was 
l iquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on such date , 
or each holder of a claim or i n t e r e s t in the c lass has accepted 
the Plan. 
10. Confirmation of the Plan is not l i ke ly to be 
followed by the l iqu ida t ion , or the need for further f inancial 
reorganization of the Debtor under the Plan, except as provided 
in the Plan. 
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11. The Court sha l l r e t a in j u r i s d i c t i o n over the 
Debtor 's Chapter 11 case for a l l purposes set forth in Ar t i c l e 
XI of the Plan. 
12. On the Effective Date, without further notice or 
order: 
(a) a l l property of the Debtor 's e s ta te is 
vested in the Debtor pursuant to Section 1141(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code unless otherwise provided in the Plan; 
(b) the property dea l t with by the Plan is free 
and clear of a l l l i e n s , c la ims, encumbrances and i n t e r e s t s 
of c red i to r s of the Debtor pursuant to Section 1141(c) of 
the Bankruptcy Code except as otherwise provided in the 
Plan; 
(c) Except as otherwise provided in the Plan, 
pursuant to Sections 524(a) and 1141(d) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, the Debtor is discharged from any debt that arose 
before the date of th i s Order, and any debt of the Plan 
specified in Sections 502(g), 502(h) or 502(i) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, whether or not: 
(i) tha t proof of the claim based upon such 
debt is f i led or being f i led under Sections 501 and 
1111(a) of the Bankruptcy Code; 
( i i ) such claim is allowed under Section 502 
of the Bankruptcy Code; or 
( i i i ) the holder of such claim has accepted 
the Plan. 
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(d) Any judgment heretofore or hereafter 
obtained in the cour t , other than t h i s Court, is nul l and 
void as a determination of the personal l i a b i l i t y of the 
Debtor with respect to any of the following: 
(i) debts dischargeable under Section 523 
of the Bankruptcy Code; 
( i i ) unless heretofore or hereafter 
determined by order of t h i s Court to be 
nondischargeable, debts alleged to be accepted from 
discharged under clauses (2), (4) and (6) of Section 
523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code; 
( i i i ) debts determined by th i s Court to be 
dischargeable. 
(e) Any nondischargeable amounts as se t out in 
Ar t i c le XII of the Plan may be s a t i s f i e d by d i s t r i bu t ions 
these c red i to r s may receive pursuant to the Plan and by 
future earnings and assets applied by the Debtor, but wi l l 
not affect any d i s t r i bu t ion made to other c red i to r s under 
th e P1 an . 
13. Pursuant to Section 524(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy 
Code a l l c red i to rs whose debts are discharged by th is order and 
a l l c red i to r s whose judgments are diclared nul l and void by 
paragraph 12 above are enjoined, stayed and res t ra ined from 
i n s t i t u t i n g or continuing any action or employing any process 
or engaging in any act whatsoever to co l l ec t such debts as 
personal l i a b i l i t i e s of the above-named Debtor. 
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14. All adminis t ra t ive claims against the Debtor 
which are not f i led with the Court and copies mailed to the 
at torneys for the Debtor within ten (10) days of service of the 
Notice of Confirmation, excepting claims for the professional 
services rendered by at torneys for Debtor, and for the 
unsecured c r ed i to r s 1 committee and other professional services 
retained by the Debtor after the ef fec t ive da te , sha l l be 
forever barred. 
15. The proposed Notice of Confirmation of the Plan 
(a copy of which is annexed hereto as Exhibit B) to be mailed 
to claimholders and other pa r t i e s in i n t e r e s t pursuant to 
Bankruptcy Rule 2002(f), be, and hereby is approved. 
16. The Plan be, and hereby i s , confirmed. 
DATED this J^J day of September, 1983. 
- 6 -
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
Central Division 
In re 
MYRON B. CHILD, 
Debtor 
JR., ) 
• * / 
Bankruptcy No. 82-00475 
Chapter 11 
THIRD AMENDED 
PLAN OF REORGANIZATION 
Myron B. Child, Jr. proposes the following Plan of 
Reorganization pursuant to section 1121 of the Bankruptcy Code: 
ARTICLE I 
DEFINITIONS 
As used in the Plan, the following terms shall have the 
respective meanings specified below: 
Administration Creditor - any Person entitled to payment of 
an Administration Expense. 
Administration Expense - any cost or expense of the 
administration of the Debtor's chapter 11 case allowed under section 
503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Acceptable Sale - a sale of the Traverse Mountain Property 
Interest to one buyer pursuant to a written contract which shall 
conform with the following minimum terms and conditions: 
EXHIBIT A 
(a) the purchase price shall be payable in cash, 
either (i) in an amount not less than $8,000,000, payable at 
Closing (as hereinafter defined) or (ii) in such installments at 
and/or after Closing as shall have a present value as of Closing 
of not less than $8,000,000, using a discount rate of 15%; 
(b) closing of such sale (the "Closing") shall occur 
on or before the Conversion Date; 
(c) the buyer thereunder (the "Buyer") shall 
(i) pay the present value of the Alpine Contract 
as of Closing, computed using a discount rate of 15.0% as 
to amounts not then due, and with interest on all overdue 
amounts at eighteen percent (18%) per annum from the due 
date until the date of such payment, as and for payment in 
full of the Alpine Contract (and the Class 4 Claimant shall 
pay amounts due or overdue under the Beck Contract, 
including interest and fees, plus the discount value of any 
future payments under the Beck Contract as of Closing, 
computed using a discount rate of 15% as to amounts not 
then due), or 
(ii) assume the Alpine Contract and pay at 
Closing all amounts then due or overdue and owing to the 
Class 4 Claimant (Alpine, Ltd.) under the Alpine Contract 
including interest at eighteen percent (18%) per annum from 
the due date until the date of such payment (and the Class 
4 Claimant shall pay amounts due or overdue under the Beck 
Contract, including interest and fees plus any future 
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payments under the Beck Contract as of Closing, computed 
using a discount rate of 15% as to amounts not then due). 
(d) the Closing shall occur through an escrow to be 
established with such bank or title company maintaining offices 
in the State of Utah as shall be approved by the Court, and all 
post-Closing Installment Payments or Alpine Amounts (as defined 
in subparagraph (f) next below), if any, shall be paid through 
such escrow; 
(e) the Debtor shall at Closing transfer to the Buyer 
the Traverse Mountain Property Interest free and clear of all 
liens and encumbrances of title; 
(f) any portion of such purchase price which shall nc 
be paid in cash at Closing (any installment payment of such 
portion, including interest or other amounts due thereon, beinc 
herein an "Installment Payment") and payment of all amounts to 
become due under the Alpine Contract after Closing (any such 
amount being herein an "Alpine Amount") shall be secured by a 
trust deed and pledge of rights under the Alpine Contract in 
form and content to be approved by the Debtor and the Court. 
(g) the transaction shall be subject to approval by 
the Court not earlier than 20 and not later than 90 days after 
notice thereof to all Creditors holding Allowed Secured Claims 
transmitting a complete copy of the contract with such notice; 
and 
(h) Closing shall occur within 30 days after the 
Court's approval of the sale, with Closing to be at the office 
of the escrow agent. 
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Allowed Claim - any Claim against the Debtor, proof of 
which was timely filed or any Claim as to which no objection to the 
allowance thereof has been interposed within the applicable period 
of limitation fixed by the Bankruptcy Code or the applicable rules, 
or if such objection has been interposed, there has been entered a 
final order no longer subject to review, appeal or certiorari 
proceeding allowing such Claim. 
Allowed Secured Claim - any Allowed Claim of a Creditor 
secured by a lien, secured interest or other charge against property 
in which the Debtor's Estate has an interest, which lien interest or 
charge is valid, perfected and enforceable under applicable law, are 
not subject to avoidance under the Bankruptcy Code or other 
applicable nonbankruptcy law, to the extent such claims are allowed 
under 11 USC § 506 and are duly established in this case. 
Allowed Unsecured Claim - any Allowed Claim of a Creditor, 
other than an Allowed Secured Claim. 
Alpine, Contract - a certain Real Estate Sales Agreement 
dated June 1, 1978, by and between Michael W. McBride as "Seller" 
and Ronald S. Cook, Myron B. Child, Jr., Ray W. Lamoreaux, Wendell 
P. Hansen and New Empire Development Co. collectively as "Buyers." 
Said contract was assigned by Ronald S. Cook, Ray W. Lamoreaux, 
Wendell P. Hansen and New Empire Development Co. to Myron B. Child, 
Jr. by an unrecorded Real Estate Contract dated September, 1980. 
Approved Sale - a sale of the Traverse Mountain Property 
Interest pursuant to a contract for an Acceptable Sale, after such 
contract shall have been approved by the Court. 
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Bankruptcy Code - Title I of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978, 11 U.S.C. S 101 ejt seq. 
Beck Contract. A certain Uniform Real Estate Contract 
dated July 11, 1972, between Jay V. Beck, Faye E. Beck, Kenneth J. 
Beck, Marilyn Beck, Afton W. Bullock, Gladys Beck and Shirley B. 
Nash as "Sellers" and Dan C. Simmons, as agent for the "Buyers", 
affecting Parcels 1-8 and 11-21 of the Traverse Mountain Property, 
as said Contract has been amended, supplemented and assigned. The 
interest of the Sellers in said Contract was conveyed to Beck Land, 
Inc., Trustee, by Deeds recorded September 22, 1972 and October 17, 
1972. The interest of Dan C. Simmons, for himself and as agent for 
undisclosed principals, has been assigned to Alpine, Ltd., as 
disclosed by a Notice dated March 14, 1973. The Beck Contract is 
currently in default, and is in foreclosure; said foreclosure 
proceedings are under automatic stay pursuant to § 362 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
Canterbury Property - The property located at 1375 
Canterbury Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah which Debtor has agreed to 
sell pursuant to the Leavitt Contract. 
Claim - Any right to payment from Debtor, whether or not 
such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, 
equitable, secured, or unsecured; or any right to an equitable 
remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise or righ 
of payment from Debtor, whether or not such right to an equitable 
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, 
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured. 
-5-
Closing Date - Date of closing on the Approved Sale of the 
Traverse Mountain Property by the terms of this Plan. 
Confirmation - The issuance by the Court of the 
Confirmation Order. 
Confirmation Date - the date an order confirming the Plan 
is issued. 
Confirmation Order - the order issued by the Court 
confirming the Plan. 
Contested Claim - any Claim as to which Debtor or any other 
party in interest has interposed an objection in accordance with the 
Bankruptcy Code and applicable rulesf which objection has not been 
determined by an order or judgment that is no longer subject to 
review, appeal or certiorar i proceeding. 
Conversion Date - July 25, 1984, if the Plan has become 
void pursuant to Article XVI. 
Court - The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Utah. 
Creditor - any Person that has a Claim against Debtor that 
arose on or before the Petition Date or a Claim against Debtor of 
any kind specified in sections 502(g), 502(h) or 502(i) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
Creditor PV - the present value of a Secured Creditor's 
Allowed Secured Claim, computed as provided in Article VI(A)(d)(i) 
of the Plan. 
Debtor - Myron B. Child, Jr., as debtor and debtor-in-
possession. 
-6-
Effective Date - the date on which the Confirmation Order 
becomes final and nonappealable. 
Jewkes Contract - the Contract dated June 12, 1980 executed 
by Paul Jewkes in the amount of $104,000 plus interest and assigned 
to the Debtor. 
Leavitt Contract - a certain contract dated June 8, 1978 by 
which Alonzo R. and Carol Leavitt have agreed to purchase the 
Canterbury Property from Debtor. 
Person - any individual, corporation, partnership, joint 
venture, trust, estate or unincorporated organization or any 
government or any agent or political subdivision thereof. 
Petition Date - February 25, 1982. 
Plan - this chapter 11 Plan proposed by Debtor either in 
its present form or as it may be altered, amended, or modified from 
time to time in accordance with the provisions of chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code and applicable rules. 
Proceeds Balance - balance of the proceeds from the 
Approved Sale after payment of Classes 1 through 5 as set forth in 
Article VI(A)(d). 
Secured Claim - a Claim secured by a lien, secured interes 
or other charge against or interest in the Debtor's Estate to the 
extent of the value of the interest of the holder of such Claim in 
Debtor's interest in such property. 
Super Priority Loans - Loans made pursuant to Article III. 
Traverse Mountain__Property - the real property more 
particularly described in Exhibit A attached hereto and made a pari 
hereof by this reference. 
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title and interest of Debtor in and to all or any portion of the 
Traverse Mountain Property, including, without limitation, any such 
right, title and interest in and to all or any portion of such 
property as Debtor may have pursuant to the Alpine Contract. 
Ultimately Allowed Claim - any Contested Claim that has 
become an Allowed Claim. 
Ultimately Allowed Secured Claim - any Ultimately Allowed 
Claim of a Creditor secured by a lien, secured interest or other 
charge against or interest in the Debtorfs Estate to the extent of 
the value of such Creditor's interest in the Estate's interest in 
such property determined in accordance with Section 506(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
Unimpaired Creditors - any Creditors or class of Creditors 
with Claims that are not impaired under the Plan pursuant to section 
1124 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Unsecured Claim - any Claim that is not a Secured Claim. 
ARTICLE II 
CLASSES OF CLAIMS AND - INTERESTS 
Division of Creditors and interest holders into classes is 
as follows: 
Class 1 - the Secured Claim(s) of those making Super 
Priority Loans pursuant to Article III hereof. 
Class 2 - all Claims for Administration Expenses and all 
priority Claims under section 507(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Class 3 - all Claims entitled to priority under section 
507(a)(2)-(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
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Class 4 - the Claim of the assignee (Alpine, Ltd.) of the 
Seller under the Alpine Contract, for amounts overdue, due or to 
become due under the Alpine Contract. 
Class 5 - the Claim of Beck Land, Inc. under the Beck 
Contract, for amounts overdue, due or to become due under the Beck 
Contract. 
Class 6 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
first priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as set 
forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 7 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
first priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as set 
forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 8 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
second priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as set 
forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 9 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
third priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as set 
forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 10 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor havin 
fourth priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as set 
forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 11 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor havir 
fifth priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as set 
forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 12 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor havii 
sixth priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as set 
forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
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Class 13 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
seventh priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as set 
forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 14 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
eighth priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as set 
forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 15 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
ninth priority in -the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as set 
forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 16 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
tenth priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as set 
forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 17 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
eleventh priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as set 
forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 18 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
twelvth priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as set 
forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 19 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
thirteenth priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as 
set forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 20 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
fourteenth priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as 
set forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 21 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
fifteenth priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as 
set forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
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Class 22 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
sixteenth priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as 
set forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 23 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
seventeenth priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as 
set forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 24 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
eighteenth priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as 
set forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 25 - the Secured Claim of the Secured Creditor having 
nineteenth priority in the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, as 
set forth on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Class 26 - all Unsecured Claims. 
Class 27 - the Secured Claim of American Savings & Loan 
Association having first priority in the Canterbury Property. 
Class 28 - the Secured Claim of Moore Financial of Utah 
(formerly FMA) having second priority in the Canterbury Property. 
Class 29 - the Secured Claim of Alonzo R. Leavitt having 
third priority in the Canterbury Property. 
Class 30 - the Secured Claim of Western Heritage Thrift & 
Loan having first priority in the Jewkes Contract. 
Class 31 - the Allowed Secured Claim of Chrysler Credit 
Corporation with respect to a lien on a 1980 Plymouth Champ. 
ARTICLE III 
SUPER PRIORITY LOAN(Sj,UP * TO $109?080 
Debtor shall be entitled to borrow a total of $100,000 fro 
one or more persons under Section 364(d) of the Bankruptcy Code 
prior to the Conversion Date. Such loan(s) shall bear an interest 
-11-
rate of 15% per annum until paid. As security for such loan(s), the 
lender(s) shall have a lien on the Traverse Mountain Property 
Interest which shall be senior to all other liens on said Property 
Interest. The $15,000 advanced by Franklin Financial Services 
("Franklin") to Debtor's counsel in March, 1983 and presently held 
in a regularly maintained and non-interest bearing trust account of 
said counsel shall be considered part of the loan(s) authorized 
under this Article. At the Effective Date Franklin shall advance an 
additional $15,000 to be deposited in said trust account. The 
$30,000 shall be applied as partial payment of such attorneys' fees 
of Fabian & Clendenin as may be approved by the Court. 
Such other sums as Debtor may borrow under this Article, up 
to an aggregate of $100,000, shall likewise be deposited in said 
trust account. Such additional sums shall be held in such account 
by Fabian & Clendenin for the benefit of the Estate, and shall be 
spent for legal fees and costs of Debtor, for the purchase of 
feasibility studies and such other analyses, and for studies or 
other services as may be necessary or desirable to evaluate the 
highest and best use(s) of the Traverse Mountain Property or to 
prepare in any way such property for development in accordance with 
such use(s) (including, without limitation, seeking such permits, 
approvals or consents as Debtor may deem necessary or desirable for 
any such development). All of such sum shall be spent in such 
detailed manner as Debtor shall from time to time recommend, subject 
to the prior approval by the Court. 
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ARTICLE IV 
PAYMENT OF CERTAIN AMOUNTS IN; CONNECTION WITH ,AfcPINE.-gQNTRACT 
On the Closing Date# Beck Land, Inc., or its successor in 
interest, will be paid by the Seller under the Alpine Contract the 
amounts due or overdue under the Beck Contract, including interest 
and fees, plus the discounted value of any future payments required 
under the Beck Contract. In that Debtor is not a party to the Beck 
Contract, Beck Land, Inc. may not be a creditor of the Estate. 
ARTICLE V 
SALE OF TRAVERSE * INTEREST 
Debtor shall have and is hereby granted the exclusive right 
to sell on behalf of the Estate pursuant to an Acceptable Sale the 
Traverse Mountain Property Interest free and clear of all liens and 
encumbrances of title for a period commencing on the Confirmation 
Date and expiring on July 25, 1984. In the event a contract for an 
Acceptable Sale shall be entered into and the transaction 
contemplated thereby shall close (Debtor having no right to a 
commission if for any reason the transaction shall not close), the 
Estate shall pay to Debtor, out of the sale proceeds, a broker's 
commission in the amount of 6% of the purchase price thereunder, 
payable as and when the purchase price or any installments thereof 
are received by the Estate. Should the Property Interest be sold to 
any Person procured by any Secured Creditor, Debtor shall pay to 
such procurer a cooperating commission in the amount of one-half of 
the commission payable to Debtor hereunder, as and when the 
commission to Debtor shall be received by him. Debtor may, at his 
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option, seek Court approval to retain a real estate agent or broker 
to assist in obtaining a sale. In such case, part or all of 
Debtor's right to a commission hereunder may be assigned to the 
agent or broker. 
Preliminary discussions have begun with Dyer & Thomas, Inc. 
for a cash sale to it or to an entity to be formed by it of the 
Traverse Mountain Property Interest at a price in the range of 
$11,000,000, but no written offer has yet been prepared and 
submitted to Debtor, and it is premature to express any view as to 
the likelihood of an offer being made or its price and other terms 
and conditions. 
The automatic stay of Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code 
shall remain in effect until the Closing Date or until the Estate is 
liquidated under Chapter 7. 
ARTICLE VI 
DISTRIBUTION GF.TRAVERSE'PROCEEDS 
A. Out of the proceeds received from the Approved Sale, an 
amount equal to the present value of the Alpine Contract, computed 
as provided in Article 1(c)(i)(A) of the definition of "Acceptable 
Sale" in this Plan, shall first be paid to the Class 4 and Class 5 
Claimants, and the balance of such proceeds shall be distributed as 
follows: 
(a) First, to the Class 1 Creditors, in payment of 
principal and accrued interest under the Super Priority Loans; 
(b) Then, to the Class 2 Creditors, in payment of 
Administration Expenses; 
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(c) Then, to the Class 3 Creditors, in payment of Class 3 
Claims with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from the 
Effective date; 
(d) Then, from such portion of the proceeds as shall 
remain (the "Proceeds Balance"), to the Class 6 through 25 
Creditors, in payment (or if the proceeds be insufficient, then in 
reduction) of the aggregate present value of all Allowed Secured 
Claims held by such Creditors as of the Petition Date, with 
distribution among said Creditors to be by a "sum-of-the-digits" 
method, as follows: 
(i) Determine the present value of each of such 
Allowed Secured Claims (the present value of a Creditor's 
Allowed Secured Claim being referred to as the "Creditor PV") as 
follows: 
(A) As to any and all such Allowed Secured 
Claims as to which the underlying amounts forming the basis 
for each such Claim shall all be due or overdue on the 
Petition Date, the present value of each such Claim shall 
be the amount of the Claim; 
(B) As to any and all such Allowed Secured 
Claims as to which all or any portion of the amount 
underlying any such Allowed Secured Claims was not due or 
overdue on the Petition Date, the present value of each 
such portion shall be determined, using a discount rate of 
15.0% against such portion, giving effect to the due 
date(s) for such portion; and 
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(C) As to any Claim covered by both (A) and (B), 
add the present value portions computed under (A) and (B); 
(ii) Compute the "Total Denominator," as follows: 
(A) Add the Creditor PV for all Secured 
Creditors, in order to compute the total present value of 
all Allowed Secured Claims (such total being referred to as 
the "Total PV"); 
(B) Divide the Total PV by the sum of $1,000, 
and round said quotient to its integer portion (the 
"Integer") (for example, if Total PV is $10,666,000, then 
the quotient would be 1,066.6, and the Integer would be 
1,066); and 
(C) Add together all of the integers between 1 
and the Integer, both inclusive (the formula for computing 
such sum being [Integer x (Integer + l)]/2, the sum thus 
computed being the "Total Denominator"); 
(iii) Allocate among such Creditors the amount, if any, 
by which the Proceeds Balance is less than the Total PV (the 
"Shortfall"), by offsetting against each Creditor's Creditor PV 
an amount computed as follows: 
(A) Compute the sum of the Creditor PV amount 
for that Creditor, plus the Creditor PV amounts for all 
Creditors who are Prior to that Creditor; 
(B) Divide the (A) sum by $1,000.00, and round 
said quotient to its integer portion, and add together all 
of the integers between 1 and such integer; 
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(C) Compute the sum of the Creditor PV amounts 
for all Creditors who are Prior to the Creditor in question; 
(D) Divide the (C) sum by $1,000.00, and round 
said quotient to its integer portion, and add together all 
of the integers between 1 and such integer; 
(E) From the figure obtained in (B), subtract 
the figure obtained in (D); 
(F) Divide the figure obtained in (E) by the 
Total Denominator, and round said quotient to the fifth 
decimal point, rounding to the nearest decimal and rounding 
up in the case of a "5" (to illustrate, if the quotient was 
.17226499, rounding would yield .17226; if the quotient was 
.17226500, rounding would yield .17227); 
(G) Multiply the figure obtained in (F) by the 
Shortfall; 
(H) Subtract the figure obtained in (G) (such 
figure being the portion of the Shortfall to be allocated 
to such Creditor) from the Creditor PV, and the result is 
the portion of the Proceeds Balance to be paid to such 
Creditor; 
(iv) If any of the Shortfall would remain unallocated 
after applying the computations set forth in (i) through (iii) 
next above, then allocate the unallocated portion of the 
Shortfall among all such Creditors by repeating said 
computations, except use the unallocated portion of the 
Shortfall in lieu of the Shortfall in all computations; if any 
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portion of the Shortfall would still remain unallocated, such 
portion shall be applied in full first against the Allowed 
Secured Claim of the Creditor who is last in Priority, and then 
against the Allowed Secured Claim which is next to last in 
Priority, and so forth in ascending order until fully allocated 
(by way of example but not limitation, the computations of this 
subparagraph (d) are illustrated in the attached Exhibit C); 
(v) Classes 6 and 7, by way of compromise of a dispute 
concerning their relative priorities have agreed to the combined 
payment to the Court of the aggregate value of their secured 
claims as allocated by the "sum-of-the-debts" formula; to be 
distributed by the Court with 87.89% of the total alloted to 
Class 6 and 12.11% of the total alloted to Class 7. Debtor has 
agreed that any dilution of the Class 8 Claim resulting from 
prioritizing the Class 7 Claim will be treated as a 
non-dischargeable claim against Debtor's estate, 
(vi) SEE ATTACHMENT page 18 a. 
(e) Then: 
(i) 50% of any remaining portion of the Proceeds 
Balance shall be distributed to the Classes 6 through 25 
Creditors, in payment (or in reduction) of the portion of their 
respective Allowed Secured Claims which arose after the Petition 
Date and on or before the Effective Date, with such 50% share 
being divided among them in accordance with "sum-of-the-digits" 
method set forth in subparagraph (d) above; and 
(ii) The other 50% shall be distributed to the Class 
26 Creditors, in payment (or in reduction) of Allowed Unsecured 
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ATTACHMENT page 18 a. 
(Article VI, Paragraph A(d)(vi) [Page 18]. 
(vi) Classes 6 and 8, by way of compromise 
of claims as between them have agreed that any portion 
of the Proceeds Balance to be paid to the Class 8 
Creditor shall be paid to the Class 6 Creditor instead 
until the Class 6 Creditor has received all amounts pro-
vided for in an Agreement, dated September 19, 1983, 
between the Class 6 and Class 8 Creditors. Thereafter, 
any remaining portion of the Proceeds Balance to be paid 
to the Class 8 Creditor shall be paid to such Class 8 
Creditor. The amounts payable to the Class 6 Creditor 
under this subparagraph shall not be combined with Class 7 
pursuant to subparagraph (v) above. 
Claims held by them, in accordance with that percentage which 
each Creditor's Allowed Unsecured Claim is of the total of all 
Allowed Unsecured Claims; 
(f) Then, to the Class 26 Creditors, in payment (or in 
reduction) of the remaining amount of the Allowed Unsecured Claims, 
in accordance with that percentage which each Creditor's Allowed 
Unsecured Claim is of the total of all Allowed Unsecured Claims; 
(g) With any remaining amount being paid to Debtor. 
B. In the event the sale involves a transfer in which the 
Alpine Contract is assumed and not paid off at Closing, whether or 
not such sale also involves the payment of some cash after Closing 
("Post-Closing Cash"), then: 
(a) Buyer shall pay the amounts from time to time falling 
due under the Alpine Contract to the Class 4 Claimant; and 
(b) Alpine Ltd. shall pay amounts due or overdue to the 
Class 5 Claimant under the Beck Contract, including interest and 
fees, plus the discounted value of the Beck Contract as of Closing, 
computed using a discount rate of 15% as to amounts not due. 
(c) Buyer shall make payments of the remainder, if any, of 
each installment of such Post-Closing Cash to all holders of Allowed 
Secured Claims and to holders of Allowed Unsecured Claims, allocated 
among them as set forth in Part A of this Article VI. 
C. For all purposes of the Plan, the Secured Claim of each 
Secured Creditor shall be considered to be in the amount, and be 
considered "Prior" or to have a "Priority" according to the order of 
priority set forth on Exhibit B attached hereto. 
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D. Each Secured Creditor waives any right it would 
otherwise have under the Bankruptcy Code to have treated as an 
Unsecured Claim any such portion of the amount of a Secured Claim as 
is not recovered under part A, B and/or D next above (as the case 
may be) from the Proceeds Balance (such portion being referred to 
herein as a "Waived Unsecured Claim") excepting only that holders of 
any Waived Unsecured Claims shall receive 25% of the other property 
of the Estate as provided in Article VII of this Plan. 
ARTICLE VII 
OTHER PROPERTY 
A. On the Effective Date the automatic stay with respect 
to the Canterbury Property shall be lifted to permit the Class 27 
claimholder (American Savings) and the Class 28 claimholder (Moore 
Financial) to foreclose. Any allowed claim of the Class 30 
claimholder (Leavitt) not satisfied through foreclosure proceedings 
shall be treated as a Class 26 claim (unsecured). 
B. The Class 30 claimholder, Western Heritage Thrift & 
Loan, will receive on the Effective Date any remaining interest the 
Debtor may have in the note owed to Debtor by Paul Jewkes up to the 
amount of $63,128.86. Any allowed claim of the Class 30 claimholder 
not satisfied by the Jewkes Contract shall be treated as a Class 26 
Claim (unsecured). Debtor agrees should Western Heritage not be paid in full fj 
Paul Jewkes and Terrace Falls, any such deficiency up to the amount of $10,000 shall be treatec 
as a nondischargeable/C. The Debtor's Sea Ray Boat and Trailer, hull 
obligation pursuant/ 
to Article/identification number 54331054/E61 will be transferred to Stanford 
KII of the/ 
Plan./ Smith, Trustee for Coordinated Financial and Paul Montgomery in 
exchange for a partial offset against their secured claim. The 
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amount of the offset will be determined either by agreement of the 
Debtor and the secured creditor or at a commercially reasonable sale. 
D. Debtor is entitled to rental income on a portion of the 
Traverse Mountain Property from the "Widowmaker Hill Climb" event 
which has been held by the Court and will be distributed to satisfy 
administrative expenses (Class 2 Claims). 
E. SEE ATTACHMENT - page 21 a. 
F. Other than the Traverse Mountain Property Interest, the 
the Debtorfs Plymouth Champ 
Widowiraker rental payments, the Jewkes Contract,/the Debtor fs Sea 
Ray Boat and the Canterbury Property, all property of the Estate, 
including without limitation Debtor's right to a commission for 
selling the Traverse Mouintain Property, as provided under Article V 
of this Plan, and all rights to payment of fees or other 
compensation or benefits which now exist with respect to, or which 
at any time may arise out of projects or undertakings in which 
Debtor presently is involved or which are in any way initiated by 
the Debtor or in which Debtor participates on or before the 
Conversion Date or other termination of the Chapter 11 proceedings 
[including by way of example but not limitation, amounts which might 
be due to Debtor if a contemplated transaction intended to involve 
the purchase and timesharing of the Manu Naniloa Surf Hotel in 
Hawaii is effected]), shall be distributed as follows: 
1. the property more particularly described in 
Exhibit D (household and other personal property) shall be 
retained by Debtor; and 
•21-
ATTACHMENT PAGE 21 a. 
E. Chrysler Credit Corporation shall be paid 
the amount of its claim ($1869.32 on September 28, 1983) 
plus interest at an annual percentage rate of 15.4% so 
that the holder of this claim will receive the present 
value of its claim, payable in monthly deferred cash 
payments of $100.00 a month until such claim is paid in 
full. In the event of non-payment, Chrysler Credit 
will be entitled to its remedies under the original 
contract executed by the Debtor. 
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2. all other property shall be distributed 50% to 
Debtor [or, if there shall be any Waived Unsecured Claim 
pursuant to Article VI(D) of this Plan, 25% to Debtor, and 25% 
to the holders of the Waived Unsecured Claims in reduction of 
said Claims, with the latter 25% being allocated among such 
holders in accordance with the sum-of-the-digits method set 
forth in Article VI(A)(d)], and the remaining 50% to the 
Unsecured Creditors [the distribution to the Unsecured Creditors 
being allocated among them in accordance with that percentage 
which each Creditor's Allowed Unsecured Claim is of the total of 
all Allowed Unsecured Claims, and the holders of any Waived 
Unsecured Claims not being considered Unsecured Creditors for 
purposes of distribution of such remaining 50%], according to 
the monetary value of the property as determined by the Court. 
Debtor agrees to use his best efforts to pursue the 
projects or undertakings in which Debtor is presently involved 
or which are in any way initiated by Debtor or in which Debtor 
participates in on or before the Conversion Date or other 
termination of the Chapter 11 proceedings and to maximize the 
amount realized therefrom. 
ARTICLE VIII 
PROVISION FOR - EXECUTORY•CONTRACTS 
A. The Alpine Contract, as modified by Article IV, shall 
be assumed upon Confirmation, subject to the payment options as 
described in clause (c) of the definition of Acceptable Sale, 
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B. All executory contracts not previously dealt with in 
the Plan, or designated by Debtor, in his sole discretion and prior 
to Confirmation, to be assumed, shall, upon Confirmation, be 
rejected effective upon the Effective Date. Parties to such 
contracts with Debtor who are damaged by the rejection of such 
contracts shall be treated as Creditors holding Unsecured Claims in 
Class 26 to the extent of their damages. 
ARTICLE IX 
TRANSFERS;OF PROPERTY 
All transferees of property distributed or conveyed 
pursuant to the Plan, shall, at their own cost and expense, cause to 
be prepared all necessary documentation to effectuate the transfers 
in accordance with the Plan, which documentation shall be in form 
and substance satisfactory to Debtor. 
ARTICLE X 
MODIFICATION OF THE PLAN 
The Plan may be altered, amended, or modified by Debtor 
before or after the Confirmation Date, as provided in section 1127 
of the Bankruptcy Code and the applicable rules. Notwithstanding 
the preceding sentence, after Franklin's acceptance of the Plan, 
Debtor shall not alter, amend or modify Articles III, IV or V 
without Franklin's written consent. 
ARTICLE XI 
RETENTION-OF JURISDICTION 
The Court shall retain jurisdiction over Debtor's chapter 
11 case for the followinq purposes: 
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A. Resolution of any and all objections to Claims; (Debtor agreec 
it will not object to the claim of Edward White and David Peters as stated on Exhibit E 
:±ed hereto.) B* Rejection of executory contracts that are not 
discovered prior to Confirmation and allowance of claims for damages 
as to rejection of any such executory contracts within such further 
time as the Court may direct; 
C. Determination of all questions and disputes regarding 
title to the assets of the estate, and determination of all causes 
of action, controversies, disputes or conflicts whether or not 
subject to pending actions as of the Confirmation Date between 
Debtor and any other party, including but not limited to, any right 
of Debtor to recover assets pursuant to the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code; 
D. The correction of any defect, and the curing of any 
omission or inconsistency in the Plan or the Confirmation Order, as 
may be necessary to carry out the purposes and intent of the Plan; 
E. Modification of the Plan after Confirmation pursuant to 
the Bankruptcy Code and applicable rules; 
F. Resolution of any and all disputes arising out of the 
Plan, the Confirmation Order or any other order issued in respect of 
the Plan, including, without limitation, disputes arising out of the 
failure of Debtor, Franklin, any other Creditor, or any other party 
in interest to perform the acts and meet the obligations required of 
such Persons under the Plan; 
G. Resolution of requests for orders closing or reopening 
Debtor's chapter 11 case; 
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H. Resolution of requests for orders directing any and all 
persons to execute such documents including without limitation, 
deeds, bills of sale, and similar instruments, as are necessary to 
effect the terms of the Plan and any other requests pursuant to 
section 1142(b) of the Bankruptcy Code; and 
I. Resolution of any disputes in respect of Debtor's 
agreements existing as of the Confirmation Date. 
ARTICLE XII 
DISCHARGE 
A. Discharge of Debtor? Injunction, All consideration 
provided pursuant to the Plan shall be in complete satisfaction, 
discharge and release of all the existing Claims of any nature 
whatsoever against Debtor, as debtor or debtor-in-possession, or any 
of his assets or properties; and, upon the Closing Date, and not 
before, all then existing Claims against Debtor and his property 
shall be satisfied, discharged and released in full, except for the 
liabilities and obligations imposed by the Plan, and the following 
claims which Debtor has agreed shall be non-dischargeable: 
(a) Gwen H. Larsen $ 35,731.32 (unsecured) 
(b) John M. Tannehill $750,000.00 (unsecured) 
(c) W.K. and Rolayne Ethington $226,000.00 (secured) 
(d) The Claim of Class 8 Creditors, if anv, as forth at 
VI.A. (d) (v) . 
(e) The claim of Class 30 Creditors, if any, as set forth at VII 
These non-dischargeable amounts will be satisfied by 
distributions these creditors may receive pursuant to the Plan and 
by future earnings and assets acquired by the Debtor, but will not 
affect any distribution made to other Creditors under the Plan. 
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From and forever after the Confirmation Date (but not if 
the Conversion Date occurs) all holders of Claims and all Creditors, 
except as provided herein, shall be enjoined pursuant to section 
524(a) of the Bankruptcy Code from asserting or setting off against 
Debtor or his assets or properties, any other or further Claim based 
upon any act or omission, transaction or other activity of any kind 
or nature that occurred prior to the Effective Date. 
B. Obligations of Debtor. Notwithstanding any other 
provision hereof, from and forever after the Confirmation Date (but 
not if the Conversion Date occurs) (i) the obligations of Debtor 
expressly set forth in the Plan are his sole liability in respect of 
any and all Claims and Administration Expenses, (ii) Debtor shall 
have no other liability and no other obligation whatsoever to any 
Person, and (iii) Debtor shall be bound by any and all obligations 
of Debtor pursuant to the Plan and any and all documents and other 
instruments delivered by Debtor pursuant to the Plan. 
C. Bar Date for. Administrative Claims. All Administrative 
Claims against Debtor which are not filed with the Court and copies 
mailed to the attorneys for Debtor within ten (10) days of service 
of the Notice of Confirmation, excepting claims for professional 
services rendered by attorneys for Debtor and for the Unsecured 
Creditorfs Committee and other professional services retained by 
Debtor after the Effective Date, shall be forever barred. 
-26-
ARTICLE XIII 
VESTING OF PROPERTY IN DEBTOR 
Upon the Closing Date, Debtor's property listed in Exhibit 
D and Debtor's interest in the 4-CH Corporation shall automatically 
vest in Debtor, free and clear of all Claims of Creditors and 
interest holders, except as expressly set forth in the Plan. Debtor 
shall not pledge, sell, assign, transfer, or otherwise encumber any 
of his property until the occurrence of the Closing Date. 
ARTICLE XIV 
ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION OF PLAN, 
EFFECT OF REJECTION BY ONE OR MORE CLASSES OF CLAIMS 
A. Voting. Except as provided in this Article XIV of the 
Plan, each impaired class of creditors or interest holders with 
Claims or interests against Debtor's Estate shall be entitled to 
vote separately to accept or reject the Plan. 
B. Requirement to Accept Plan. A class of Creditors shall 
have accepted the Plan if the Plan is accepted by at least two-
thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of the Claims of 
such class that have accepted or rejected the Plan. 
C. Confirmation Without Acceptance. If any impaired class 
of Creditors or interest holders with Claims against or interests in 
Debtor's Estate shall fail to accept the Plan in accordance with 
section 1129(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, Debtor shall, nonetheless, 
request that the Bankruptcy Court confirm the Plan in accordance 
with section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
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ARTICLE XV 
IDENTIFICATION OF/CLAIMS,. NOT IMPAIRED »BY THE/PLAN 
A. Unimpaired Classes, Classes 1, 2 and 3 are not 
impaired by the Plan. 
B. Impaired Classes. All other classes may be impaired by 
the Plan. 
ARTICLE XVI 
EXPIRATION OF THE PLAN-AND.LIQUIDATION UNDER•CHAPTER - 7 
Notwithstanding the occurrence of the Effective Datef if 
for any reason whatsoever and regardless of fault, the Approved Sale 
has not occurred on or before July 25, 1984, the Plan and all 
acceptances of the Plan and assumptions pursuant to the Plan shall 
be void and of no force or effect (except that the matters approved 
in Article IV, the Super Priority Loan(s) pursuant to Article III 
and the disposition of the Canterbury Property pursuant to Article 
VII(A) shall be unaffected, and Debtor shall automatically forfeit 
any right Debtor might otherwise have to require the conveyance to 
or for the benefit of Debtor of acreage pursuant to the partial 
release provision of paragraph 2.6 of the Alpine Contract), a 
trustee shall forthwith be appointed by the Court and the Estate 
shall be liquidated under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, with 
such liquidation to be affected pursuant to a sale or sales at 
public auction to be held no later than September 25, 1984 at such 
place or places as may be appointed by the trustee. If the 
provisions of this Article XVI shall apply and the Estate shall be 
liquidated, then, notwithstanding anything in this Plan to the 
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contrary and any other rights any of the Creditors may have, after 
payment of the trustee's fees and before payment to any other person 
of any other amount, there shall be paid those attorneys' fees for 
Debtor approved by the Court which are in excess of the $30,000 held 
for Debtor's counsel pursuant to Article III. 
DATED: September 7, 1983. 
DEBTOR 
ron B. Child, Jr.) ^ 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, / 
A Professional Corporation, 
attorneys for the festarte ffi. -/ y/ / 
B y / » , - - ^ < l > ^ 
Peter W. Billings, Jr. 
Michael F. Jones 
Denise A. Dragoo 




LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF 
TRAVERSE MOUNTAIN PROPERTY 
Land situate in Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, as follows: 
PARCEL 1; 
The South 1/2 of the Southeast Quarter, and Northeast 
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 7, Salt Lake County, 
Utah, 
PARCEL 2: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 
8, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
PARCEL 3: 
The Southeast Quarter and South 1/2 of the Southwest 
Quarter and the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of 
Section 9, Salt Lake County, Utah.l/ 
PARCEL 4; 
All of Lots 3 and 4 and the West 1/2 of the Southwest 
Quarter of Section 10, located in Salt Lake County, Utah. Except 
those portions released by the terms of the Alpine Contract.2/ 
PARCEL 5: 
All of that portion of Lot 1, and that portion of the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 15, located within Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
Excepting therefrom, that portion of the property 
commencing at a point West 1979 feet from the Northeast Corner of 
1/ This interest constitutes a remainder interest in 
Beck Land, Inc., as Trustee, excepting therefrom that interest 
described in a Deed to Archie J. Griggs and Erma S. Griggs, husband 
and wife as joint tenants, recorded July 10, 1980 in Book 5121, Page 
959, Official Records of Salt Lake County. 
2/ Portions of this parcel have been released by the 
terms of the Alpine Contract. See Parcel 22 under "Released 
Acreage". 
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the Northwest Quarter of Section 15, and running thence South 2630.3 
feet; thence West 1374.6 feet; thence North 2630.3 feet; thence East 
1374.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 6: 
All of that portion of Section 16 located within Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
PARCEL 7: 
All of that portion of Section 17 located within Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
PARCEL 8: 
All of that portion of the North 1/2 of Section 18 located 
within Salt Lake County, Utah. 
PARCEL 9; 
That portion of Lots 3 and 4, Section 10, located within 
Utah County, Utah. Excepting those portions released by the terms 
of the Alpine Contract.J/ 
Excepting therefrom that portion of the property commencing 
at the Northeast Corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10; and 
running South 2640 feet more or less to the South section line of 
Section 10; thence West along the section line 3353.6 feet; thence 
North 2640 feet more or less; thence East 3353.6 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
PARCEL 10: 
All of that portion of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10 
located within Utah County, Utah. Except those portions released by 
the terms of the Alpine Contract.il/ 
—' Title to this parcel appears to have passed to 
Richard F. McKean and Maurine G. McKean, his wife, as joint tenants, 
and then by Sheriff's Deed dated December 21, 1982 to Zion's First 
National Bank. 
1/ Portions of this parcel appear to have passed to 
Richard F. McKean and Maurine G. McKean, his wife, as joint tenants, 
and then by Sheriff's Deed dated December 21, 1982 to Zion's First 
National Bank. Other portions of this parcel are described in 
greater detail under "Released Acreage". 
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Excepting therefrom a 50-foot strip as Deeded to the 
Metropolitan Water District and now owned by The United States of 
America, the center line of which is described as follows: 
Commencing at a point on the South line of Section 10 from 
which point the Northwest corner bears North 5078.2 feet and West 
2667.8 feet; thence North 30o30' West 2829.7 feet to a point , and 
from which point the Northwest corner of Section 10 bears North 2640 
feet and West 1231.6 feet. 
Also excepting therefrom that portion commencing at a point 
South 1320 feet from the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter 
of Section 10, and running thence South 1320 feet, more or less, to 
a point on the South Section line of said Section 10, thence West 
along the section line 3353.6 feet; thence North 1320 feet, more or 
less; thence East 3353.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 11: 
That portion of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter, and the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of 
Section 11 located within Utah County, Utah. 
Also, that portion of the North 1/2 of the North 1/2 of 
Section 11 located within Utah County, Utah. 
Also, that portion of the Southeast Quarter of the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 11 located within Utah County, Utah. 
Also, the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter, the 
South 1/2 of the Southwest Quarter, and the Northeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of Section 11. 
PARCEL 12: 
All of Section 14; excepting therefrom the East 1/2 of the 
Northeast Quarter. 
PARCEL 13: 
All of Section 15, including Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, located 
in Utah County, Utah.!/ 
Excepting therefrom the 50-foot strip Deeded to the 
Metropolitan Water District and now owned by The United States of 
America as described in a Deed recorded January 13, 1950; the 
centerline of which is described as follows: 
1/ Helena Allen appears as record title holder as to 
Lots 3 and 4, Section 15 with Beck Land, Inc., as Trustee to the 
remainder. 
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A strip of land Fifty (50.0) feet wide and included between 
two lines extended to the property lines and everywhere equally 
distant Twenty-five (25.0) feet on each side of that portion of the 
following described center line of the Alpine-Draper Tunnel between 
Station 25+32.6 and Station 71+28.5, measured at right angles 
thereto. Said centerline is more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at Station 25+32.6, a point on the South line of 
the Grantor's porperty in the Southeast Quarter of Section 15, from 
which point the Southeast corner of said Section 15, from which 
point the Southeast corner of said Section 15 bears East 578.8 feet; 
thence North 30°30! West 4595.9 feet to Station 71+28.5, a point on 
the North line of the Grantor's property, from which point the 
Southeast corner of said Section 15 bears South 3968.0 feet and East 
2911.5 feet. 
Also except therefrom that portion described as follows: 
Commencing at the Northeast Corner of the Northwest Quarter 
of Section 15; and running thence South 2630.3 feet; thence West 
3353.6 feet; thence North 2630.3 feet; thence East 3353.6 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 14: 
All of Section 16 located within Utah County, Utah. 
PARCEL 15: 
All of Section 17 located within Utah County, Utah. 
PARCEL 16: 
All of the North 1/2 of Section 18 located within Utah 
County, Utah. 
PARCEL 17: 
All of Section 21; 
Excepting therefrom the following: 
Commencing 3765 feet West from the Southeast Corner of 
Section 21; thence North 1170 feet; thence East 375 feet; thence 
South 1170 feet; thence West 375 feet to the point of commencement. 
Excepting therefrom the following: 
Commencing 3015 feet West and 1170 feet North from the 
Southeast corner of said Section 21; thence North 585 feet; thence 
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West 375 feet; thence South 585 feet; thence East 375 feet to the 
point of commencement. 
PARCEL 18: 
Commencing on the North line of Section 22, 134.64 feet 
West from the Northeast corner of Section 22 and running thence 
South 62°46f West 590.04 feet; thence South 54039l West 810.48 feet; 
thence North 738.54 feet to the North line of Section 22; thence 
East 1185.36 feet along the North line of Section 22 to the point of 
commencement. 
Except therefrom the following: 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the Metropolitan Water 
District and now 'owned by The United States of America as described 
in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
Also, commencing on the North line of Section 22, 1320 feet 
West from the Northeast corner of Section 22 and running thence 
South 738.54 feet; thence South 54°39' West 858.66 feet; thence 
South 66°29,West 211.86 feet; thence South 66029' West 1328.58 feet; 
thence South 73°57f West 899.58 feet; thence South 28o01l West 
205.92 feet; thence South 30°13f West 564.3 feet; thence South 
31°11! West 171.6 feet; thence South 31°47f West 1050.72 feet; 
thence North 3715.14 feet more or less to the North line of Section 
22; thence East along the North line of Section 22, 4000.36 feet to 
the point of commencement. 
PARCEL 19: 
The North 1/2 of the Northeast Quarter of Section 23, 
located in Utah County, Utah. 
PARCEL 20: 
Commencing at the Northeast corner of Section 28; thence 
South 1320 feet; thence South 76°West 2744.94 feet; thence North 
1980 feet; thence East 2640 feet to the point of commencement. 
Also, the Northwest Quarter of Section 28. 
Excepting therefrom the following: 
Commencing at the Northeast corner of Section 28 and 
running thence South 1320 feet; thence South 76° West 1496.50 feet; 
thence North 1682 feet to the North line of said Section; thence 
East 1452 feet to the point of commencement. 
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PARCEL 21: 
The Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter, and the 
Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 29, in Utah 
County, Utah. 
Also, commencing at the Northwest corner of the Southeast 
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 29 and running thence 
East 1320 feet; thence South 572.88 feet; thence North 72o05l West 
316.80 feet; thence North 64°12' West 1094.28 feet; thence South 
O°20' East 647.46 feet; thence South 66°41' East 1069.2 feet; thence 
South 72°051 East 313.5 feet; thence South 151.14 feet; thence West 
1320 feet; thence North 1320 feet to the point of commencement. 
Also, commencing 653.4 feet East and 75.24 feet North from 
the Southwest corner of Section 20 and running thence East 4626.6 
feet; thence South 1417.68 feet; thence West 3901.92 feet; thence 
North 25° West 452.10 feet; thence North 33°45f West 520.08 feet; 
thence North 32°15l West 374.88 feet; thence North 9°15f West 262.68 
feet to the point of commencement. 
Excepting from all the foregoing, all land hereto conveyed 
for purposes of the Alpine-Draper Tunnel, all mineral rights and 
rights of ingress and egress pertaining thereto.il/ 
RELEASED ACREAGE 
The following described parcels appear to have been 
released pursuant to the terms of the Alpine Contract and are no 
longer encumbered by the estate: 
PARCEL 22: 
That portion of the following described property located 
within Lots 3 and 4, and the West 1/2 of the Southwest Quarter of 
Section 10; Salt Lake County: 
Commencing at the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter 
of Section 10; and running thence South 1320 feet; thence West 
3353.6; thence North 1320 feet; thence East 3353.6 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Except therefrom the following: 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT and now owned by THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as described 
£' Easements, mineral rights and encumbrances are more 
particularly described in Preliminary Title Report No. 6031, Empire 
Land Title, Inc., dated June 15, 1982 and supplemented March 1, 1983. 
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in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
(Title to Parcel 22 appears to have passed to Richard F. 
McKean and Maurine G. McKean, his wife, as joint tenants, and then 
by Sheriff's Deed dated December 21, 1982 to Zion's First National 
Bank.) 
PARCEL 23: 
Commencing at a point South 1320 feet from the Northeast 
corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 4 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 
3353.6 feet; thence South 270.7 feet; thence East 3353.6 feet; 
thence North 270.7 feet to the point of beginning. 
Except therefrom the following: 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT and now owned by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as described 
in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
(Record title to Parcel 23 appears to be in Pension 
Property Fund, Ltd.) 
PARCEL 24: 
corner 
Commencing at a point 1590.7 feet South of the Northeast 
me of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 4 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 
3353.6 feet; thence South 198.6 feet; thence East 3353.6 feet; 
thence North 198.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
Except therefrom the following: 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT and now owned by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as described 
in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
(Record title to Parcel 24 appears to be in Pension 
Property Fund, Ltd.) 
PARCEL 25: 
Commencing at a point South 1789.3 feet from the Northeast 
corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 4 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence West 
3353.6 feet; thence South 245.1 feet; thence East 3353.6 feet; 
thence North 245.1 feet to the point of beginning. 
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Except therefrom the following: 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT and now owned by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as described 
in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
(Record title to Parcel 25 appears to be in Pension 
Property Fund, Ltd.) 
PARCEL 26: 
Commencing at a point South 2034.4 feet from the Northeast 
corner of the Southwest one-quarter of Section 10; and running 
thence South 605.6 feet, more or less, to a point on the South 
section line of said Section 10; thence West along the section line 
3353.6 feet; thence North 605.6 feet, more or less; thence East 
3353.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
Except therefrom the following: 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT and now owned by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as described 
in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
(Record title to Parcel 26 appears to be in Pension 
Property Fund, Ltd.) 
PARCEL 27: 
Commencing at a point West 1979 feet from the Northeast 
corner of the Northwest Quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South 
2630.3 feet; thence West 1374.6 feet; thence North 2630.3 feet; 
thence East 1374.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
(Record title to Parcel 27 appears to be in Richard F. 
McKean as to the Southerly 3 feet and Richard A. Christenson, 
Trustee for Cape Trust as to the remainder.) 
PARCEL 28: 
Commencing at a point West 1151 feet from the Northeast 
corner of the Northwest Quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South 
2630.3 feet; thence West 828 feet; thence North 2630.3 feet; thence 
East 828 feet to the point of beginning. 




Commencing at the Northeast corner of the Northwest Quarter 
of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; and running thence South 681.18 feet; thence West 1151 
feet; thence North 681.18 feet; thence East 1151 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Except therefrom the following: 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT and now owned by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as described 
in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
(Record -title appears to be in Pension Property Fund, Ltd.) 
PARCEL 30: 
Commencing at a point South 681.18 feet from the Northeast 
corner of the Northeast Quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South 
1949.12 feet; thence West 1151 feet; thence North 1949.12 feet; 
thence East 1151 feet to the point of beginning. 
Except therefrom the following: 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT and now owned by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as described 
in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
(Record title appears to be in F.& J. Associates.) 
Excepting from all of the foregoing all land heretofore 
conveyed for purposes of the Alpine-Draper Tunnel and all mineral 
rights, and rights of ingress and egress pertaining thereto.2/ 
2/ Easements, mineral rights and encumbrances are more 
particularly described in Preliminary Title Report No. 6031, Empire 




TABLE OF TRAVERSE-MOUNTAIN PROPERTY 
SECURED CREDITORS WITH PRIORITIES 
SECURED CLAIM 
CLASS PRIORITY NAME OF AMOUNT 
NUMBER NUMBER SECURED AS OF 2/25/82 
6 1 Capitol Thrift & Loan/ $1,632,969.29 
Franklin Financial 
7 1 Jay Horrocks 225,000.00 
8 2 Ronald S. Cook, Ray W. 1,125,000.00 
Lamoreaux, Wendell P. 
Hansen 
9 3 Ponderosa Associates 344,054.57 
10 4 Stanford Smith, 162,160.96 
Trustee for Coordinated 
Financial Services and 
Paul Montgomery 
11 5 J. McDonald Brubaker 25,000.00 

















Richard A. Christenson 
Richards Hawks Associates 
P.R.E.P. INSTITUTE OF 
AMERICA, INC. 
Paul and Carol Rubey 
William David Owen, 
Custodian 
Stephen F. Patterson 












20 14 David V. Peters and 200,000.00 
Edward A. White 
21 15 Bentley & Kostopolas 4,556.27 
22 16 W. H. Bintz & Company 3,615.68 
23 17 Jack M. Stevens 25,000.00 
24 18 Franklin Financial 105,237.14 













































































































































1/ The example set forth in this Exhibit D is merely an illustration, 
and contains certain simplifying assumptions as noted. The actual 
computations will vary, and will be in strict accordance with the 
provisions of Article VI(A)(d). 
2/ Figures used herein are based upon Exhibit B to the First Amended 
Plan previously filed by Debtor (and now obsolete), and reflect 
simplifying assumption that the present value of all Secured Claims, 
giving effect to Article VI(A) (d)(i), is exactly equal to the amount 
of the respective Secured Claims as scheduled on said Exhibit B; the 
said assumption will not be the case. 
2/ "Proceeds Balance" as defined in Article VI(A) (that is, proceeds ne 
of payment to Alpine, Ltd. and to Class 1, 2 and 3 Creditors); based 
on assumptions made: 
Total PV = $4,932,559.37 
Integer = 4,932 
Total Denominator = 12,164,778 





(formerly located at Debtor's residence, 3006 Thackeray 
Place, values based on Debtor's best estimate 
of present under-the-hammer value) 
MAIN LEVEL 
Entry Hall: Walnut Commode and Matching Mirror $ 150 
Brass Lamp (broken) 32 
Sitting Room: 2 crak tailback chairs 250 
Sheepskin rug 18 
1 table 56 
1 lamp 18 
1 flower arrangement 10 
3 portraits 125 
Living Room: 2 Sofas 355 
1 large tapestry 1,250 
Piano 2,000 
Sculpture 500 
3 portraits 175 
1 telescope 32 
1 porcelain figure 112 
1 walnut flowerstand 58 
Miscellaneous nick-nacks (silver, 
crystal, etc.) 250 
Dining Room: 2 Antique commodes 150 
Flower arrangement 10 
1 Brass and glass serving table 125 
1 Silver punchbowl set 88 
Lennox Christmas dinner set (china) 75 
Glass punchbowl set 15 
Silverware for 12 
Miscellaneous Serving pieces (imported) 125 
Library: 1 leather tufted couch 375 
1 leather tufted chair with ottoman 88 
1 rocking chair 33 
1 Belgian glass and brass table 200 
2 lamps 125 
1 side table 20 
1 commode with bevelled glass front 75 
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Books: Complete works of 
Shakespeare, Book of-Science 
(10 vol.), Childcraft, Enc. " 
Br ittanica, Enc. Brittanica 
for Children, The American 
Peoples Enc., Colliers Enc., 
Chamber.1 s Enc. , The Outline 
of - Knowledge (18 vol.), 
Jacques Couste.au (20 vol.). 
Additional sets of books & 
individual volumes include 
religious, historical, self 
improvement, biographies, 
philosophical, childrens, 
travels, mysteries, art, etc. 
(most sets out of date) 150 
1 inlaid wood barometer 88 
Miscellaneous artifacts (some imported) 255 
Pictures 75 
Bathroom: 1 painting 28 
1 brass flower arrangement (broken) 10 
Laundry Room: 2 washers 125 
2 dryers 125 
Kitchen: Oak table with 10 chairs 200 
Microwave Oven 125 
Magic Mill Wheat Grinder 32 
Overhead copper pan rack 60 
Copper pots and pans 60 
Clock 19 
Glasses (fine) 125 
Dishes (fine) 125 
Tableclothes (fine) 50 
Pots, pans, dishes, glasses, 15 
Tupperware, Nick-nacks 5 
ATTIC 
Playroom: 9' Sofa 50 
2 tables 30 
2 lamps (broken) 50 
T.V. 100 
1 lamp 10 




Bedroom: King size bed 225 
2 commodes 350 
T.V. 88 
2 French Chairs 125 
Art (sculpture) 25 
Miscellaneous art objects 25 
Bathroom: Sculpture 32 
Pink Bedroom: White Wicker Bed, Chair, Lamp, Loveseat, 113 
Bird Cage 
Custom made bedspread, cushions, 
prillows 75 
Nightstand, desk, 2 commodes, bookcase 250 
Red Bedroom: Trundle bed with matching 3 commodes 
& bookcases (Danish Modern) 500 
Custom made bedspread 75 
Chair 38 
Stereo 75 
2ND LEVEL DOWN 
Yellow 
Bedroom: Queen size brass bed 300 
Custom made bedspread 75 
2 nightstands, vanity table, commode 
with mirror, commode with bookcase 250 
Chair 30 
Stereo 40 
Blue Bedroom: Matching wooden nautical bedroom set 
incl., bed, nightstand, desk with 
bookcase, 200 
Dresser with mirror, dresser with 
bookcase, chair, nautical brass 
assessories 150 
Lamp, decorations, books, typewriter 75 
Green 




Dollhouse with miniature furniture 50 
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Sewing Room: Bernina sewing machine with desk & chair 150 
Hand painted desk 50 
Sewing box (imported) 25 
Pictures (imported) 25 
3RD LEVEL DOWN 
Family Room: 10 sectional piece sofa 400 
Oak and glass and cloth bar set with 5 
chairs with matching shelf case 1,250 
Ping-pong table, pool table, soccer 
game 250 
Game table with 4 chairs 200 
Imported chess set 50 
Telephone stand 50 
6 custom made art works 300 
Exercise Belt Machine 125 
Storage 
Rooms: 1 large freezer 100 
3 beds (old) 100 
Outdoor furniture 100 
2 dressers 50 
2 filing cabinets 60 
African 
Bedroom: Queen size bed with built-in lighting & 
2 matching bookcases with built-in 
lighting; matching dresser and mirror; 
table with 2 chairs; Wicker loveseat 
and fan chair with custom made 
cushions 225 
2 lamps 50 
Life size tiger sculture 75 
T.V. 40 
Office: 2 chairs 30 
1 filing cabinet 50 
Wallhanging 25 
Guest Room: Twin bed 75 
Commode 75 
Table with 4 chairs 125 
Corner cabinet 25 
Lamp 10 
PERSONAL ITEMS 
Costume jewelry 200 
Mink coat (used) 2,000 
Mink jacket (used) 750 
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Tab J 
HARRIET E. STYLER HY\ u^o lS 
Attorney for Trustee 
Valley Tower, Tenth Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 Vft\£U 
Telephone: (801) 532-4236 *** 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
—ooOoo--
In re : In Bankruptcy No. 82C-00475 /^ 
MYRON B. CHILD, JR., : ORDER 
Debtor. 
—00O00--
Upon consideration of the motion filed by Harriet E. 
Styler, trustee herein, for an order approving the sale of 
the real property of the estate, known as Traverse Mountain, 
as more particularly described on Exhibit nA,f attached 
hereto, to Alpine Ltd., free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, 
and interests, and it appearing to the court that Alpine 
Ltd. purchased said property at the auction sale held February 
28, 1985, after notice to creditors and pursuant to an order 
of this court authorizing the trustee to sell said property 
upon the terms set forth in said notice, and no further 
notice being required, and good cause appearing therefor, it 
is hereby 
| n DEFENDANT'S' j EXHIBIT 
IJ 0-50 
ORDERED, that the sale of the real property of the 
estate, known as Traverse Mountain, as more particularly 
described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto, to Alpine Ltd., 
free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, and interests be, 
and the same hereby is, approved. 
DATED this /JP day of March, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 





• ThoOer'r' s ~': * 
ofce r t ' ^ » 
j ^ E r . i - . »r:c '-> - • 
* .?< 




GLEN E. CLARK 
United States Bankruptcy Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, postate fully prepaid, 
t h i s
 ? L day of March, 1985, to: 
Harriet E. Styler 
Attorney at Law 
50 West Broadway, 10th Floor 




LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF 
TRAVERSE MOUNTAIN PROPERTY 
Land situate in Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, as follows: 
PARCEL It 
The South 1/2 of the Southeast Quarter, and Northeast 
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 7, Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
PARCEL 2; 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 
8, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
PARCEL 3: 
l a •! • • ii 
The Southeast Quarter and South 1/2 of the Southwest 
Quarter and the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of 
Section 9, Salt Lake County, Utah.2/ 
PARCFL 4: 
All of Lots 3 and 4 and the West 1/2 of the Southwest 
Quarter of Section 10, located in Salt Lake County, Utah. Except 
those portions released by the terms of the Alpine Contract.2/ 
PARCEL 5: 
All of that portion of Lot 1, and that portion of the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 15, located within Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
Excepting therefrom, that portion of the property 
commencing at a point West 1979 feet from the Northeast Corner of 
1/ This interest constitutes a remainder interest in 
Beck Land, Inc., as Trustee, excepting therefrom that interest 
described in a Deed to Archie J. Griggs and Erma S, Griggs, husband 
and wife as joint tenants, recorded July 10, 1980 in Book 5121, Page 
959, Official Records of Salt Lake County. 
2/ Portions of this parcel have been released by the 
terms of the Alpine Contract. See Parcel 22 under "Released 
Acreage". 
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the Northwest Quarter of Section 15, and running thence South 2630.3 
feet; thence West 1374.6 feet; thence North 2630.3 feet; thence East 
1374,6 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 6; 
All of that portion of Section 16 located within Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
PARCEL 7: 
All of t h a t p o r t i o n of Sec t ion 17 located within Sal t Lake 
County, Utah. 
PARCEL 6: 
All of that portion of the North 1/2 of Section 18 located 
within Salt Lake County, Utah. 
PARCEL 9: 
That portion of Lots 3 and 4, Section 10, located within 
Utah County, Utah. Excepting those portions released by the terms 
of the Alpine Contract.—' 
Excepting therefrorr that portion of the property commencing 
at the Northeast Corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10; and 
running South 2640 feet more or less to the South section line of 
Section 10; thence West along the section line 3353.6 feet; thence 
North 2640 feet more or less; thence East 3353.6 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
PARCEL 10: 
All of that portion of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10 
located within Utah County, Utah. Except those portions released by 
the terms of the Alpine Contract.!/ 
2' Title to this parcel appears to have passed to 
Richard F. McKean and Maurine G. McKean, his wife, as joint tenants, 
and then by Sheriff1! Deed dated December 21, 1982 to Zion1! Firit 
National Bank. 
1/ Portions of thi6 parcel appear to have passed to 
Richard F. McKean and Maurine G. McKean, his wife, as joint tenants, 
and then by Sheriff's Deed dated December 21, 1982 to Zion's First 
National Bank. Other portions of this parcel are described in 
greater detail under "Released Acreage". 
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Excepting therefrom a 50-foot strip as Deeded to the 
Metropolitan Water District and now owned by The United States of 
America, the center line of which is described as follows: 
Commencing at a point on the South line of Section 10 from 
which point the Northwest corner bears North 5078.2 feet and West 
2667.8 feet; thence North SQ^O 1 West 2829.7 feet to a point , and 
from which point the Northwest corner of Section 10 bears North 2640 
feet and West 1231.6 feet. 
Also excepting therefrom that portion commencing at a point 
South 1320 feet from the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter 
of Section 10, and running thence South 1320 feet, more or less, to 
a point on the South Section line of said Section 10, thence West 
along the section line 3353.6 feet; thence North 1320 feet, more or 
less; thence East 3353.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL lit 
That portion of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter, and the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of 
Section 11 located within Utah County, Utah. 
Also, that portion of the North 1/2 of the North 1/2 of 
Section 11 located within Utah County, Utah. 
Also, that portion of the Southeast Quarter of the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 11 located within Utah County, Utah. 
Also, the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter, the 
South 1/2 of the Southwest Quarter, and the Northeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of Section 11. 
PARCEL 12: 
All of Section 14; excepting therefrom the East 1/2 of the 
Northeast Quarter. 
PARCEL 13; 
All of Section IS, including Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, located 
in Utah County, Utah.!/ 
Excepting therefrom the 50-foot strip Deeded to the 
Metropolitan Water District and now owned by The United States of 
America as described in a Deed recorded January 13, 1950; the 
centerline of which is described as follows: 
£/ Helena Allen appears as record title holder as to 
Lots 3 and 4, Section 15 with Beck Land, Inc., as Trustee to the 
remainder . 
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A strip of land Fifty (50.0) feet wide and included between 
two lines extended to the property lines and everywhere equally 
distant Twenty-five (25.0) feet on each side of that portion of the 
following described centerline of the Alpine-Draper Tunnel between 
Station 25+32.6 and Station 71428.5, measured at right angles 
thereto. Said centerline is more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at Station 25+32.6, a point on the South line of 
the Grantor's porperty in the Southeast Quarter of Section 15, from 
which point the Southeast corner of said Section 15r from which 
point the Southeast corner of said Section 15 bears East 578.8 feet; 
thence North 30°30! West 4595.9 feet to Station 71+28.5, a point on 
the North line of the Grantor's property, from which point the 
Southeast corner of said Section 15 bears South 3968.0 feet and East 
2911.5 feet. 
Also except therefrom that portion described as follows: 
Commencing at the Northeast Corner of the Northwest Quarter 
of Section 15j and running thence South 2630.3 feet; thtnce West 
3353.6 feet; thence North 2630.3 feet; thence East 3353.6 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 14: 
All of Section 16 located within Utah County, Utah. 
PAPCEL 15: 
All of Section 17 located within Utah County, Utah. 
PAPCEL 16: 
A l l of the Nor th 1/2 of S e c t i o n 18 l o c a t e d w i t h i n Utah 
C o u n t y , U t a h . 
PARCEL 1 7 : 
All of Section 21; 
Excepting therefrom the following: 
Commencing 3765 feet West from the Southeast- Corner of 
Section 21; thence North 1170 feet; thence East 375 feet; thence 
South 1170 feet; thence West 375 feet to the point of commencement. 
Excepting therefrom the following: 
Commencing 3015 feet West and 1170 feet North from the 
Southeast corner of said Section 21; thence North 585 feet; thence 
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West 375 feet; thence South 585 feet; thence East 375 feet to the 
point of commencement. 
PARCEL 18; 
Commencing on the North line of Section 22, 134.64 feet 
West from the Northeast corner of Section 22 and running thence 
South 62°46' West 590.04 feet; thence South 54039f West 810.48 feet; 
thence North 738.54 feet to the North line of Section 22; thence 
East 1185.36 
commencement. 
Except therefrom the following 
thence North 7J«.:>4 reet to the North line of Section ii\ tnence 
East 1185.36 feet along the North line of Section 22 to the point of 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the Metropolitan Water 
District and now 'owned by The United States of America as described 
in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
Also, commencing on the North line of Section 22, 1320 feet 
West from the Northeast corner of Section 22 and running thence 
South 738.54 feet; thence South 54°39* West 858.66 feet; thence 
South 66°29,West 211.86 feet; thence South 66°29' West 1328.58 feet; 
thence South 73°57l West 899.58 feet; thence South 28o01, West 
205.92 feet; thence South 30°13l West 564.3 feet; thence South 
S^li1 West 171.6 feet; thence South 31047' West 1050.72 feet; 
thence North 3715.14 feet more or less to the North line of Section 
22; thence East along the North line of Section 22, 4000.36 feet to 
the point of commencement. 
PARCEL 19: 
The North 1/2 of the Northeast Quarter of Section 23, 
located in Utah County, Utah. 
PARCEL 20: 
Commencing at the Northeast corner of Section 28; thence 
South 1320 feet; thence South 76°West 2744.94 feet; thence North 
1980 feet; thence East 2640 feet to the point of commencement. 
Also, the Northwest Quarter of Section 28. 
Excepting therefrom the following: 
Commencing at the Northeast corner of Section 28 and 
running thence South 1320 feet; thence South 76° West 1496.50 feet; 
thence North 1682 feet to the North line of said Section; thence 
East 1452 feet to the point of commencement. 
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PARCEL 21: 
The Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter, and the 
Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 29, in Utah 
County, Utah, 
Also, commencing at the Northwest corner of the Southeast 
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 29 and running thence 
East 1320 feet; thence South 572.88 feet? thence North 72°05l West 
316.80 feet; thence North 64°12f West 1094.28 feet; thence South 
Oo20' East 647,46 feet; thence South 66041l East 1069.2 feet; thence 
South 72°05f East 313.5 feet; thence South 151.14 feet; thence West 
1320 feet; thence North 1320 feet to the point of commencement. 
Also, commencing 653.4 feet East and 75.24 feet North from 
the Southwest corner of Section 20 and running thence East 4626.6 
feet; thence South 1417.68 feet; thence West 3901.92 feet; thence 
North 25° West 452.10 feet; thence North 33°45' West 520.08 feet; 
thence North 32°15' West 374.88 feet; thence North 9°15l West 262.68 
feet to the point of commencement. 
Excepting from all the foregoing, all land hereto conveyed 
for purposes of the Alpine-Draper Tunnel, all mineral rights and 
rights of ingress and egress pertaining thereto.£/ 
RELEASED ACREAGE 
The following described parcels appear to have been 
released pursuant to the terms of the Alpine Contract and are no 
longer encumbered by the estate: 
PARCEL 22: 
That portion of the following described property located 
within Lots 3 and 4, and the West 1/2 of the Southwest Quarter of 
Section 10; Salt Lake County: 
Commencing at the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter 
of Section 10; and running thence South 1320 feet; thence West 
3353.6; thence North 1320 feet; thence East 3353.6 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Except therefrom the following: 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT and now owned by THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as described 
k' Easements, mineral rights and encumbrances are more 
particularly described in Preliminary Title Report No. 6031, Empire 
Land Title, Inc., dated June 15, 1982 and supplemented March lf 1983 
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in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
(Title to Parcel 22 appears to have passed to Richard P. 
McKean and Maurine G. McKean, his wife, as joint tenants, and then 
by Sheriff's Deed dated December 21, 19B2 to Zion'a First National 
Bank,) 
PARCEL 23; 
Commencing at a point South 1320 feet from the Northeast 
corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 4 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 
3353.6 feet; thence South 270.7 feet; thence East 3353.6 feet; 
thence North 270.7 feet to the point of beginning. 
Except therefrom the following: 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT and now owned by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as described 
in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
(Record title to Parcel 23 appears to be in Pension 
Property Fund, Ltd.) 
PARCEL 24: 
Commencing at a point 1590.7 feet South of the Northeast 
corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 4 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 
3353.6 feet; thence South 198.6 feet; thence East 3353.6 feet; 
thence North 198.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
Except therefrom the following: 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT and now owned by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as described 
in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
(Record title to Parcel 24 appears to be in Pension 
Property Fund, Ltd.) 
PARCEL ,2 5: 
Commencing at a point South 1789.3 feet from the Northeast 
corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 4 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence West 
3353.6 feet; thence South 245.1 feet; thence East 3353.6 feet; 
thence North 245.1 feet to the point of beginning. 
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Except therefrom the following: 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT and now owned by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as described 
in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
(Record title to Parcel 25 appears to be in Pension 
Property Fund, Ltd.) 
PARCEL 26: 
Commencing at a point South 2034.4 feet from the Northeast 
corner of the Southwest one-quarter of Section 10; and running 
thence South 605.6 feet, more or less, to a point on the South 
section line of s*aid Section 10; thence West along the section line 
3353.6 feet; thence North 605.6 feet, more or less; thence East 
3353.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
Except therefrom the following: 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT and now owned by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as described 
in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
(Record title to Parcel 26 appears to be in Pension 
Property Fund, Ltd.) 
PARCEL 27: 
Commencing at a point West 1979 feet from the Northeast 
corner of the Northwest Quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South 
2630.3 feet; thence West 1374.6 feet; thence North 2630.3 feet; 
thence East 1374.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
(Record title to Parcel 27 appears to be in Richard F. 
McKean as to the Southerly 3 feet and Richard A. Christenson, 
Trustee for Cape Trust as to the remainder.) 
PARCEL 28: 
Commencing at a point West 1151 feet from the Northeast 
corner of the Northwest Quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridiani and running thence South 
2630.3 feet; thence West 628 feet; thence North 2630.3 feet; thence 
East 828 feet to the point of beginning. 




Commencing at the Northeast corner of the Northwest Quarter 
of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; and running thence South 681.18 feet; thence West 1151 
feet; thence North 681.18 feet; thence East 1151 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Except therefrom the following: 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT and now owned by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as described 
in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
(Record title appears to be in Pension Property Fund, Ltd.) 
PARCEL 30: 
Commencing at a point South 681.18 feet from the Northeast 
corner of the Northeast Quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence South 
1949.12 feet; thence West 1151 feet; thence North 1949.12 feet; 
thence East 1151 feet to the point of beginning. 
Except therefrom the following: 
A 50-foot strip as Deeded to the METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT and now owned by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as described 
in an instrument recorded January 13, 1950, in book 545, page 131, 
Official Records of Utah County. 
(Record title appears to be in F.k J. Associates.) 
Excepting from all of the foregoing all land heretofore 
conveyed for purposes of the Alpine-Draper Tunnel and all mineral 
rights, and rights of ingress and egress pertaining thereto.2/ 
2' Easements, mineral rights and encumbrances are more 
particularly described in Preliminary Title Report No. 6031, Empire 




This AGREEMENT made and entered into this \1-TH day of June, 
1985, by and between Ronald S. Cook, Myron B. Child, Jr., Ray W. 
Lamoreaux, Wendell P. Hansen and New Empire Development Co. 
together hereinafter referred to as ASSIGNOR; and Richard F. 
McKean hereinafter referred to as ASSIGNEE. 
WITNESSETH AS FOLLOWS: 
WHEREAS, on or about the 7th day of June, 1979, the ASSIGNEE 
entered into a written contract designated as an Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit 1, and made a part hereof by reference hereby ASSIGNOR 
agreed to sell the Traverse Mountain Property to ASSIGNEE; and to 
release to ASSIGNEE the amount of 800 acres free and clear at the 
date of closing, and 
WHEREAS, ASSIGNEE was not able to obtain the release of 800 
acres free and clear, the closing could not take place on the 
agreed date of June 22, 1979; and 
WHEREAS, on June 22, 1979, the sale could not be closed 
because ASSIGNOR could not provide a free and clear release of 
800 acres, therefore ASSIGNEE could not complete the financing 
for sale of the property; and 
WHEREAS, the parties agreed that in order to preserve the *j> ^ 
ASSIGNOR'S underlying contract with Alpine Ltd.*, that the P*** y?j 
ASSIGNEE would pay $330,000.00 to Alpine Ltd.*, as a payment on fct^L ^ 
the contract with ASSIGNORS and that said payment by ASSIGNEE ~~ 
would entitle ASSIGNEE to receive from Alpine Ltd?, the property 
which was to be released by Alpine Ltd. upon payment of the 
annual payment of $330,000.00 as required by paragraph 2.fcB of 
the contract between ASSIGNOR and Alpine Ltd. 
Nowtherefore, 
IN CONSIDERATION of the payment by ASSIGNEE of the sum of fij^ & 
$330,000.00 on June 25, 1979, to Alpine Ltd?, and other ?w ^ 
considerations the undersigned hereby covenant and agree as ^v\ ^ ^ 
follows: Iffife 
1. ASSIGNOR acknowledges that pursuant to it's contract with /MI AU 
Alpine Ltd., the annual payment on the Traverse Mountain yj^ u ^ 
property owed to Alpine Ltdt on May 25, 1979, was paid in full by -f^ j(, 7n 
ASSIGNEE on June 25, 1979. jffi}/ 
2. That in consideration of said payment by ASSIGNEE/ ASSIGNOR h]J^ A 
agreed to assign and release to ASSIGNEE all right, title and A - / 
interest in and to the property required to be released to -^* 2 
ASSIGNOR by Alpine Ltd., pursuant to the contract between 
ASSIGNOR and Alpine Ltd.* dated TOKJF \ 1^7^ # a copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit 2 and made a part hereof. 
>/ 
* Should also read "or MICHEAL W. McBRIDE" /)J/ A>£ V 
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3. That in consideration of said payment by ASSIGNEE/ of the 
$330/000.00 to Alpine Ltd? on June 25/ 1979/ the undersigned 
hereby assign to ASSIGNEE/ all right/ title and interest in and 
to the property required to by so released as a result of said 
payment as to any refund/ damages or payments which may be due 
and owing as a result of the failure and refusal of Alpine Ltd? 
to release said property or refund said payment. 
4. The undersigned hereby authorizes ASSIGNEE to take any such 
action on behalf of ASSIGNOR in it's name or in the name of 
ASSIGNEE/ to obtain said release of property of value of 66 2/3% 
of the payment made or refund of payment or damages incurred as a 
result of the failure to release said property. 
This ASSIGNMENT shall be binding on the undersigned/ their 
heirs and assigns. 
Dated J u n e 1 2' 1 9 85 
•a 
'^L-J&l S. Ccns. xSh*U^ iti 
RONALD S. COOK 
W. LAMOREAUX 
WENDELL P. HANSEN 
MYTRON CB£ CHILD, JF^ 
New Empire Development Co./ a corporation 
By: 
& 'A Accepted By: 
1985. 
RICHARD F. MCKEAN1 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to before me this /jg j/j day of June, 
My Commission 
* Should also re 
€£fa£4*lA—' 
NOTARY PUBLIC, residing in 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
W. McBRIDE" Mh rfj; 
'fof 7TK. 
in\. 
